The US is militarized because it is a global class-contested territory

There are four outlier countries in the affluent world, each characterized by an extremely high percentage of the working-class population employed in guarding property from the rest of the working-class population: Greece, the US, the UK, and Spain. Depending on how you count it, 1 out of 4 (or 5) of every US workers is guarding property from other workers. That proportion increased over fourfold in the US between the late 19th century and today. By contrast, there is only 1 guard for every 20 workers in Sweden.

Brought together, empirical analyses by Bowles and Jayadev (2007), and Gourevitch (2015)  reviewing Brecher (2014) and Mitrani (2013), identify correlates of the guard labour market & militarized police state: 1) socio-economic inequality; and 2) a strong history of class contention. Bowles & Jayadev caution that though these factors, and not others, correlate with the policed society, by themselves they cannot explain the extent of guarding and policing in a society, because in the US, guarding continued to rise as a proportion of employment even in the exceptional, lower-inequality Trente Glorieuses period following WWII and prior to 1975. However, as Gourevitch will clarify, even during the short period of reduced aggregate socio-economic inequality in the US, quiescence was even briefer, as the Civil Rights Movement was organizing during that period.

Although the state is designed to protect large domestic (and some global) capitalists from expropriation, only white male smallholders enjoyed new state protection from expropriation during the short Trente Glorieuses (Fraser 2017), spurring other social groups to organize to expand those protections and state accountability to the entire working class, including African-Americans and other racialized groups, women, and indigenous peoples in the US. This organization was met by US police forces and militaries as warfare, and it was met by politicians with carceral expansion (Murakawa 2014), contributing to continued guarding and policing expansion. Moreover, as we see below, in 1947 the US cemented in an extraordinary legal regime for hobbling working-class people in the US. While there are surely automatic structural mechanisms, both macro and meso-institutional, favoring capital and hobbling working-class people in capitalism, the briefness of the Trente Glorieuses is well explained by the extraordinary level of capitalist organizing to restrain and divest the American working class of collective action capacity, including by diverting work into guarding and militarized policing as well as via legal mechanisms. On both sides of the pond, of course, deregulation of finance, beginning in the City of London in the mid-1950s, permitted the reorientation of US capital from national to global class alignment, and permitted the dismantling of working class-accountable institutions within the US state–converting US state capacity to protect workers from expropriation into military, militarized policing, and guarding property: exclusively protecting global capital from expropriation.

If we explain the rise of the policed society by returning to the question of Why Greece, the US, the UK, and Spain (with NZ, Australia, and Belgium in hot pursuit)?  it becomes reasonable to suggest that in the late capitalist era, these places may be distinguished as the most desirable combined markets and territories from both a capitalist and labour perspective. These are the contested territories of capitalism. The US and UK contain the globe’s leading financial institutions, all of the top four policed societies feature brash traditions of conservativism and antihuman repression targeting the working class, and Greece, the US, and Spain contain some of the globe’s most liveable territory, from a human perspective, combined with at least moderately-developed economies and institutions. I hypothesize that what distinguishes surveilled, militarized, policed societies is an ongoing history of class warfare over primo global territory. This explanation has the virtue of also explaining the observed correlates of socio-economic inequality and bursts of civil warfare. Greece, the US, the UK, and Spain are barely nations. Riddled by class and regional internal divisions, they are nations in the sense that they are cemented together by heavy resource expenditure on force and nationalism.

We can return to the issue of increasing guard labour in the US during the Trente Glorieuses with the explanation that, despite the cross-class consensual drive to continue the economic expansion initiated with high state-capital coordination during the war, the class conflict over the territory was not closed, and the domestic police force was being built out of the imperial military post-war in order for global capital to resume control of the territory by 1980. This hypothesis is confirmed by the 1947 passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, and its perpetual institutional maintenance, preserving the absolute rejection of workers’ human rights in favor of limitless, global capitalist liberty in the US.

Because it’s capitalism, the global capitalist class has secured the hierarchical social order and regulated collective behaviour in the heavily-policed societies. Interesting follow-up project: A working-class Moneyball TM analyst would recommend the (relatively-neglected) best places for labour to migrate to based on attractive features without the Policed Four’s military level of surveillance, co-optation, and repression.

Though, a Geographic Economist I once knew said that capital follows labour. Could the working class even abandon the US, UK, Greece, and Spain in significant numbers? Or are compensating factors, and the complicating factors of migration, so overwhelmingly on the side of these four lands that the class conflict and militarization of society cannot help but lurch on?

Certainly the Anglophone model provides a steam valve in its repressive framework. It directs social subsidy to capital, incentivizing a large portion of the American working class to migrate into and through precarious small-business ownership (Nail salons!) as an alternative to suffering the obscene state-reinforced class dehumanization and unfreedoms.

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In Lawrence 2014, pp. 205-206 are particularly succinct and poignant summaries of the stand-out manacled life of the American working class. The legal mechanisms for shackling the American working class include the following:

  1. Following its codification by US Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes in the 1937 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (affirming the Wagner Act), American law denies “the fact that the coercion and intimidation inherent in a threat of discharge (firing) are intrinsic to virtually all employment contexts” in capitalism (Lawrence 205). US law refuses to recognize and regulate capitalist powers, including capital strike.
  2. Preserving absolute private property right, Taft-Hartley section 2(5) prohibits workers from bargaining (contributing information or decision-making to) many issues affecting their work, the business, the community, and the socio-economy: layoffs, plant closings, production decisions, investment decisions, product pricing, etc.
  3. Enforcing “Right to Work” TM laws, Taft-Hartley section 7 enables vulnerable workers to forfeit to state-protected, politically-mobilized, wealthier employers the workers’ own, human collective action capacity.
  4. Taft-Hartley section 8(b) prohibits the following repertoire of worker solidarity and collective action: sympathy strikes, solidarity strikes, support strikes, industry-level agreements or cross-class planning (in an industry, or in an industrial council).
  5. Taft-Hartley section 303 illegalizes sympathetic boycotts.
  6. Taft-Hartley section 301 enables employers to use their superior economic resources to sue and break labor organizations via US federal court. This includes, when an employer repeatedly violates an employment contract, and if the union responds with a strike, the US courts enable the employer to sue and financially cripple the labour organization; and if a wildcat strike breaks out, the US courts enable the employer to sue and financially cripple the workers’ labor organization.
  7. Taft-Hartley section 14(a) provides a grotesquely-expansive definition of the workers who are not allowed to unionize, whom employers can force to serve as scabs: Any worker whose work includes any sort of “coordination” or “guidance” to other workers.
  8. On behalf of absolute private property right, Adair 1908 established in the US the unilateral managerial right to fire any worker “at will.”
  9. On behalf of absolute private property right, Mackay 1938 established in the US the unilateral managerial right to replace workers with scabs.
  10. US law denies working-class peoples’ rights as human rights (Lawrence 2014: 204). The 2000 Human Rights Watch report highlighted how US labor law violates fundamental human rights.
  11. In labor law, the US stands out as preserving property owner (employer) absolute liberty, based on servitude, per American slaver John C. Calhoun’s and others’ influential formulation.
  12. That is why the US Supreme Court features so many jurists educated in the ancient conservative Catholic legal tradition, developed to support warlords’ feudal privileges.
  13. This extreme anti-worker legal framework, treating working-class people as second-class citizens (or third-class in the case of slaves, prisoner-slaves, immigrants, and immigrant prisoners and prisoner-slaves), is unique in the world for its dogged enforcement and lack of modification over the years (Lawrence 2014: 199). It is also probably why investment capital flooded into the US when Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard in 1971, and why global capital is attracted to the US. The US has committed to sacrifice its own people’s freedom and suppress their human development, in order to most faithfully service domestic and global elites.

 

References

Abraham, David.

Bowles and Jayadev (2007)

Brecher (2014)

Fraser, Nancy. 2017. “From Exploitation to Expropriation: Historic Geographies of Racialized Capitalism: Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography.” Economic Geography 94(1): 1-17.

Gourevitch, Alex. 2015. “Police Work: The Centrality of Labour Repression in American Political History.” Perspectives on Politics 13(3): 762-773.

Klare, Karl E. 1977-78. “Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41.” Minnesota Law Review 61: 265-339.

Lawrence, Andrew G. 2014 Employer and Worker Collective Action: A Comparative Study of Germany, South Africa, and the United States. Cambridge.

Lambert, Josiah Bartlett. 2005. If the Workers Took a Notion. ILR Press (Cornell University).

Mitrani (2013)

Mittelstadt, Jennifer. 2015. The Rise of the Military Welfare State. Harvard.

Murakawa, Naomi. 2014. The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America. Oxford.

Orren, Karen. 1991. Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United States. Cambridge.

Pistor, Katharina. 2019. The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality. Princeton.

Reply to Reader:

Thanks to the contribution of the reader with an institutionalist meso-level hypothesis on how the US (ignoring the other countries discussed above) produces extreme guarding (not including policing) of the American population. Meso-level, institutional facts, such as high levels of litigation or insurance requirements in the US, suggest a couple of the possible mechanisms for how the US arrives at extreme policing and guarding, and nest under and support the above socio-geographic explanatory (why) framework. Logical modesty begs a distinction between identifying mechanisms and inferring causality. (Causal explanation would have to be able to address the factors the explanatory frameworks address: Why have the mechanisms changed in the top four policed & guarded countries? Why aren’t they as important factors in some other countries? Are they as important in Spain, Greece, and the UK?)

The hazard of accepting a couple of institutional mechanisms as a fulsome explanatory framework (accepting how for why) is that if you intervene to suppress these identified mechanisms without considering the underlying cause, you’re just playing whack-a-mole. Whack-a-mole may be profitable for lawyers, and it may occupy political wonks and unfree bureaucrats while more powerful collectives make the decisions, but we pursue social scientific knowledge to improve collective agential contribution to change. They’re two types of knowledge with different functions, built for different types of societies: technocratic v. democratic.

Alternative to using technocratic knowledge to preoccupy the staff, a scientific research contribution for an institutional, meso-level analyst would be to run a regression testing those (litigation rate, volume of insurance requirements for guard protection) and other theorized mechanisms proliferating guard labour (such as extent of military welfare/keynesianism (Mittlestadt 2015), carceral growth rate, etc). If a researcher were able to do that (using rate of change data) across countries, that would be particularly helpful towards mapping out the mechanisms by which policed societies are built. Again, that’s not explanation. It’s not philosophy, and it’s not science. But it would contribute  toward science, a collective knowledge, and thus, unlike technocratic knowledge, would not foreclose against democratic development at the outset.

My thesis presented above is distinctively designed to explain not only Bowles & Jayadev’s comparative findings (About guarded and policed societies, inclusive of, but not just lost in the blare and glare of the US. Because they are comparative, they can support more disciplined, valid hypotheses.), but also the work of political historians (also comparative data, across time). As Gourevitch points out in his review of Mitrani & Brecher’s historical work, we can observe the connection between, on the one hand, the historical, high levels of impactful working class (and Civil Rights Movement) organization and the subsequent growth and militarization of policing in the US, solidified into the extremity and comparative absoluteness of working-class repression in the US, see also the notes on US labour law below (per Lawrence 2014), and changes in citizenship law & administration (See legal theorist David Abraham) since 1970. The macro-level explanatory thesis presented here is designed to explain both the political history of militarized policing and labour law & administration in the US, and Bowles and Jayadev’s comparative studies of guarding, as it is reasonable to explain the coincidence of quantitatively-extreme guarding with quantitatively- and qualitatively-extreme policing, though they may have different arrays of mechanisms of implementation, particularly as we have observed change over time and variation across countries in guarding and policing. (Particularly given policing is a state function, insurance or legal “markets” is not a response that can provide much insight or explanatory power.)

Explanatory power: The contribution of the macro-level explanatory thesis, here highlighting the relationship between human preferences in geography, climate, and institutional development–particularly state capacity to protect groups from expropriation, (as well as aversion to dislocation and loss of financial, cultural, and social capital), is that it supports and guides a number of reasonable, useful consequent hypotheses concerning the ongoing development of social conflicts, policing, militarization, surveillance technology, domestic and international politics, racial formation, gender relations, and migration, within the US and similar policed societies (Greece, Spain, the UK).

For example, some of these consequences even impact lawyers. Consider a consequent hypothesis about the spectacular growth of disciplinary student debt amongst lawyers. A fair question that people have asked is: Why do American lawyers put up with that expropriation? Here I suggest: Because despite the fact that debt, expropriation, is a major cost to many lawyers, the US still presents globally-comparative benefits along with the constraint of illiquid smallholder assets: climate, geography, and state protection from even more expropriation. (As well, in the highly-policed society, the voice of the policed is replaced with the sovereign’s voice (See Scarry 1985).) There’s no effective voice for democratic change, and as yet there is no substantial defection. So the expropriation– in this case, law school debt– stays.

I also suggest that even taking into account the aversive conditions that exiting the US would impose within the human lifespan (and which Americans, observing, exploiting, and violating immigrants, are very familiar), this individual cost-benefit rationality is not in equilibrium: The structural and political tendency has been and continues to be toward increasing expropriation. Most people must submit. For now, even lawyers are impotent to protect themselves.

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Canadian Sexism

Premises

  1. Premise: All societies are sexist in different ways.
  2. Premise: Canada is a highly-urban, extractivist arm of the British Empire, and in addition to its English and French population, the English of which maintains an ongoing, fairly creepy (unreflective), idealist, rivalristic, anti-American nationalist discursive project, its settler population largely consists of the merchant class diaspora of war-torn and industrializing countries. The indigenous population has been highly influenced by this culture as well as missionary Christianity. In aggregate, this sociological foundation influences the Canadian brand of sexism.
  3. Premise: Sexism is carried out by both women and men, though they have distinctive roles in its functioning.

Canadian sexism

  1. Work networking occurs through male collective association contexts.
  2. Females have traditionally served as social reproducers, including managing and conducting a large sector of unpaid imperial social-service carework volunteerism.
    1. The Canadian government protects a healthy number of holidays, assisting social reproduction.
    2. However, today most socio-biological reproductive work also has to be subsidized by other populations, including both immigrants, and intergenerational labour (by grandparents), as the structure of costs v. socially-average wages in Canada is based on working-age (age 20-68) households with two adults in paid employment.
  3. Liberal Canadian feminist identity valorizes a mytho-poetic “Strong Woman” construction, which means a woman who avails herself of some part of the repertoire of rights and obligations proper to bourgeois females, or mature (desexualized/queered) females under state-protected security, including moving about freely in public spaces, particularly while volunteering, in paid employment, and consuming; novel reading and aesthetic appreciation; household, neighbourhood, or poverty management/reproduction; and gender-segregated communicative freedom and freedom of same-sex micro-assembly.
    1. Under this liberal model, and perhaps due to its high level of urbanization, the “modern” Canadian femininity variant consists of  adopting the habitus of flamboyantly gay male culture, permitting practitioners commercially-compliant, aesthetic and cultural appreciation/critique, in addition to more typically-feminized carework and human-relations management.
  4. In Canada, the sexual availability signal is simple, one-on-one cross-gender fraternization. There is no secondary tier of sexual availability signalling beyond such fraternization, for example an additional verbal negotiation and agreement. It is always assumed that one-on-one cross-gender socialization and networking is primarily for the purpose of sexual intercourse. So, women and men generally cannot and do not socialize as friends or work together in a dyad in Canada. A desegregated “friendship” or desegregated working dyad in Canada would require submission to or perpetual negotiation of the baseline Canadian open sexual access expectation.
    1. It is unclear to me at this stage how people of the same gender signal sexual availability to each other, given the heavy reliance in Canada on same-gender socialization to police the sexual-access boundary.
      1. However, it could be an aspect of Canadian sexism that, for example, same-gender sexual solicitation (or boundary assertion excluding sexualization) is accomplished through an additional tier of egalitarian verbal communication that is not available across unequal genders.
      2. It seems also clear that Canadians rely on group socialization and work environments to permit non-sexualized, gender-desegregated interactions. Through group or chaperoned interaction, Canadians avoid signalling the sexual availability they assume to be an inherent property of cross-gender one-on-one interaction in that society.
    2. A norm is a norm. If the prohibition on non-sexualized cross-gender fraternization is not observed (For example, in the case of a cross-gender social or work interaction between two people.), but the female privately and/or publicly objects to the Canadian sexualized-relationship norm itself (in the case where she comes from another culture where women and men are able to engage in non-sexualized social or working relations without chaperones), her objections to the norm are categorically disregarded by Canadians, and she is simply considered a norm violator; to Canadians her objection to the sexist norm is indistinguishable from deviance.
      1. Her only alternative to silently submitting to the Canadian sexualized relationship norm in one-on-one cross-gender interactions is to levy a sexual-harassment charge upon the individual man (“friend”/colleague), requiring the female to defect from her social/professional relationships, and put her own social and/or professional capital on the line.
        1. This legalistic, antisocial, and personally-damaging line of “remedy” is enforced by the community, including women, as the only way to intervene on the norm. They will not allow the social norm to be publicly reconsidered. This approach is in accord with highly-delimited and institutional liberal conceptions of social change, as well as the general devaluation of women’s work.
        2. In Canada, it is imagined that only through such individual “Strong Woman” acts of self-sacrifice, or strict adherence to group/chaperoned unsegregated social interaction, can men’s natural, free sexual being be contained for and within the collective good.
        3. With this Canadian-sexism consequence tree, this incentive structure, the community maintains the cross-gender relationship sexualization norm.
        4. This collective norm maintenance is likely reinforced by its benefit to reliable, predictable, calculable social reproduction, undergirding and stabilizing the market.
  5. As in many other jurisdictions, attachment to a lineage of male protection secures women (a lower quality of) social credit and social cooperation in Canada.
    1. In the patriarchal protection racket, a husband is no substitute for a father. Effectively dispensing with the protection of a father, like divorce or death, an exercise of patrilocality strips women of individual identity and much social credit and cooperation.
    2. While patriarchal networks can provide reduced-quality economic cooperation to women attached by marriage to the network–as a way of directing additional resources to the patrilineage, attached females do not cooperate substantively down or across the patriarchy (as is typical in patriarchies, where new-female blood is expected to relieve senior females of the patriarchy’s highly-dehumanized, super-exploited roles).
      1. The only possibility for women seeking to acquire social cooperation in Canada is through building exclusively-female networks outside the patriarchal networks.
      2. In patrilocality, offspring are culturally regarded as property of the patrilineage. The possibility that the liberal Canadian state could support the outsider mother’s claim on the offspring, and potentially, her removal of the offspring, is constructed as a permanent, existential patriarchal community threat. Thus a female relocated to a Canadian patrilocality is collectively, primarily perceived within the patrilocality social network as a latent existential threat if she produces an offspring, particularly a male.
        1. Although natural to the patriarchal culture, this is an extremely creepy and alienating cultural phenomenon, from the relocated female perspective. She must countenance not only suspicion and barely-suppressed hostility in social interactions across the patrilocality, but also endless assertions of primary patriarchal ownership of the offspring, and heavy, instrumentalist (with an eye toward state appeal) documentation of the patrilineal relationships. While it may incentivize some degree of placating behaviour, patrilineage-securitization also produces alienation between the introduced female and the patriarchy network (both male and female), and depletes trust, credit, cooperation, and recognition.
        2. Patrilineage-securitization in a patrilocality can stress the marriage partnership, as that relationship requires copious, substantial trust; and much emotional work is demanded within the marriage to prevent that ambient paranoid securitization from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
    3. Recognizable, performative butch-lesbian professional identity is respected in liberal Canada as an alternative path to economic cooperation, as long as it is associated with management initiatives exploiting and/or expropriating working women.

 

Hypothesis: Little influenced by democratic republicanism, but commercially-compliant, Canadian sexism is a liberal-Anglo ideal type.

Social Reproduction Feminism on Worker Citizenship and Expropriation

“Once separated from the means of production and proletarianized, they are protected, at least in theory, from further expropriation.”–Nancy Fraser . 2018. “Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography–From Exploitation to Expropriation: Historic Geographies of Racialized Capitalism.”

In theory, but, yeah, no. Absolutely not. Exactly like masculinity, the Premium Economy status of “free”-individual metropolitan citizen-worker exploitables is always challenged, always has to be fought for, on pain of consignment to the larger class of expropriables subjected to regular state violence. (Knowing your gender theory, see Kimmel 2002, helps with political economic analysis.)

This is what nonelites organized by conservatives know that “progressive neoliberals” serving global capitalists discreetly overlook, in the conduct of their professional duties distancing from and disciplining the mob. Using the White Privilege that “the mob” knows it has fought for, to selflessly usher the Exceptional Deprived under the benevolent wing of protective or symbolic elite patronage, progressive neoliberals appeal to “fairness while extending expropriation” (Fraser 2018: 15). In this sense, are liberal-arts academics the public complement to private lawyers in capitalism–where private law quietly, massively secures oligarchy (Pistor 2019), while liberal arts academics piously, publicly attack unfair advantages accruing within pockets (other than the police) of the working class? Managerial sanctimony for some, little national flags for others.

fight club

Fraser understands that the legally-recognized (cosmopolitan–historically male, European, White, but shifting with the global mobilization of labour, see Fatah-Black & van Rossum 2014, and the rise of global capitalist metropoles) exploited worker has always been a hard-won, probationary status, though the function is required for capitalist value creation. Attaining state-recognized, exploited worker status is probationary because capital also needs a lot more expropriated work. For value to be accumulated by capitalists, exploited workers have to work upon the mass “raw material” of cheap nature and social reproduction, which is supplied by coerced, expropriated work (Fraser 2018; Moore 2015). Unlike capital assets (See Pistor 2019), the capitalists’ state will not protect–fully or durably–worker income achievements or other smallholdings without expensive private law securing it. Where one of Sweden’s innovations was to extend entitlements across the population, “leveling upward” (Barton 1986: 173), antisocialist societies keep the entitlements and rights markets scarce and expensive.

Though as early as the late 18th century, the impossibility of maintaining spatially-segregated expropriated v. exploited labour forces pushed the Dutch Republic to ban slavery (total racialized expropriation) in the European metropole (Fatah-Black & van Rossum 2014), the growth of hybrid exploitation-expropriation status has arisen with “financialized capitalism” (Fraser 2018: 12).

David Abraham (2010) has identified the political mechanism instituting hybrid exploitation-expropriation status: broadened but cheapened citizenship, the dismantling of social citizenship rights and institutions, along with the expansion and intensification of imperial disruption and population relocations, what in “progressive neoliberal” hands becomes the Dem Party’s Open Borders politics.

Like all progressive neoliberalism, Open Borders TM is a late-hour emergency reversal, a pious optical roll back from the deluge of neoliberal policies that have landed at grotesque expropriation visuals: ICE’s concentration camps for immigrant babies. The left hand of the conservatize-liberal Dem party suggests decriminalizing immigrants–great! But the more consistent, dominant right hand of the political party continues to follow Mises’ and Hayek’s Viennese Chamber of Commerce model, replacing national sovereignty with global capitalist sovereignty (Pistor  2019, Ch. 6; Slobodian 2018; Zevin 2019)–that is, diminishing citizenship rights, facilitating expropriation universally: criminalization of the rest of marginalized life (and in capitalism, marginalized life is a lot of life), for-profit slave-labour prisons throughout the Anglosphere, and disruptive, dislocating war abroad. There’s more than one way to skin the people alive. (That said, I wish the Justice Democrats well. May they slap down–and impale with a wooden cross–the dead right hand of the Slaver County-Wall St. Dem bloc.)

Why is N. Fraser so necessary and relevant today? After a three-year application process, I got citizenship in a country where to get citizenship (qualifying for legalized exploitation, as opposed to violent expropriation, but downgraded to hybrid exploitation-expropriation in the financialist restoration) you have to swear allegiance to the British monarchy. Canadian citizenship remains both colonial and Burkean:

Society is indeed a contract…between those who are living (and) those who are dead…So far is it from being true that we acquired a right by the Revolution to elect our kings that, if we had possessed it before, the English nation did at that time most solemnly renounce and abdicate it, for themselves and for all their posterity forever” (Burke, 1790).

Apparently, lots of new settlers aren’t down with this reactionary 1790 social contract, however symbolic (How does this even work in Quebec? Headscarf law, I guess.); so in the official ritual, the Canadian citizenship induction team makes a point of threatening the inductees and then monitoring them to ensure they swear fealty to the British monarchy, instead of mumbling The Internationale or La Marseillaise or even Elizabeth Bishop’s The Moose under their breath.

After a lot of official chit-chat about The Greatest Nation(-state) on Earth and how it requires unpaid labour (voluntarism), a citizenship inductee can volunteer to speak about what Canadian citizenship means to her. A young woman from Africa was introduced, got up, and gave a cheerful speech about how Canadian citizenship means that everyone in that room can now finally avoid Canadians expropriating them. She went over the varieties of expropriation line item by line item.

It was a super-instrumentalist account of what citizenship means, and, since no capitalist could object to it on ideological grounds, but it was a far cry from the conservative-liberal idealist bath we’d just been given, her assertion of imperial reality was kind of a subtly-subversive move. I appreciated the new citizen’s initiative.

On the other hand, it’s hard to be totally reassured: Canadian citizenship policy and Burkean discourse channel the real financialized-imperialism experience of unequal, inegalitarian, and predatory class and state relations into an “I got mine” discourse of individualist instrumentalism. Here’s hoping the liberal exhortations to volunteer and “be friends” with indigenous Canada somehow keep the back cellar door open for the internationalist-organization way out of this global rentier-capitalist, conservative-liberal Forever Home.

Naturally, the same citizenship team that had threatened and monitored us to swear loyalty to the British royalty was a bit nonplussed. “I expect you’ll take my job!” the exquisitely-cast, good-looking, Metis, pompadour-dyke-hair judge slipped out of character, as the new citizen wrapped up her oration and returned to her seat.

References

Abraham, David. 2010. “America, Germany, Israel: Three Modes of Citizenship and Incorporation.” International Labour and Working-class History 78: 123-128.

Barton, H.A. 1986. Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 1760-1815. University of Minnesota.

Burke, Edmund. 1790. Reflections on the Revolution in France.

Fatah-Black, Karwan & Matthias van Rossum. 2014. “Slavery in a ‘Slave-free Enclave’?: Historical Links between the Dutch Republic Empire and Slavery, 1580s-1860s.” Werkstatt Geschichte 66-67: 55-73.

Federici, Silvia. 2019. “From Crisis to Commons,” pp. 175-187 in Re-enchanting the World: Feminism and the Politics of the Commons. PM Press.

Fraser, Nancy. 2018. Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography–From Exploitation to Expropriation: Historic Geographies of Racialized Capitalism.” Economic Geography 94(1): 1-17.

Kimmel, Michael S. 2002. “Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity.”

Meiksins-Wood, Ellen. 2014. “Capitalism’s Gravediggers,” Jacobin.

Pistor, Katharina. 2019. The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality. Princeton.

Slobodian, Quinn. 2018. Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Harvard.

Zevin, Alexander. 2019. “Every Penny a Vote.” Pp. 27-30 in the London Review of Books, 15 August. https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n16/alexander-zevin/every-penny-a-vote.

 

 

Scenario Analysis

Best-Practices Management: Scenario Analysis

A common form of risk-reduction management in industries, like finance, where results matter, Scenario Analysis is increasingly being adopted to assess the impact of policy proposals on climate change, another field where growing consensus holds that real-world, in-situ results need to be optimized. There is also enough at stake in seemingly small middle-management decisions made within institutions that collect and house valuable public and private assets and income to warrant the adoption of Scenario Analysis to mitigate risks to the enterprise.

At stake: Reducing Perverse-incentive Spillover

One of the standard problems over the past half century of institutional reforms has been the adoption of Isolated Optimization analysis and decision making throughout institutions. In the Isolated Optimization management approach, variables that the policy designer can control are optimized in isolation from the context that they will operate in. Factors that the manager cannot immediately control are excluded from the analysis and the decision-making process.

It is one thing to distinguish controllable, “Close to Home” factors from environmental factors. It is a serious overstep to ignore those environmental factors, or dismiss them prematurely as unknowable, in a strategic analysis and in making organizational decisions. Analytical reduction generally can be a useful tool for making decisions; however, it would be a mistake to equate the Isolated Optimization analytical reduction with analytical reduction generally. Isolated Optimization is just one, excessively-parsimonious variant of analytical reduction, and the risks and costs associated with this reductive variant  over the past half-century have proven too high.

Isolated Optimization policies are generally understood to be the product of the best of intentions, including positive intentions expressed toward growth, efficiency, seniority, and diversity. The problem that Isolated Optimization policies create is not bad intentions. The problems they create when they hit the road include insufficient decision-making method, and resulting bad decisions and perverse incentives.

The perverse incentive epidemic we have lived through ranges from the tax reduction movement’s perverse incentivization of labour oversupply and wage and economic stagnation, to excess carceral build up on behalf of rationalization and its perverse incentives to war, concentration camps for immigrant children, and the far-reaching reduction of public, working class life-supports in expensive economies, to financial deregulation and socio-economically perverse incentives resulting from automatic state convertibility responses to financial failures. The empirical record of perverse-incentive spillover resulting from management optimizing “controllable” immediate variables in isolation from their context goes on and on and on. It is unfortunately the management aesthetic that we have known in our era. But we have enough data on the results to respectfully require  managers to adopt the more fully-specified cost-benefit risk-assessment and decision-making methodology that is used when resources are at stake and outcomes matter.

Scenario Analysis: The Benefits

Scenario Analysis by contrast is designed to mitigate the avalanche of unintended consequences of Isolated Optimization decisions. It can be particularly appropriate and beneficial for those institutions and organizations that have insufficiently accounted for their own access to assets, income streams, and benefits relative to that same accounting made by better-organized, for-profit institutions like finance and investment firms, tech and management firms, and management-directed accounting consultants.

By extrapolating the introduction of proposed policy changes to a fully-specified environment of institutional connections and their operational mandates, including and analyzing Best and Worse-case Scenarios within policy proposals, Scenario Analysis allows a decision-making collective to make better decisions–still optimizing controllable variables, but with respect to the context they operate within.

Key benefits include:

  • Future planning – gives public-sector stakeholders a peek into the expected returns and risks involved when planning to shift budgets.
    • The goal of any business venture is to grow–to increase revenue over time, and it is best to use informed calculations when deciding to begin a transfer of public budgets to private businesses.
  • Proactive – University communities can avoid or decrease potential losses that result from uncontrollable factors by being aggressively preventive during worst-case scenarios, by analyzing events and situations that may lead to unfavorable outcomes. As the saying goes, it is better to be proactive than reactive when a problem arises.
    • Worst case scenario example:In 2012 Bain Financial (owners of Dollar Stores, inter alia) famously identified regional (hinterlands) universities as under-tapped resources for investors wanting low-risk publicly-provided assets in their tranches and portfolio mixes. In 2019 the Republican government of Alaska reinterpreted the financial industry’s asset vein interpretation of universities to mean that the public was excessively larding universities with income and assets. In lieu of inter-regional income transfer, the conservative government of Alaska stripped 41% of university funding, targeting 1,300 university workers for layoffs.

      What will happen to 40% of each regional university’s budget over the upcoming years? Will it be diverted to investment portfolios and for-profit management and software sales/data-accumulation firms? Or will it be stripped by governments and converted into regional tax reductions? Can university stakeholders and managers identify strategies alternative to facilitating or  private v. public income and asset mining?

  • Avoiding risk and failure – to avoid poor budgeting, priorities, planning, and policy decisions, scenario analysis allows the university organizations and communities to assess prospects detracting from or fortifying institutional integrity and degrees of freedom. It takes the best and worst probabilities into account so that stakeholders can make an informed decision.
  • Projecting investment returns or losses – the analysis makes use of tools to calculate the values or figures of potential gains or losses of an investment. This gives concrete, measurable data that stakeholders can base the approaches they take for a better outcome.

Case Study: Replacing University Courses with Software Rental

Let’s take the scenario of a project by a regional university’s management to replace first-year university courses with renting educational software from an international for-profit Health and Education Management and Software corporation with national and regional offices. The Isolated Optimization management approach would both design and market the policy as optimizing controllable immediate, organization variables, while black boxing how those variables will perform within the context of the same business environment it institutionalizes. In the Isolated Optimization approach, management would be simply required to present outcomes of this policy that we would expect if the organization and institution were operating in a black box, rather than in a specifiable context.

Rose colored glasses: For example, sans context, the replacement of first-year courses with capital-intensive, reduced-labour costs training software could be expected to a) allow scholars employed by the university to better use their skills, concentrating on university-level education and research (assuming the university has previously established loose income-driven or immigration-driven admissions criteria, flooding first-year courses with seriously-underprepared education-credential consumers). Sans context, and less realistically, the replacement of first-year courses with training software might be hoped to be designed to b) professionally, neutrally, incrementally introduce students of all identities to the university experience and basic work expectations, or perhaps instead to c) efficiently, objectively weed out underprepared education credential consumers after they have contributed income to the university. Sans context, the replacement of first-year courses with capital-intensive, reduced-labour costs training software could be expected to d) allow management to institute a “cost-saving” (substituting capital for labour) managerial strategy recognized by the business community and its legislatures for its contribution to profits or economic control, or e) build strong, portable relationships within international Health and Education management and software market networks. In an Isolated Optimization analysis, the policy change is presented–marketed–as a win-win all-benefits proposition. It lacks a realistic accounting of probable costs in situ. Yet in a specifiable context that such policy change will help institutionalize and operate within, these win-win scenarios can very well fail to pan out, or even produce the perverse incentives that have been a hallmark of Isolated Optimization.

Financial management corporations such as the ubiquitous Bain Capital (owner of Dollar Stores, inter alia) are part of that identifiable context that should be incorporated in analysis and accounted for in decision-making. They have long advised that privatizing multiple functions and assets of regional universities and redirecting regional universities’ public funding into financial instruments channeling organization income into private investors’ income streams will permit investors around the world to expand their opportunities to earn income on their otherwise-underemployed wealth, while the financial advisors themselves enjoy income and profits from managing these privatized assets and innovating the financial instruments that are built upon investor credence that these assets will provide lucrative income to financial firm shareholders.

The perverse incentive characteristic of an era in which a small number of people around the globe own more assets than they can productively employ in wealth-generating production is that commonly–as in the famous case of Lehman Brothers inter alia–the real, amassed assets that global shareholders rely upon to deliver market-busting returns, such as those contained in the regional public university–are simply depleted, the debts owned by financial firms are transferred into the depleted organization, and that underlying productive organization feeding the financial-instrument strategy is allowed to die, stripped of assets and burdened with transferred debt.

Financial advisors identify regional universities in particular as promising sources of private income and debt sinks because global investors are thought to be distant from the effects of regional asset liquidation. The current financial system is awash in moral hazard. As well, dedicated to private wealth, legislatures can be relied upon to let the public resources die rather than restore the public institution by taxing the very investors (possibly beyond the jurisdictional state’s reach, and due to wealth transfer, increasingly wealthier and more powerful than regional actors) whose financial investment earnings were taken out of the public resources, and debts transferred to the public resources, to boost private wealth in the first place. Socially-rational taxation currently violates wealth entitlement. Under current conditions, the perverse incentive cascade can only be nipped in the policy proposal stage, for example with effective barriers to the privatization/expropriation of public budgets.

Fortunately, the management corrective to analysis overlooking these salient contextual factors is available. Organizations can require their management to pursue a more fully-specified analysis, the Scenario Analysis. The key is requiring management modeling to incorporate context research and specification, which management will deploy in crafting Best and Worst-case Scenarios concerning the policy innovation.

If organization members have adequate freedom to hold management to competent research into contextual factors and analysis of Best and Worst-case Scenarios, these scenarios will allow management to make more valid analyses, and will allow the organization to make better decisions preserving member goals and organization integrity, including as that integrity supports regional socio-economic integrity.

The Scenario Analysis Method

Identifying Optimization Parameters

The first step is asking the members of the organization what it is that they value about their work, in this case as scholars. Compiling these answers will inform the organization’s policy optimization parameters, which will be reintroduced after the contextual identification and analysis and the Best and Worse-case Outcomes analysis stages.

Contextual Identification and Analysis – TBD

An organization needs to understand the nature of the market-related risks and opportunities it may face.

  • Each organization faces a different blend of market-related risks and opportunities.
  • The enterprise impacts related to market change may vary significantly depending on the economic sector(s)/sub-sector(s) in which an organization operates.
  • Enterprise impacts may also vary significantly depending on the following:
    • the geographic location of the organization’s value chain (both upstream and downstream).
    • the organization’s assets and nature of operations.
    • the structure and dynamics of the organization’s supply and demand markets.
    • the organization’s customers.
    • the organization’s other key stakeholders.

Best and Worse-case Outcomes Analysis, Prep

There are 3 major categories of considerations organizations face in constructing scenarios and conducting scenario analysis: parameters/assumptions, analytical choices, and impacts.

Parameters/Assumptions

Discount rate – what discount rate does the organization apply to discount future value?, see Best-case/Worst-case Scenarios, below.

Labour & technology commodity prices – what assumptions are made about how labour v. technology prices would develop over time, including economic incentives and disincentives to the in-house or outsourced development and maintenance of the skilled v. deskilled or unskilled university labour force, and multiplier effects and their social and geographic distribution? How does the distribution of in-house v. outsourced skilled v. unskilled labour impact socio-economic inequality and attendant political shifts recursively impacting university funding? How does the distribution of multiplier effects impact socio-economic inequality and attendant political shifts recursively impacting university funding?

As technology inputs allow private for-profit companies to monopolize data on stratified consumer-products (students and their households) over time, how will private data pricing impact the cost structure, to the university, to the public financers, and to its consumer-products and their end-users, of the education commodity?

In the university enterprise, as with online media, the consumers are also the product. As management and technology allow higher-education and credentialing inputs to be standardized, optimized for efficiency, and cheapened, what conclusions does the organization draw about the development over time of quality and market prices for the student consumer-product outputs of public financing, private financing, labour, and technology? How might optimizing efficiency of production in regional universities, v. flagship national universities, impact the consumer-product’s capacity to penetrate the higher-value labour markets increasingly concentrated in metropoles in a period of declining economic mobility, or contribute to stagnation or exceptional economic dynamism in regional networks?

Work demand and mix – what would be the resulting total work demand and work mix across different sources of primary work (labour, technology)? How does this develop over time assuming supply/end-use efficiency improvements? What factors are used for work conversion efficiencies of each source category and for end-use efficiency in each category over time?

Macro-economic Variables – what public financing rate, consumer-financing rate, employment rate, and other economic variables are used?

Demographic variables – what assumptions are made about population growth, migration, labour mobility and its distribution, economic mobility, socio-economic network development, and socio-economic inequality?

Institutional, social and economic distribution of benefits and costs – to what extent are distributions of income and assets, efficiency (type specified) gains and losses, sovereignty and strategic degrees of freedom gains and losses, clean energy transition, and ecologically-driven regional physical changes incorporated into scenarios, priorities and planning?

Geographical tailoring of transition impacts – what assumptions does the organization make about potential differences in input and output parameters across regions, countries, asset locations, and markets?

Technology – does the organization make assumptions about the development of performance/cost and resulting levels of deployment over time of various key supply and demand-side technologies (e.g. education and research labour, and technologies in interested sectors including financial, managerial, data accumulation, and patent rentiers)?

Policy – what are assumptions about the strength of different private-public policy coalitions and signals, and their development over time and across jurisdictions (e.g. provincial university funding, university managerial independence, collective bargaining and organized labour, Academic Freedom, Collegial Governance; subsidies for technology; subsidies for construction; marketing budgets; accounting budgets; Black Budgets; managerial and other administrative budgets; the university as conduit for increasing the public funding of international private marketing, management, education services, social services, immigration services, and financial services providers). What can we assume about the upcoming likelihood of private-public growth political parties v. anti-public political parties and governments?

Expropriation sensitivity assumptions – assumptions of privatization increase v. taxation stagnation or decrease; increased demand by financial, technology, and managerial firms for income streams, public access; assumptions about university consolidation in Canada v. spinning off regional universities or their parts into online course credential sales?

Analytical Choices

Scenarios – what scenarios does the organization use for transition impact analysis and which sources are used to assess physical impact both for central/base case and for sensitivity analyses?

Quantitative vs. qualitative or “directional” – is the scenario exercise fully quantitative or a mix of quantitative and qualitative?

Timing – how does the organization consider timing of implications under scenarios e.g. is this considered at a decadal level 2020; 2030; 2040; 2050

Scope of application – is the analysis applied to the whole value chain (inputs, operations and markets), or just direct effects on specific organization units / operations?

Financial, tech, and managerial models/data sets – which models and data sets support the assessment of privatization-related risks?

Risks to scholarship, schools, and the university – when assessing market risks, which specific risks have been included, including tje severity of their probable impact? To what extent has the organization assessed the impact to its portfolio (e.g. largest assets, most vulnerable assets) and to what extent have risks been incorporated in future organization strategy?

To what extent has the impact on prices and availability in the whole value chain been considered, including knock-on effects from suppliers, infrastructure, and access to consumers?

Enterprise Impacts/Effects

Earnings – what conclusions does the organization draw about impact on earnings and how does it express that impact (e.g. as EBITDA, EBITDA margins, EBITDA contribution, dividends)?

Costs – what conclusions does the organization draw about the implications for its operating/production costs and their development over time?

Revenues – what conclusions does the organization draw about the implications for the revenues from its key commodities/ products/ services and their development over time?

Assets – what are the implications for asset values of various scenarios?

Capital Allocation/ investments – what are the implications for capex and other investments?

Timing – what conclusions does the organization draw about development of costs, revenues and earnings across time (e.g. 5/10/20 year)?

Responses – what information does the organization provide in relation to potential impacts (e.g. intended changes to capital expenditure plans, changes to portfolio through acquisitions and divestments, retirement of assets, entry into new markets, development of new capabilities etc.)?

Enterprise Interruption due to physical impacts – what is the organization’s conclusion about its potential enterprise interruption/productivity loss due to market impacts– both direct effects on the organization’s own assets and indirect effects of supply chain/product delivery.

 

Best case-Worst case Scenarios

When performing the analysis, managers and executives at a university, school or department will generate different future states of the university, higher education, and the economy. These future states will form discrete scenarios that include assumptions about supplier business plans, product prices, student-consumer data, operating costs, politics and public funding, and other drivers of the  enterprise.

Managers typically start with 3 basic scenarios:

  • Base case scenario – this is the average scenario based on management assumptions.
    • Note: When calculating the net present value, the rates most likely to be used are the discount rate, or the cash flow growth rate.
  • Worst case scenario – considers the most serious or severe outcome that may happen in a given situation.
    • Note: When calculating the net present value, one would take the highest possible discount rate and subtract the possible cash flow growth rate.
  • Best case scenario – this is the ideal projected scenario, and is almost always assumed by management to market and institute their pre-existing preferences.
    • Note: When calculating the net present value, use the least possible discount rate, highest possible growth rate, or lowest possible tax rate.

 

Preventing Garbage In, Garbage Out: Distributed Power in Organizations

While a significant improvement on Isolated Optimization, Scenario Analysis is not immune to GIGO–Garbage In, Garbage Out hazard. Though we would like to believe that all managers are competent at identifying and analyzing environmental factors and their likely interactions with policy, it also remains that managers can often have seriously-compromised incentive to constructing effective Scenario Analyses.

This is not just because Scenario Analysis requires more work of managers, but because the same firms with a business model tapping into public-organization budgets standardly also provide incentivizing career-building, income-enhancing, and network opportunities to helpful agents within the target organization. This business model has been particularly common within sales to the public sector, which labor market is subject to legislatively-imposed income compression, stagnation, and in the course of anti-public campaigns, status degradation. In fact, recognition of this standard business model–selling both products to organizations and managerial job opportunities to helpful agents within those organizations– should be built into the Scenario Analysis, as the business model itself imposes environmental costs upon the organization.


It is easy to identify whether this business model is an environmental factor: Does the firm selling the product also support helpers’ career advancement within customer organizations, or, more ostentatiously, hire helpful agents from within client organizations? Is the for-profit goods or service provider also a management or consulting firm? Huron Consulting Group is an example of such a firm (see appendix), advertising to cooperative health care and university managers and purchasers career-mobility opportunities in its own international management and sales network expansion.


An important cost of this business model to be analyzed in decisions to adopt their products, to transfer public funding to the private for-profit corporation, is that organization members serving as agents of private firm product adoption are opening exclusively for themselves a wider field of credible employment opportunities, an advantage in employment negotiations that can allow them to command a larger share of organizational resources at coworkers’ expense. These employment opportunities may also engage moral hazard by incentivizing predatory, organization-depleting decisions from which the facilitating agent is uniquely shielded by virtue of their employment mobility through their relationship with the management and product sales firm.

The integrity of the cost-benefit analysis requires that managers not be allowed to exclude this prevalent contemporary context from analysis, and regardless of whether organization intermediaries admit an intention to take advantage of perks on offer, no policy change proposal should be allowed to proceed until such cost-benefit distribution factors are incorporated in the Scenario Analysis and Best- and Worst-case Scenarios. After all, even respected and well-remunerated professionals like medical doctors have been known to overprescribe medications under pharmaceutical rep influence.

The safeguard against disincentivized, half-hearted, ineffective Scenario Analysis is an organizational structure of distributed power, wherein organization members have the capacity to push managers for analytical improvements and policy options based on fully-specified analysis.

This is also to point out another common contextual factor today: Because hierarchical decision making undermines the conditions required for effective, fully-specified Scenario Analysis, and so permits greater opportunities for predatory decision-making capture, interested corporations, such as financial, technology, and management-consultant firms, have an especial, compelling interest in supporting hierarchical decision making in the organizations whose income and assets they target, as Bain Capital has also indicated. Therefore, in universities, active Collegial Governance is an institution essential to fully-capacitated policy analysis and sound decision making.

 

References

Bain Capital. 2012. “The Financially Sustainable University.” https://www.bain.com/insights/financially-sustainable-university/

Corporate Finance Institute. “Scenario Analysis.” https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/modeling/scenario-analysis/

Kishita et al. 2016. “Scenario Analysis.” https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/earth-and-planetary-sciences/scenario-analysis

Pistor, Katharina. 2019. The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality. Princeton.

TCFD. “The Use of Scenario Analysis in Disclosure of Climate-related Risks and Opportunities.” https://www.tcfdhub.org/home/scenario-analysis

 

Appendix: Tech Sales-Driven Management Goals, Stage One

The following images summarize institutional optimizations that for-profit management and tech sales corporations are geared to sell to universities via their managers. Recall also that most tech sales firms have a less-public, longer-term business plan to eventually monopolize and monetize the data (eg. on consumer-products) that they will gain through organizations adopting their technology; this typical, staged business strategy in the present era of private property law-making can create and lock in future increased–constraining and possibly prohibitive–costs for the technology-adopting (university) organization and its (student) consumer-product base.

Clarifying Social Reproduction Feminism: Not Liberal, Not Idealist, It’s Socialist and Historical-materialist

The essay, “Traveling in the Wrong Direction” by British political philosopher Lorna Findlayson is required reading for socialist feminists. The first half is a brilliantly-written take-down of liberal feminism. The second half wobbles around, and reveals something very interesting, an analytical deficit in an otherwise powerful analysis:  A philosophical-Marxist (as opposed to political-Marxist) tendency to analyze capitalism as THE ruling class mode does not survey history, really take women’s socio-material global experience seriously, and does not consider that exploitative capitalism is a competitive option, always reliant on mass expropriation, in the arsenal of rivalristic regional ruling class strategy. Findlayson posits social reproduction strikes as an *alternative* to organized industrial action.

Findlayson needs some Jane McAlevey correction. Greta Thunberg’s individual action, the Climate School Strike, is not industrial action, and it is not the sole answer. But, as she indicates, it is a good form of collective action for a young person on the autism spectrum.

Findlayson is trying to equate social reproduction socialist-feminism with liberal feminism, in terms of strategic lameness and misdirection. But to pursue this reduction, she doesn’t see the strategic problem that is visible today: How do you counter a rivalristic, regional ruling class strategy that has always juggled a little bit of exploitation with a lot of expropriation?

In the late 19th century, industrial action, particularly in steel production, was effective because Western economies leaned on steel production at that time (Lawrence 2014).  At their most effective, industrial action was in truth collective action across working class communities. We just don’t see it because our delegated capitalist imaginations only recognize the exploited male labor, and so we’re gender blind.

Then there’s the issue: Western economies have moved on from the industrializing era. What does this mean for industrial action, or for smallholder political interests and strategy in regions that have been capturing global wealth?

Further, over the long haul, we have seen that capitalism cannot be dismantled simply by disrupting key nodes of exploitation, though conceived more broadly as building working-class communicative and egalitarian-cooperative capacity (by capitalist definition, disruptive; see also McAlevey 2016 for description), union-community action needs to be organized again–recognizing that militarization and policing is funded precisely to crush that organization. (Left Critics of the Left always uncannily forget about or black-box the massive repressive apparatus into which much of global wealth, energy, and human capacity is poured. This tradition of “Critical”/competitive kvetching (firing circle) Left “forgetting” always reads like a ritual that might easily be fanned by cops.)

By cohering a hierarchical economic alliance through selective exploitation, regional capitalists sell finance as a vehicle for expropriation, and they enjoin class-solidaristic, shifting-frenemy rivalries with each other. But the properly-capitalist exploitative mode is plodding as well as fungible and optional where there are other strategies–imperial war, for example–of pursuing elite rivalries for domination. Where there are other strategies is everywhere, all the time, because once you make money off of commodity production, you plunge it into higher-profit expropriative and rentier activities to keep your advantage and entitlements (See Pistor 2019, Piketty 2013). Exploitation and commodity production are a tool for organizing economy, society, and states under globalizing capitalist elites, and underwriting elite power expansion. Once the organization and underwriting have been accomplished, the real elite Power Resources are in taking, not making.

Industrial action cannot itself dismantle capitalism not only because capitalists possess the surveillance technology, the legal strategists, the economist marketeers and whips, the state, and layers of militarized police (as Adam Smith observed in 1776), not only because it’s far easier for less-numerous, habitually, socially class-solidaristic capitalists than workers to organize across space and scale, along with their supportive comprador class of lawyers and managers (as Adam Smith again observed in 1776, was demonstrated in the early 20th century strikes, and was analyzed by Bill Domhoff over his career), and not only because they possess the wealth to outlast resource-poor worker revolt, but also because erstwhile capitalists possess the economic degrees of freedom to shift to rents, extraction, and expropriation.

If workers and other smallholders in the West can be organized for internationalism, to solidaristically support Chinese and Indian worker revolt, that may well cause enough disruption to produce change, including some lessening of elite confidence. But we have learned that it will not be enough to direct change or maintain an egalitarian direction. Disruption is not the same as strategy, full human coordination capacity. We already have had neoliberalism producing change. What we need is to build the capacity to direct change strategically upon a temporary elite loss of confidence that industrial action could achieve, aiming to build up redistributive incentives. A key to collective agential change is agile, multipronged strategic capacity. Social Reproduction feminists are in one of the best positions to think strategically in this context, as I have indicated previously (Fridell 2017).

Socialist Social Reproduction feminism still has plenty of room for development, but it has been forwarded by some of the most powerful analysts of both logical structure and empirical variation, and, compatible with historically- and regionally-sensitive Political Marxism (per Meiksins-Wood), it holds out the promise of clarifying better anticapitalist strategy than is possible via idealist-discursive philosophy, including idealist-philosophical Marxism.

As Bourdieu suggested, idealist philosophy’s contribution to an egaliberte justice telos arrives when those philosophers turn their decisionist- genealogical and discursive-deconstructionist approaches on their own discipline…or even on conservative-liberal law and mainstream economics, if they cannot bear to critically analyze their own methods and knowledge’s structure and (given the encompassing historical context that philsophers are not interested in specifying) its effects. The neoliberal era is a long, conservatizing period in which junior managers and marketeers have aestheticized managing the variables they can control (for philosophers–critiquing equality-justice discursive logics), bereft of anything like Scenario Analysis–analyzing the optimal and worst case scenarios of how the products of that management interact with adjoining and governing incentives. For some reason in this conservatizing period, only financial managers have been allowed to assess management’s and products’ interactions with context.

To accomplish better socialist strategy, Social Reproduction feminism advances not idealist philosophy, but materialist philosophy. Historicist, socialist-feminist Social Reproduction scholarship and praxis, as well as new feminist indigenous theory, have reconstructed philosophical materialism as an egalitarian, internationalist form of cosmopolitanism supporting re-organization.

 

Bibliography

Benner, Erica. 2018 (1995). Really-existing Nationalisms. Verso.

Bezanson, K. and M. Luxton, eds. 2006. Social reproduction: Feminist political economy challenges neoliberalism. McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Bhattacharya, T., ed. 2017. Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression. Pluto.

Federici, Silvia. 2018. Re-enchanting the World: Feminism and the Politics of the Commons. Pm Pr.

Federici, Silvia. 2004. Caliban and the Witch: Women, The Body, and Primitive Accumulation. Autonomedia.

Finlayson, Lorna. 2019. “Traveling in the Wrong Direction.” London Review of Books

Finlayson, Lorna. 2015. The Political is Political: Conformity and the Illusion of Dissent in Contemporary Political Philosophy.

Fraser, Nancy. 2017. “Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography— From Exploitation to Expropriation: Historic Geographies of Racialized Capitalism.” Economic Geography 94(1): 1–17.

Fraser, Nancy. 2013. Fortunes of feminism.

Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth. 2003. Redistribution or Recognition?

Fraser, Nancy and Linda Gordon. 1994. “Dependency Demystified: Inscriptions of Power in a Keyword of the Welfare State.” Social Politics 1(1): 4-31.

Fraser, Nancy and Linda Gordon. 1992. “Contract vs. Charity: Why Is There No Social Citizenship in the United States?” Socialist Review 22(3): 45-67.

Fridell, Mara. 2017. “The Social-Democratic Small-State Strategy and Immigration: Sweden in the 21st Century.” World Review of Political Economy. Vol. 8, No. 3, Small States in the Multi-polar World (Fall 2017), pp. 390-415.

Kollontai, Alexandra. 1916. Society and Motherhood.

Lawrence, Andrew G. 2014. Employer and Worker Collective Action: A Comparatie Study of Germany, South Africa, and the United States. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McAlevey, Jane. 2016. No shortcuts: Organizing for Power in the New Gilded Age.

Meiksins-Wood, Ellen. 2014. “Capitalism’s Gravediggers.” Jacobin, December 5.

Pistor, Katharina. 2019. The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality.

 

Roaming Rights Now!

Over the last couple of years there have been books and bills introduced to establish Roaming Right in Anglo-American jurisdictions. Roaming Rights were denied in the colonies on the grounds that indigenous people had to be cleared from the land to make way for colonial extraction. As contested as they were and are, Roaming Rights were established for indigenous populations in treaties between colonial and indigenous governments, however.

The racist, colonial denial of universal Roaming Right in Anglo-American law produces an unjust conflation between private land required for living, such as a house, a yard, and a garden, and mass-acreage land privately owned, for example in land speculation, for the accumulation of social power over other citizens, rival rentier capitalists, and global markets. In Marxist terms, this (im)moral conflation reflects the power-blind liberal conflation of capitalist use value–profit–with general use values, which legitimates sovereign-consumer and consumer-market choice arguments, private monopoly and collusion, corporate deregulation, inequality, and general capitalist Best of All Possible Worlds assumption/argumentation. Under this ruling and codified conceptual conflation, even homes have been used in apartheid settler societies not for shelter (use value), a necessary minimal condition of health, enjoyment and development, but as assets (capital) permitting Whites and global economic victors to claim intergenerational wealth over, power over, and capacity to exclude Blacks and smallholders.

This conceptual blindness is the vehicle through which inequality produces inegalitarianism, despite liberalism’s formal subscription to the former and proscription of the latter. While it brings liberalism to coalesce with conservatism, liberalism’s formal separation of inequality and inegalitarianism keeps liberalism able to co-opt the exhausted portions of its egalitarian opposition, and better able to maintain law; in this way, while it’s less immediately appealing than conservative exceptionalism, liberalism can ultimately outcompete raw conservatism, devoted to inequality, inegalitarianism, and exceptionalism. Or, liberalism and conservatism together create a system-stabilizing oscillation of strategies that pragmatists and true-believers alike can insert themselves into.

Because of this lack of conceptual distinction, for a long time, the incapacity to recognize a public interest in cross-population, sustainable use of land and water supported an inegalitarian elite-settler coalition dedicated to absolute, exclusive private property in liberal societies. This institutionalized blindness to public interest, this inegalitarianism can be observed every day in financial apartheid advertisements for gated rural and suburban property and Poor Door urban real estate property, in excluding curtains and punitive air travel policies corralling most travelers, and in the enduring public goods and services poverty of historical slavery counties. It sustains a socialized inability to distinguish depletion activities on land and water from sustainable activities. This apartheid-society conceptual incapacity was useful for establishing colonies as premier global sites of unfettered resource extraction and unfree labor exploitation and expropriation.

Restoring Collective-action Capacity and Freedom in Rural Tributaries

In the latter-day context of global monopoly capitalism, with its institutionalized wealth cores and tributary peripheries, these conceptual incapacities, codified in law, strongly undermine the freedom and reproductive capacity of non-elite, smallholder settlers. It is another case where in the multi-generational run, non-elite settlers would have been better off in coalition with peasantified indigenous people and enslaved workers than serving as grunts for elite colonial interests, under the hope that their own patrimony would be protected, not by a politically- and socially-constructed status such as citizenship, but by a magical, mythical identity conferred only at elite convenience–White Ownership.

To start off with, as discussed above, smallholders’ interests–in securing living space and life enjoyment in balance with others–are not reducible to or stably, largely compatible with mass-property owning rentier-capitalists’ interests in mining wealth for the exclusive, advantageous accumulation of social power and control over other citizens, over rival rentier capitalists, and over global markets. Whiteness politics are the result of a naive, excessive belief in the munificence and durability of economic elites’ instrumentalist marketing campaigns. But as the recent mass primitive accumulation of New Zealand, the Canadian West, and particularly the US West demonstrate, even Christian Texan billionaires–raised as Masters of Whiteness sacralization and politics–will not maintain White coalition in all those places where non-Whites have already been cleared from the land (Turkewitz 2019). If you cannot count on even Evangelical Texas oil-extractionist billionaire patriarchs for White protection, do you think it’s a good social contract option for you to buy into?

As a mystical moral exclusion, a promise of inclusion in an exclusive coalition with ruthless, teeth-baring elites, the White political construction was always designed to be land-owning elites’ paw of control over a traumatized, fearful population, for elites’ own political benefit, if variably distributing lesser resources to a malleable “White” “police” force. The broad Whiteness elite-“police” coalition is easily scrapped–in England, but just as well in the militarized, surveillance-embedded settler colonies–in favor of the narrower elite-police employer relationship in Nightwatchman societies. Today’s capital-intensive, tech-addled Nightwatchman policing relationship with exclusive, absolute, mass private property severely curtails non-elite freedom and enjoyment–from snowmobiling to fishing to hunting, to cross country skiing, mushroom gathering, forest bathing, walking, clean-water swimming, stargazing, fresh air, and so on–outside of capitalism’s expensive urban metropole commodity market.

Roaming Right & Freedom of Movement, Right of the “Starving” Man in an Excluding, Privatized World Economy

In Europe, Roaming Rights were codified in law in the mid-20th century (In England, they were codified in liberal law in 2001). They distinguish the exclusionary space needed for living–the yard, garden, house, barn, garage–from the larger, decommodified space required for people, the public, to both modestly supplement private life and enjoy sustainable use of the political-territory’s land: hiking, fishing, swimming, boating, horse watering, berry gathering, and camping rights, etc. Roaming Rights assume that people are living, reproducing, developing Earthlings, and therefore the public needs to traverse–move freely–and enjoy life in a social, balancing, non-depleting manner. This assumption is not shared by property right law, built for perpetual conquering (See the influential, founding formulations of property right and its underlying assumptions, forwarded by liberal-conservative theorists including Hobbes, Grotius, and Burke’s later reconciliation with capitalist liberalism, etc.). Roaming Right corrects property right and its antihuman excesses.

Organizing for Roaming Rights is important in the settler colonies today because inequality has grown to the point where settlers are financially excluded from global rentier capitalism’s metropoles, while at the same time they are losing access to the dispersed resources required to live and enjoy life in the tributary regions. In this context, tributary settler-indigenous coalition is vital. After all, and all pretty mystifications aside, how are indigenous people made? Indigenous people are not another, animal-like species or colorful otherworldly visitation, as political discourse has predominantly constructed them. Whatever their history and culture, the indigenous have been repeatedly constructed, and will be made out of the raw material of people again, by imperialists prohibiting indigenous people’s free movement and access to the necessities and enjoyment of life outside of inaccessible, commodified, commercial cities. Race is network boundary construction, and it’s not been as tight or class-distinguishing a boundary as wealth accumulators prefer. Today’s FIRE (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate industry) and surveillance and military tech do the exact same function, tighter.

Every capitalist elite is afraid of working class settlers and smallholders recognizing that they can be made indigenous or enslaved. To some extent this is an honest, liberal fear, because many smallholding settlers have, with but a little elite threat/encouragement, moved from that sociological, historical realization to “Better you than me” imperial warfare against indigenized people, the enslaved, and descendents thereof (See Wilson 1976).

But that honest fear has always been in coalition with the much more self-interested elite fear that other smallholding settlers will coalesce politically with the indigenized, the enslaved, and their descendants. By suppressing non-elite organic intellectuals, we have hardly come to terms with this liberal-conservative elite coalition, the imperial “civilized” bloc, and its ravaging effects.

Instead, apartheid society is fed a nonstop stream of conservative and liberal high and low cultural enforcement, cementing us apart along the difference-justice telos: Whites must know only their unjust, isolated historical place. Reified, stylized, Black positionality, Black Exceptionalism will carry difference justice (as that is reduced to liberal Dem Party political rentier strategy). In the UK, this quasi-historical (permitting recognition of heritage, but prohibiting recognition of ongoing social construction, social reproduction) cultural pseudo-speciation is further reinforced through regional class distinctions.

The Primitive Accumulation of the US West in the 21st Century

From Turkewitz 2019: “In the last decade, private land in the United States has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few. Today, just 100 families own about 42 million acres across the country, a 65,000-square-mile expanse, according to the Land Report, a magazine that tracks large purchases. Researchers at the magazine have found that the amount of land owned by those 100 families has jumped 50 percent since 2007.”

The fracking-lord Wilks brothers “who now own some 700,000 acres across several states, have become a symbol of the out-of-touch owner. In Idaho, as their property has expanded, the brothers have shuttered trails and hired armed guards to patrol their acres, blocking and stymying access not only to their private property, but also to some publicly owned areas…The Wilks brothers see what they are doing as a duty. God had given them much, Justin said. In return, he said, “we feel that we have a responsibility to the land.”

“Gates with “private property” signs were going up across the region. In some places, the Wilkses’ road closings were legal. In other cases, it wasn’t clear. Road law is a tangled knot, and Boise County had little money to grapple with it in court. So the gates stayed up.

…The Wilks family hired a lobbyist to push for a law that would stiffen penalties for trespass…

The problem, said Mr. Horting, “is not the fact that they own the property. It’s that they’ve cut off public roads.”

“We’re being bullied,” he added. “We can’t compete and they know it” (Turkewitz 2019).

As well, financial institutions started dispensing with land titling a few years ago, so in the post-2007 property grab, claims on property are going to fall to might rather than right. It’s a new mass primitive accumulation offensive.

Climate Crisis, Unproductive Capital, & Elite Rentier Strategy

While they let their Republican henchmen lull the peasantry with squeals of “No climate crisis” for decades, billionaire rentier capitalists shifted quietly into land-capturing overdrive.

“Brokers say the new arrivals are driven in part by a desire to invest in natural assets while they are still abundant, particularly amid a fear of economic, political and climate volatility.

‘There is a tremendous underground, not-so-subtle awareness from people who realize that resources are getting scarcer and scarcer,’ said Bernard Uechtritz, a real estate adviser” (Turkewitz 2019).

The Persistent Role of Moralism in Expropriation

Moving into extractive fracking from a Texas religious franchise, the Wilks Bros provide a strong example of how extractivism and expropriation is buttressed by moralism.

While buying political and legal cover, they continually assert that their antisocial land speculation offensive is mandated by God, sacralizing their self-interested conflation of smallholder living space with their own, exclusionary mass capture of land.

Expropriative, Gilded-Age Restoration: Separating Out Global Rentier Capitalists’ Interests from Smallholder Interests

TBD

The Urbanite’s Interest in Roaming Right

Why would an urbanite care about Roaming Right? After all, urbanites are precisely the people who have forfeited Roaming Right in favor of obtaining all their life reproduction needs and enjoyment through the concentrated commodity market of the city, and by proximity to self-interested elite infrastructure. As Mike Davis and Cedric Johnson (2019) clarify, the cosmopolitan eschews the public. Relatedly, the condition of inequality-restoration urbanity, the engine of global monopoly capitalism, is the denial of capitalism’s reproductive dependence upon its sea of expropriation. A city is built on legalized, overlapping claims on future wealth creation, but the ingredients to that wealth creation are not exclusively to be found in the city.

Urban intellectuals and social workers recognize that denial extremely partially, as “gentrification.” Those who cannot live on 100% commodified life, the poor, are removed out of sight from the metropole. Yet at the same time, within and across borders, the tributary countryside is enclosed by global billionaires, and the people in that periphery are shoved to the smallholding margins, left without wealth, without access to fully-commodified life (which affordability, which wage-consumption urban economy depends on rural decommodifications, cheap inputs), or access to non-commodified life reproduction or enjoyment. They are expelled, set marching, set reeling. We admire how they’ve chosen us when they alight amongst us to serve us. Or we demand to speak to the manager. As in past Primitive Accumulation offensives, itinerancy is criminalized, and imperial militarization and an international for-profit carceral industry rages like a climate-crisis Firenado.

In this context, wouldn’t it be more natural, an efficient division of political labor, for urbanites to focus on getting Democrats (or Liberals or NDP) elected to office? Meanwhile urbanites can wait for deprived, low-density rural populations to organize their own solution to their desperate lives. After all, in those moments when those rural folks were organized and slightly-patronized by big owners (See Wilson 1976), they should have seen the limits of the inequality coalition…like wage-earning urbanites do? Something seems to be impeding organization. Perhaps, just perhaps, it’s that massive surveillance, policing, and carceral apparatus (Johnson 2019).

Cities depend on tributaries for most of the raw materials of life bought on the urban market. As well, they depend on using the countryside as an urban waste sink. A pervasive lack of recognition of the non-autonomy of the city, urban commodity fetishism, including imagining the enjoyments–museums, libraries, bars and restaurants, dance venues, art galleries, theatres, orchestras, ballet troupes, poetry nights, etc.–as the sui generis private-collective property of the city, the lack of  conceptualization of how the cheap raw-material market goods come to appear in the city and how wastes disappear from the city, leads to pervasive political mis-analysis.

If cosmopolitans around the world want to stop being ruled by Donald Trump and like politicians, if they want to enjoy the free expression of their cosmopolitan merit, they need to use their geographic concentration as an organization asset to break down the marginalization, the peasantification of the countryside domestic and international, the remnant alignment between rural -tributary smallholders and global rentier capitalists–particularly in an unfree time in which those rentier capitalists are aggressively excluding rural settlers from enjoyable rural life and yet inequality, including tight metropole police exclusion of indigents, prohibits mass rural-urban mobility.

museum display

Artwork by Fernando Garcia-Dory & Amy Franceschini

As beholden as their enjoyment and their identities are to FIRE (Finance Insurance Real Estate capital) patronage and cheap commodity inputs and waste sinks, urbanites need to organize, to reconstruct a smallholder Red-Green alliance traversing the urban-rural divide, and taming private property right, as Swedes did at the turn of the Twentieth Century to establish an effective, semi-independent social democracy. Roaming Right is a great coalition vehicle for such a democratic realignment and legal revolution. City people should use their structurally-superior communication and organization capacity to reach out and help rural people–across race and gender–to secure–but not mine–the non-commodified world they need to live and enjoy themselves, through universal Roaming Right. Recognizing that the past half century of rural expulsions transcends national boundaries, Red-green political coalition could be the “close to home” foundation of internationalist capacity, rather than mere consumption cosmopolitanism.

 

You Are What You Enjoy: Identity, Alienation, & Inegalitarianism in Capitalism

TBD

 

Bibliography

 

Greens of British Columbia. 2017. “Weaver introduces Right to Roam Act.”

Ilgunas, Ken. 2018. This land is our land: How we lost the right to roam and how to take it. Plume Press.

Johnson, Cedric. 2019. “Black political life and the Blue Lives Matter Presidency.” Jacobin, February 17.

Turkewitz, J. 2019. “Who gets to own the West?The New York Times, June 22.

Wikipedia. “Freedom to Roam.”

Wilson, William Julius. 1976. “Class conflict and segregation in the Postbellum South.” Pacific Sociological Review 19 (4): 431-446.

The peasantification of the American working class

The Anglo-American policy was to take from indigenous peoples, and give to non-elite settlers, smallholder property, a mode of life that “begets no community…and no political organisation among them, they do not form a class.” In Anglo-America, there is no effort toward organizing work decently, humanely, with respect for life. All the organization is toward converting (subsidizing) workers into high-risk-saddled (Lotto mentality) smallholders. A million nail shops. Why this has been done is best understood through Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire analysis of peasantry politics. Erica Benner preciently analyzed this in 1995, and Verso republished her work in 2018.

Peasants “were obliged to rely on other classes to protect their interests: ‘they cannot’, Marx wrote, ‘represent themselves; they must be represented.” This, however, has not always, everywhere been true. In Sweden the peasant class for centuries held their own parliamentary seats, reserved for them by economic status, and occupied by the more affluent peasants. It is Anglo culture, including via Anglo liberalism, that structures peasantry to be a politically-subordinate, dehumanizing condition.

This particular sort of peasant culture is reproduced throughout imperial Europe, where for peasants, “war was their poetry, the smallholding, extended and rounded off in imagination, was their fatherland, and patriotism was the ideal form of property” (Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire). While religion and military honour culturally predispose peasants to elite manipulation, however, Marx “firmly rejected the notion that cultural values provide a stronger set of motivations explaining peasant nationalism than their more specific, prudential interests…To espouse an ideology which strikes deep chords in tradition-bound peasant heart is not, (Marx) insisted, a sufficient condition for a successful appeal to the peasantry” (Benner 2018: 129).

Rather, the decisive “question was whether those who issued the (co-optative or coalitional) appeal promised to protect the peasant’s material and social interests. Marx argued that those interests did not necessarily dictate support for reactionary leaders and policies” (Benner 2018: 129). Hence the eventful Red-Green coalition in turn-of-the-20th century Sweden, as well as 1930s Minnesota, etc.

By pouring all Anglo-American policy into incentivizing working-class people to gamble on small businesses–typically a succession of marginal and failing businesses–as diametrically opposed to supporting decent working conditions, the ruling class has ensured the peasantification of the settler working class.

From there, the ruling class strategy– from Clear Channel to the SPA to Focus on the Family and the centralized organization of rural churches–has been to stroke peasantry culture while promising to protect the Anglo-American peasantry’s material and social interests– ensuring that the peasantified Anglo-American working classes support reactionary leaders and policies.

In that sense, Trump is continuity, he is but a part of a longstanding ruling class strategy. He is merely distinguished as a boss rentier at the rentier phase of global monopoly capitalism.

Despite Joe Biden and the Clintons’ avid, patronizing, and peasant-immiserating pursuit of the Arkansas Walmarts-and-for-profit-prison model, the professional political rentiers, particularly in the strategically urban-centric Democrat Party, were failing to co-opt the peasantry. The peasantry had, by policy design, spread beyond the low-population-density, tributary countryside to encompass the American working class, including suburbs and increasingly cities, and including smallholders. The Dems’ exhausted late -20th century Southern strategy (Meritocratic Neoliberalism) in the 21st century is a strategy for private political rentierism, not party success.

 

Bibliography

Benner, Erica. Really existing nationalisms. Verso. Pp. 128-129.

Marx, Karl. 1852. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte.