defense industry in the Middle East

Modified from:

Sidestepping Sanctions
While the Bush administration looks the other way, U.S. companies are dodging laws that bar them from doing business with nations accused of sponsoring terrorism.
By Michael Scherer
July/August 2003 Issue
Mother Jones

In April 2003, as American tanks approached the outskirts of Baghdad, Pentagon officials suggested that only U.S. companies would be allowed to take part in the postwar reconstruction of Iraq’s oil fields. In strategic leaks to the press, the Defense Department offered a rationale for an American-only policy: European firms, they declared, should be excluded because they do business with Iran and other countries that sponsor terrorist organizations and harbor weapons of mass destruction.

What defense officials failed to note, however, is that many U.S. companies routinely find ways to bypass economic sanctions and export regulations that bar American citizens and companies from trading with Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Sudan. Taking advantage of legal loopholes, these corporations simply conduct their business through offshore subsidiaries that employ only foreign citizens. With no Americans on the payroll, the subsidiaries are free to ignore U.S. sanctions against the “axis of evil” and other countries identified by the Bush administration as the primary sponsors of terrorism. Other U.S. firms — including Hewlett-Packard, Kodak, and Procter & Gamble — ship their products to Dubai, where third parties are known to “re-export” goods to Iran.

Says Michael Beck, an expert on sanctions at the University of Georgia, “American companies bypass U.S. export controls by using entities based in other countries.”

In Iran — “the most active state sponsor of terrorism,” according to the State Department — General Electric is providing four hydroelectric generators to expand a dam on the Kurun River through a Canadian subsidiary called GE Hydro and is also supplying pipeline compressors and gas turbines for Iran’s burgeoning oil sector through an Italian unit called Nuovo Pignone. Not far from the Iraqi border, a subsidiary of Halliburton is helping to build a $228 million fertilizer plant, one of the world’s largest. Another Halliburton division based in Sweden is providing the Iranian National Oil Co. with a $226 million semi-submersible drilling rig, while other subsidiaries operate in Libya. A British subsidiary of ConocoPhillips helped Iran survey its Azadegan oil field, and ExxonMobil only recently sold its Sudanese gas subsidiary based in Khartoum.

U.S. companies acknowledge that they routinely use overseas subsidiaries to trade with sanctioned countries in the Middle East and elsewhere. “We have used foreign subsidiaries to sell oil equipment in those regions,” says Scott Amann, a vice president at the oil-service firm Cooper Cameron. “We’re not allowed to have an American company or American operation.”

But while President Bush has drawn a line in the sand with foreign governments, warning them “you are with us or you’re with the terrorists,” he has done little to crack down on U.S. corporations that skirt trade embargoes designed to undercut terrorist organizations.

Previous administrations have been less friendly to sanction dodgers. The Reagan administration pressured subsidiaries of Conoco and Marathon to leave Libya in the 1980s, and in 1995 the Clinton administration persuaded Conoco to abandon an Iranian oil contract arranged through a Dutch subsidiary. “If a government is strongly committed to stopping these kinds of transactions, it can do so,” says Kenneth Rodman, a sanctions expert at Colby College. “There is power that the U.S. is choosing not to use for some reason.”

Instead, the Bush administration has used its power behind the scenes to make it easier for American companies to do business with the very countries it has targeted in the war on terrorism. As CEO of Halliburton, Dick Cheney lobbied to lift U.S. sanctions against Iran and Libya, saying they hurt business and failed to stop terrorism. As vice president, Cheney has initiated a “comprehensive review of sanctions” as part of the National Energy Review, suggesting that sanctions against oil-producing nations should be relaxed to improve “energy security.” Last year the administration supported a bill that would have weakened trade restrictions on high-speed computers and other technology that can be used to develop nuclear weapons, and the Securities and Exchange Commission has delayed issuing rules that would require foreign companies to disclose their business deals in sanctioned countries.

Political capitalists and their lobbyists, such as William Reinsch of the National Foreign Trade Council, which spent $280,000 lobbying against sanctions in 2001, have been lobbying fiercely to further loosen trade barriers. While they obviously would like to make profits off of businesses in the sanctioned countries, their rhetoric is (1) that sanctions against Iran, Libya, Sudan, and other countries limit cultural and economic exchanges that could promote reform; and (2) they say sanctions give unfair advantage to foreign companies not beholden to U.S. law.

Critics ask why major corporations are being allowed to sidestep the law. Sanctions enjoy broad, bipartisan support — the most recent version of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act passed Congress by a vote of 409-6 — and conservative Republicans have been among the most vocal champions of cutting off trade to countries that sponsor terrorist organizations. “By doing business in these countries, you are basically selling the rope that will be used to harm U.S. citizens,” says Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.). “It’s fundamentally immoral to me.”

In April, Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) called on the Pentagon to investigate Halliburton’s business dealings with Iran and Libya, noting that the company also provides support for American military operations. “I think many people will be surprised to learn that a company receiving millions of taxpayer dollars to support the war on terrorism has had business deals with some of the leading state sponsors of terrorism,” Waxman says. “Congress should determine whether companies are complying with the spirit and the letter of U.S. law.”

At the state level, lawmakers and investors have decided to take action themselves. In January, a bill requiring public pension funds to disclose their dealings with sanctioned countries was introduced in Arizona. A month later, officials who manage pensions for public employees in New York City urged shareholders of General Electric, Halliburton, and ConocoPhillips to pass resolutions requiring the companies to disclose their contracts with Iran and Syria, another “state sponsor of terrorism,” saying such trade deals “violate the spirit of the law.”


the word on class and political parties, from Political Science

Asked by me to explain Poli-Sci’s take on the question: “Why do we have two (2) parties (one A-team, one B-team) representing capital in the U.S. (and no one representing anyone else)?”, my poli-sci guru said:

“I suppose it depends on what you think capital’s (capital as sector or factor) overarching interest is. My bet is that capital, irrespective of sectoral divisions within, wants to limit redistribution from itself to the poor, middle class, working class.

There’s really strong cross-national evidence that the more proportional an electoral system is, the higher taxes and redistribution are. Increased proportionality improves the representation of the poor/left which often times enters a governing coalition with a party of the center and votes for higher taxes on capital and redistributes to its own constituencies.

If you want to avoid this, a two party system is very nice as it forces the left to moderate itself in search of voters in the middle of the ideological (or income) distribution. The rich get off even better if a two party system is imposed on a society in which the vote of the left is geographically concentrated (it’s almost always concentrated in cities), because the resulting single member districts tend to create a smallish number of very, very safe and ‘far to the’ left districts (Sigrunn’s scare quotes).

In the meantime, the right is able to gerrymander the suburbs and rural areas in a way to generate a right, or conservative, bias in the electoral system.

There are more formal, semi-bullshit stories one could spin out of the median voter theorem, and how it works under different electoral systems, that would provide a similar account.

This all works only if you think capital’s preferences are fundamentally different from those of the poor. There are others who tell stories of efficient bargains where the interests of workers and capital in any given sector are consistent with each other. I think these latter stories are pretty wacked.”

Absolute Corruption

The citation for the NYTimes story on the limited, censored release of CIA FoI documents in 2007, RE: the CIA attempts to assassinate Castro, as well as domestic spying, torture, and CIA-mafia connections, from the 1960s and early 1970s:

Mazzetti, Mark and Tim Weiner. 2007. “Files on illegal spying show C.I.A. skeletons from Cold War.” The New York Times, June 27.

judge walton snaps evil fuckers

Slightly adapted from:

A Little Help
Dozen Top Legal Scholars Line Up for Libby Appeal
By Carol D. Leonnig
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, June 11, 2007; Page A15

A dozen of the country’s most respected constitutional scholars have leapt to I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby’s aid, asking a federal judge if they could try to convince him about critical legal questions that favor letting Libby remain free while he appeals his conviction in the Valerie Plame leak case.

Within hours of Friday’s filing from the scholars, U.S. District Judge Reggie B. Walton wrote back. In the teeny-tiny print of a footnote, he said he was delighted to know that such a distinguished group was available to help argue on behalf of criminal defendants on “close questions” of the law.

Walton promised he’d ring them up very soon when there might be poor defendants who need big legal minds to avoid incarceration, as opposed to Vice President Cheney’s well-padded former chief of staff facing the threat of the slammer.

Walton sentenced Libby last week to 30 months in prison and will hold a hearing on Thursday to consider whether Libby can remain free while his case is appealed.

“It is an impressive show of public service when twelve prominent and distinguished current and former law professors of well-respected schools are able to amass their collective wisdom in the course of only several days to provide their legal expertise to the Court on behalf of a criminal defendant,” Walton wrote. It is unclear whether he intends to grant the Right-wing Legal/Academic A-team’s request.

Walton added: “The Court trusts that this is a reflection of these eminent academics’ willingness in the future to step up to the plate and provide like assistance in cases involving any of the numerous litigants, both in this Court and throughout the courts of our nation, who lack the financial means to fully and properly articulate the merits of their legal positions.”

Indeed, it was an impressive group, including former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork and beloved Zionist hatchet man Alan Dershowitz.

Also joining the brief were Vikram Amar of the University of California’s Hastings law school, Randy Barnett and Viet Dinh of Georgetown, Douglas Kmiec and Robert Pushaw of Pepperdine, Richard Parker of Harvard, Gary Lawson of Boston University, Thomas Merrill of Columbia, Earl Maltz of Rutgers and Robert Nagel of the University of Colorado.

The Gang of Twelve argued in a six-page brief that Libby, who was convicted of lying to investigators probing the leak of Plame’s identity, has a decent shot at appeal on the question of Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald’s appointment to investigate that leak. That appointment was likely inappropriate, they argued, because Fitzgerald lacked any supervision that would make his superiors “politically accountable”, presumably to Republican overlords.

Note: In this article, the journalist uses Dershowitz’s own, deeply Orwellian title for himself: “civil libertarian”. Clearly, she was frightened, as well she should be from that monster. When she tries to argue that Dershowitz is “no friend of the Bush administration”, the author also evinces an inexplicable innocence as to the existence of the Right-wing political group known as neocons, to which all the above “constitutional” lawyers belong.

Senate Republicans block union bill

Senate Republicans block union bill
Staff and agencies
26 June, 2007
By JESSE J. HOLLAND, AP Labor Writer 1 minute ago

WASHINGTON – Senate Republicans on Tuesday blocked a bill that would allow labor unions to organize workplaces without a secret ballot election.

The final vote was 51-48.

The House passed the bill in March. Democrats and labor unions pressed for a vote in the Senate in hopes of rallying their voters in the 2008 elections, where they hope to win the White House and increase their majorities in the House and Senate.

The GOP also plans to use the vote for election-year campaigning, with corporations and businesses being the top opponents to the legislation. The National Republican Senatorial Committee sent out a fundraising video last week asking people to contribute in order to help stop the Employee Free Choice Act.

The legislation was a litmus test vote for organized labor and businesses, strong supporters of Democrats and Republicans respectively. “Today‘s vote shows us who is standing with workers and which politicians are in collusion with corporate America to destroy the middle class,” Teamsters President Jim Hoffa said.

The bill would require employers to recognize unions after being presented union cards signed by a majority of eligible workers on their payrolls. Under current labor law, a company can demand a secret ballot election supervised by the federal government after being presented the union cards.

Unions complain that employers have greater access to workers during secret ballot campaigns and claim that corporate threats, intimidation and eventual firings have become common for union activists. By dragging out the election process, companies often succeed in wearing down union enthusiasm, they add.

The communications professional Holland concludes his article by listing the amount of money labor gives to Democrats. But since he somehow failed to list how much money organized capital gives to the Republicans, or even how much money organized capital gave to Republicans for this particular anti-union campaign, both of which figures would dwarf labor contributions to the Dems, I am not going to dignify such unbalanced storytelling with repetition.

The Social Democratic Party in Sweden

Since it’s been edited away from this version by now, I’ll own up to editing and writing this Wikipedia entry in nearly its entirety, while I was doing my Swedish dissertation research write-up a few years back. I’ve re-edited it here a bit to bring out parts of the story that I think are germane to understanding what makes social democracy tick, but that don’t particularly appeal to Wikipedia’s conservative, nationalist, and liberal patrols.


Swedish Social Democracy’s Backbone: Social Movements & Socialism

Since the party has held power of office for a majority of terms after its founding in 1889, the ideology and policies of the Social Democratic Party (SAP, Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti) have had strong influence on Swedish politics.[5] Swedish social democracy is partially an outgrowth of the strong and well-organized 1880s and 1890s working class emancipation, temperance, and religious liberalization folkrörelser (folk movements), by which peasant and workers’ organizations both vigorously disrupted the status quo and penetrated state structures early on, paving the way for electoral politics. These social movements had a profound influence on political formation in Sweden (at least in part because they experienced less state repression than workers’ organizations have, for example, throughout the Anglosphere–the UK, US, Canada, Australia). In this way, Swedish social democratic ideology is inflected by a socialist tradition foregrounding widespread and individual human development. [6]

Gunnar Adler-Karlsson (1967) confidently likened the social democratic project to the successful social democratic effort to divest the king of all power but formal grandeur: “Without dangerous and disruptive internal fights…After a few decades they (capitalists) will then remain, perhaps formally as kings, but in reality as naked symbols of a passed and inferior development state.” [7] However, so far the capitalists have decidedly outmanoeuvered this ambition, which is in any case not likely shared by neoliberal party members.

Liberalism in Swedish Social Democracy

Liberalism has also strongly infused social democratic ideology. Liberalism has oriented social democratic goals to security, as where Tage Erlander, prime minister from 1946-1969, described security as “too big a problem for the individual to solve with only his own power.”[8] Up to the 1980s, when neoliberalism and neoconservatism began to provide an alternative, aggressively pro-capitalist model for ensuring social quiescence, the SAP was able to secure capital’s cooperation by convincing capital that it shared the goals of increasing economic growth and reducing social friction. For liberal social democrats, Marxism is at best loosely held to be valuable for its emphasis on changing the world for a more just, better future.[9] In 1889, Hjalmar Branting, leader of the SAP from its founding to his death in 1925, asserted, “I believe…that one benefits the workers…so much more by forcing through reforms which alleviate and strengthen their position, than by saying that only a revolution can help them.” [10]

Some observers have argued that this liberal aspect has hardened into increasingly neoliberal ideology and policies, gradually maximizing the latitude of powerful market actors.[11] Certainly, conservative neoclassical economists have been firmly pushing the Social Democratic Party into capitulating to most of capital’s traditional preferences and prerogatives, which they term “modern industrial relations.”[12]

Both socialist and liberal aspects of the party were influenced by the dual sympathies of early leader Hjalmar Branting, and manifest in the party’s first actions: reducing the work day to eight hours and establishing the franchise for working class people.

Social Democratic Assets

While some commentators have seen the party lose focus with the rise of SAP neoliberal study groups, the Swedish Social Democratic Party has for many years appealed to Swedes as innovative, capable, and worthy of running the state.[13] The Social Democrats became one of the most successful political parties in the world, with some structural advantages in addition to their auspicious birth within vibrant folkrörelser.

At the close of the nineteenth century, liberals and socialists had to band together to augment establishment democracy, which was at that point embarrassingly behind in Sweden; they could point to formal democratic advances elsewhere to motivate political action. [14] Sweden was a semi-peripheral, small country at the beginning of the twentieth century, considered unimportant to competing global political factions; so it was permitted more independence, while soon the co-existence of communist and capitalist superpowers allowed social democracy to flourish in the geo-political interstices. [15]

The SAP has the resource of sharing ideas and experiences, and working with its sister parties throughout the Nordic countries. Sweden could also borrow and innovate upon ideas from English-language economists, which was an advantage for the Social Democrats in the Great Depression; but more advantageous for the bourgeois parties in the 1980s and afterward. While the SAP has not been innocent of repressing communists,[16] the party has overall benefitted, in government coalition and in avoiding severe stagnation and drift, by engaging in relatively constructive relationships with the more radical Left Party and the Greens, and in supporting and working with another external ally, the LO Labour Confederation, which has supplied to the coalition ingenious labor economists over the years. The SAP had internal resources as well, in creative politicians with brilliant tactical minds.

Among the prime ideological assets of the Swedish Social Democratic Party in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century was its redefinition of “socialization” from “common ownership of the means of production” to increasing “democratic influence over the economy.” [17] Starting out in a socialist-liberal coalition fighting for the vote, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) defined socialism as the development of democracy—political and economic. It has been argued that this modification of socialism was key to the SAP’s comparative ability to form coalitions, innovate, and govern where other European social democratic parties became crippled and crumbled under Right-wing regimes.[18]

The Swedish Social Democrats could count the middle class among their solidaristic working class constituency by recognizing the middle class as “economically dependent,” “working people,” or among the “progressive citizens,” rather than as sub-capitalists.[19] “The party does not aim to support and help [one] working class at the expense of the others,” the Social Democratic congress of 1932 established. In fact, with social democratic policies that refrained from supporting inefficient and low-profit businesses (Except supporting small business ownership as an economic strategy for refugee immigrant families.) in favor of cultivating higher-quality working conditions, as well as a strong commitment to public education, the middle class in Sweden became so large that the capitalist class (broadly speaking) has remained concentrated (compared to countries where policy encourages a large low-profit, high failure rate, low-wage, small business sector).[20]

Not only did the SAP fuse the growing middle class into their constituency, they also brilliantly forged initial and subsequent periodic coalitions with small-scale farmers (as members of the “exploited classes”) to great strategic effect. [21] Their trans-working class and red-green coalitions were key to Social Democrat successes. A backbone socialist ideology allowed the SAP to long maintain a prescient, and effective view of the working class: “[The SAP] does not question…whether those who have become capitalism’s victims…are industrial workers, farmers, agricultural laborers, forestry workers, store clerks, civil servants or intellectuals,” asserted the party’s 1932 election manifesto.[22]

Folkhemmet: The SAP’s Strategic Co-optation of Conservative Nationalist Ideology

As the SAP has worked more or less constructively with Left parties serving as a radical edge, the Social Democrats have borrowed from socialists some of their discourse, and decreasingly, the socialist understanding of the structurally-compromised position of labor under capitalism.

Even more creatively, the Social Democrats commandeered selected, transcendental images from such nationalists as Rudolf Kjellen (1912), very effectively undercutting fascism’s appeal in Sweden. [23] In this way, Per Albin Hansson declared that “there is no more patriotic party than the [SAP since] the most patriotic act is to create a land in which all feel at home,” famously igniting Swedes’ innermost longing for transcendence with the idea of the Folkhem (1928), or People’s Home. “The expansion of the party to a people’s party does not mean and must not mean a watering down of socialist demands,” Hansson soothed. [24]

“The basis of the home is community and togetherness. The good home does not recognize any privileged or neglected members, nor any favorite or stepchildren. In the good home there is equality, consideration, co-operation, and helpfulness. Applied to the great people’s and citizens’ home this would mean the breaking down of all the social and economic barriers that now separate citizens into the privileged and the neglected, into the rulers and the dependents, into the rich and the poor, the propertied and the impoverished, the plunderers and the plundered. Swedish society is not yet the people’s home. There is a formal equality, equality of political rights, but from a social perspective, the class society remains, and from an economic perspective the dictatorship of the few prevails” (Hansson 1928).[25]

Yet the Social Democratic Party promoted Folkhemmet as a socialist home with an unfinished agenda at a point in which the party forswore disruptive working class strategy and distanced itself from the policy tool of nationalization (Although there were exceptions. The railway companies were nationalized from 1939-1948, the LKAB mining company was nationalized in 1957, and large parts of the banking sector were nationalized in 1992).

ALMPs, Centralized Bargaining, & Full Employment: Social Democratic Policies

The Social Democratic Party is generally recognized as the main architect of the progressive taxation, free trade, low-unemployment, Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP)-based Swedish welfare state that was developed in the years after World War II. Sweden emerged sound from the Great Depression with a brief, successful “Keynesianism-before Keynes” economic program advocated by Ernst Wigforss, a prominent Social Democrat who educated himself in economics by studying the work of the British radical Liberal economists. The voluntary 1938 Saltsjöbaden capital-labor agreement, regulating and constraining capital’s and labor’s tactical conflict repertoires, established the cooperative institutional foundation for three decades of centralized bargaining. The social democratic labor market policies (ALMPs) were developed in the 1940s and 1950s by LO (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, the blue-collar union federation) economists Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. [26]

The Rehn-Meidner model featured the centralized system of wage bargaining that aimed to both set wages at a just level and promote business efficiency and productivity. With the pre-1983 cooperation of capital and labor federations that bargained independently of the state, the state determined that wages would be higher than the market would set in firms that were inefficient or uncompetitive and lower than the market would set in firms that were highly productive and competitive. Workers were compensated with state-sponsored retraining and relocating; as well, the state reformed wages to the goal of “equal pay for equal work,” eliminated unemployment (“the reserve army of labor”) “as a disciplinary stick,” and kept incomes consistently rising, while taxing progressively and pooling social wealth to deliver services through local governments. [27] Social Democratic policy in Sweden has traditionally emphasized a state spending structure whereby public services are supplied via local government, as opposed to emphasizing social insurance program transfers. [28]

From Emulation to Discipline: On the Response of Anglo-america to Swedish Social Democracy

The depiction of Swedish society abroad has reflected or rebuked these social democratic policies. The early Swedish “red-green” coalition encouraged Nordic-networked socialists in the state of Minnesota, in the U.S., to dedicate efforts to building a similarly potent labor-farmer alliance that put the socialists in the governorship (who could then use the National Guard to defend striking workers from Pinkerton Detectives), ran model innovative statewide anti-racism programs in the early years of the twentieth century, and enabled federal forest managers in Minnesota to practice a precocious ecological-socialism, before Democratic Party reformers appropriated the Minnesota Farm-Labor Party infrastructure to the liberal Democratic Party in 1944.[29]

On the other hand, policies comprising the Nordic model have often been depicted, in American conservative circles and the American press, as wreaking havoc upon Swedish society. At a July 27, 1960 Republican National Committee breakfast in Chicago, President Dwight D. Eisenhower disingenuously claimed that “a friendly European country (commentators read this as Sweden)…has a tremendous record for socialistic operation, following a socialistic philosophy, and the record shows that their rate of suicide has gone up almost unbelievably and I think they were almost the lowest nation in the world for that. Now they have more than twice our rate. Drunkenness has gone up. Lack of ambition is discernible on all sides.”[30] Unflattering depictions of Swedish society, emanating from conservative American competitive distaste for social democratic policies, have not withered over time. Arguing that the Swedish approach to Muslims is too lenient, a typical [47] New York Times editorial claims, “(C)learly, various experiments close to the heart of Swedish democracy and Swedish socialism have gone wrong.”[31]

Sweden & Global Social Disruption

Under the Social Democrats’ administration, Sweden retained neutrality, as a foreign policy guideline, during the wars of the twentieth century, including the Cold War. Neutrality preserved the Swedish economy and boosted Sweden’s economic competitiveness in the first half of the twentieth century, as other European countries’ economies were devasted by war.[32] Under Olof Palme‘s Social Democratic leadership Sweden further aggravated the hostility of political conservatives when Palme openly and unequivocally denounced US imperial aggression in Vietnam. In a typical fit of pique, Nixon temporarily suspended diplomatic ties with the social democratic country. Olaf Palme was assassinated in 1986; while many petty criminals have been fingered for the crime, it is popularly believed the CIA was the assassinator, due to UN mediator Palme’s characteristic lack of sympathy for the conservative Americans’ Iran-Contra operation at that time.

The Swedish neutrality policy has changed with the contemporary ascendance of the bourgeois coalition, and Sweden has committed troops to support the Anglosphere’s imperial adventures in Afghanistan and other oil-strategic Islamic countries.

Sweden and its capitalists have long prospered by defense industry. Under Social Democratic governance, some of this profit was converted into relatively strong overseas humanitarian programs and a comparatively well-developed refugee program, that is nonetheless a lightning rod for neoliberalization arguments.[33]

Tipping Point / Not with a Bang but a Whimper: 
The Rejection of Socialism, the Triumph of the SAP Neoliberals & The Decline of Social Democracy in Sweden

Because the Rehn-Meidner model allowed capitalists owning very productive and efficient firms to retain excess profits at the expense of the firms’ workers, workers in these firms began to agitate for a share of the profits in the 1970s. Meidner established a study committee that came up with a 1976 proposal that entailed transferring the excess profits into investment funds controlled by communities and the workers in the efficient firms. This was a social democratic precipice for Sweden. Capital immediately distinguished this proposal as socialism, and launched an unprecedented opposition that became amplified by the global neoliberal movement. The Social Democratic Party blinked, and backed away from the progressive “reform”. [34] Here was the real limit to social democracy’s promise of a kinder, gentler transition to socialism.

As Swedish capital increasingly moved Swedish investment into other European countries with the coalescing of the European Union, a hegemonic consensus arose among the elite financial community: progressive taxation and pro-egalitarian redistribution became economic heresy.[35] Financial capital struck when the Swedish government imposed a miniscule financial tax on local brokerage services (The experimenting state neglected to impose the tax on foreign broker services, and this is regarded as the policy’s fatal flaw.); foreign investors removed their speculative funds to solicitous London, and domestic investors reduced their number of equity trades.[48]

Decline in per capita GDP after the 1970s portrays the Swedish economy in a dimming light, but it is important to note not only did profit rates begin to fall world-wide in the 1970s,[37] also this period saw rightward changes in Social Democratic ideology and policies, growing disenchantment with the SAP, and the electoral rise of the bourgeois coalition in place of the Social Democrats. A leading proponent of capital’s cause within the SAP at the time, Social Democrat Minister of Trade (1970-1975) and Finance Ministry member Kjell-Olof Feldt reminisced in a Swedish Playboy interview about his role in the SAP’s rightward turn,

“The negative inheritance I received from my predecessor Gunnar Sträng (Minister of Finance 1955 – 1976) was a strongly progressive tax system with high marginal taxes. This was supposed to bring about a just and equal society. But I eventually came to the opinion that it simply didn’t work out that way he concluded. Progressive taxes created instead a society of wranglers, cheaters, peculiar manipulations, false ambitions and new injustices. It took me at least a decade to get a part of the party to see this.”[36]

Social Democratic neoliberal measures instituted in the 1980s–including deregulating the currency, dropping corporate taxation and taxation on high income-earners, and switching from anti-unemployment policies to anti-inflationary policies–were exacerbated by international recession, unchecked currency speculation, and a centre-right government led by Carl Bildt, creating the financial crisis, and then state fiscal crisis, of the early 1990s.[38]

When the Social Democrats returned to power in 1992, they responded to the induced fiscal crisis by stabilizing the currency and nationalizing a large part of the banking system. As well, in the standard neoliberal Shock Doctrine approach of the era, the SAP reduced the welfare state and privatized public services and goods. With the collapse of the Left bank that was the Soviet Union, Right pressure ran amok worldwide, and Social Democratic Party leaders sought to tie the SAP, their own careers, and Sweden to the European Union’s (EU) fortunes. Goran Persson and Mona Sahlin promoted EU  membership, and the Swedish referendum passed by 52-48% in favor of joining the E.U. on August 14, 1994. However, inasmuch as the SAP claimed that it would allow Swedes to influence the rest of Europe, the neoliberal SAP’s turn to the EU was received with deep ambivalence if not popular disfavor in Sweden. In a subsequent referendum, Swedes rejected the SAP leadership’s efforts to abandon Swedish monetary policy (semi-)control by converting to the euro currency.

Withal, many of the aspects of the social democratic welfare state continued to function at a high level, due in no small part to both path dependency and the exemplary competency and efficiency of the feminized public sector workforce.[39] As well, the Social Democrats initiated studies on the effects of the neoliberal changes, and the dismally-regressive picture that emerged from those findings allowed the party to reduce many tax expenditures, slightly increase taxes on high income-earners and significantly reduce taxes on food. The Social Democratic Finance Minister increased spending on child support and continued to pay down the public debt.[40] At the turn of the twenty-first century, Sweden has a well-regarded, generally robust economy, and the average quality of life, given government transfers, is very high, inequality is about the lowest in the world– though as elsewhere it is rising (the gini coefficient is .28), and social mobility is high (compared to other affluent but more sclerotic countries following Anglosphere and Catholic Conservative traditions) [41].

The twenty-first century Social Democratic Party champions “an open economy, strong trade unions and generous welfare” as the “pillars of the Swedish model,” [42] as opposed to the corporatist decision making institutions, and solidaristic wage policies that formerly constituted the Swedish Model. [43] Contemporary liberal Swedish Social Democratic politicians urge all “normal” European social democratic parties to “forswear all Marxist ideas,” as the German SPD did at Bad Godesberg in 1959.[44] Where decommodifying policy provides resources to working class people to help them have some independence from employer and capitalist class control,[45] Social Democratic efforts to decommodify workers have declined.

Even as initiatives to re-commodify workers gained momentum, Swedish feminists and Greens pushed the Social Democratic Party to pursue environmentalist and feminist policies which defend the conditions of reproduction and continue to push for decommodification in ways that take gender roles into account. Feminist policies formed and implemented by the Social Democratic Party and its coalitional partners, the Left Party and the Greens, include paid maternity and paternity leave, high employment for women in the public sector, combining flexible work with living wages and benefits, providing public support (still to an insufficient degree) for women in their traditional responsibilities for care giving, and policies to stimulate women’s political participation and leadership. Reviewing policies and institutional practices for their impact on women had become common in social democratic governance.

However, the variety of targeted social progressivism that can accompany neoliberal economic management is designed to dismantle broad freedoms-expanding social democratic foundations. Identity champions, including within the SAP, also allied with the post-1990 conservative “immigration crisis” political campaign, leading to the development of an “immigration crisis” consensus that fanned a passionate fear of order loss across Swedish society, promoted a desire for law and order, put labor institutions in question, and advanced the strengthened bourgeois coalition at the expense of the decreasingly-distinctive SAP in 2004 and thereafter.[46]

It appears that the SAP strives to model its post-socialist/social democracy role in Swedish society upon the UK’s New Labour and the US’s Democrat, somewhat more legitimation-oriented, capitalist parties. It remains to be seen, whether the LO and the other labor confederations will reconsider the Saltsjöbaden concessions, should a more favorable political opportunity structure of protest and disruption arise globally.


^ “Socialdemokraterna tappar medlemmar”, Svenska Dagbladet, 2007-03-19. Retrieved on 2007-03-27. (in Swedish)
^ Hur röstade LO-medlemmar?, Social bakgrund – sysselsättning relaterat till partiröst SVT Valu (Parliamentary election exit poll)
^ (Swedish)Historisk statistik över valåren 1910 – 2006, from Statistics Sweden, accessed June 14, 2007
^ Sundström, Eric. 2006. “Election analysis: Why we lost.”.
6) Samuelsson, Kurt. 1968. From great power to welfare state: 300 years of Swedish social development. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Misgeld, Molin & Amark. 1992. Creating Social Democracy. Penn State: Ch 2 Esping-Anderson on the prelude to soc dem, Ch 3 Amark on the trade union movement behind social democracy, Ch 4 Gidlund on how the popular movement transformed into a party, Ch 6 Odhner’s “Workers and farmers shape the Swedish model.”
Olsen, Gregg. The Politics of the Welfare State. Ch 6 “Societal Actors: Pressure from Above & Below.”
Alapuro, Risto. 1999. “On the repertoires of collective action in France and the Nordic countries.” TBD.
Pp. 101-102 in Adler-Karlsson, Gunnar. 1967. Functional Socialism. Stockholm: Prisma. Cited on p. 196 in Berman, Sheri. 2006. The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, MA.
^ Pp. 258-259 in Erlander, Tage. 1956 SAP Congress Protokoll, in Från Palm to Palme: Den Svenska Socialdemokratins Program. Stockholm: Raben and Sjögren. Cited in Berman 2006: 196. Abrahamson, Peter. “The Scandinavian model of welfare.” TBD
^ Berman 2006: 153
^ in a letter to Axel Danielsson in jail (1889), reprinted on p. 189 in Från Palm to Palme: Den Svenska Socialdemokratins Program. Stockholm: Raben and Sjögren. Cited in Berman 2006:156.
^ Korpi, Walter and Stern. 2004. “Women’s employment in Sweden: Globalization, deindustrialization, and the labor market experiences of Swedish Women 1950-2000.” Globalife Working Paper No. 51. Korpi, Walter and Joakim Palme. 2003. “New politics and class politics in the conext of austerity and globalization: Welfare state regress in 18 countries 1975-1995.” Stockholm: Stockholm University. Korpi, Walter. 2003. “Welfare state regress in Western Europe: Politics, Institutions, Globalization, and Europeanization.” Annual Review of Sociology 29: 589-609. Korpi, Walter. 1996. “Eurosclerosis and the sclerosis of objectivity: On the role of velues among economic policy experts.” Economic Journal 106: 1727-1746. Notermans, Ton. 1997. “Social democracy and external constraints.” Pp. 201-239 in Spaces of globalization: Reasserting the power of the local, edited by K.R. Cox. New York: The Guildord Press. Olsen, Gregg. 2002. The politics of the welfare state: Canada, Sweden, and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pred, Alan. 2000. Even in Sweden: Racisms, racialized spaces, and the popular geographical imagination. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ryner, Magnus. TBD. SAF. 1993. The Swedish Employers’ Confederation: An Influential Voice in Public Affairs. Stockholm: SAF. Stephens, John D. 1996. “The Scandinavian welfare states: Achievements, crisis, and prospects.” Pp. 32-65 in Welfare states in transition: National adaptations in global economies, edited by Gosta Esping-Anderson. Wennerberg, Tor. 1995. “Undermining the welfare state in Sweden.” ZMagazine, June. Accessed at [1].
^ Vartiainen, Juhana. 2001. “Understanding Swedish Social Democracy: Victims of Success?” pp. 21-52 in Social Democracy in Neoliberal Times, edited by Andrew Glyn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
^ Berman 2006: 153-154, 156
^ Berman 2006: 159
^ Berman 2006: 152
^ Cohen, Peter. 1994. “Sweden: The Model That Never Was.” Monthly Review, July-August.
^ Berman 2006: 196
^ Berman 2006: 153, 155
^ Berman 2006:157
^ Stevenson, Paul. 1979. “Swedish Capitalism: An Essay Review.” Crime, Law, and Social Change 3(2).
^ Berman 2006: 158-159; 166-167
^ Reprinted in Håkansson, edl, Svenska Valprogram, Vol. 2, and cited in Berman 2006:173
^ Berman 2006: 163-164; 170
^ Hansson, Per Albin. “Folk och Klass”: 80. Cited in Berman 2006: 166
^ Berkling. Från Fram till Folkhemmet: 227-230; Tilton. The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: 126-127.
^ Carroll, Eero. 2003. “International organisations and welfare states at odds? The case of Sweden.” Pp.75-88 in The OECD and European welfare states, edited by Klaus Armingeon and Michelle Beyeler. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Esping-Anderson, Gosta. 1985. Politics against markets: The social-democratic road to power. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Korpi, Walter. 1992. Halkar Sverige efter? Sveriges ekonomiska tillväxt 1820-1990 i jämförande belysning., Stockholm: Carlssons. Olsen, Gregg M. 1999. “Half empty or half full? The Swedish welfare state in transition.” Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology, 36 (2): 241-268. Olsen, Gregg. 2002. The politics of the welfare state: Canada, Sweden, and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Samuelsson, Kurt. 1968. From great power to welfare state: 300 years of Swedish social development. London: George Allen and Unwin.
^ Berman, Sheri. 2006. The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, MA
^ Abrahamson, Peter. 1999. “The Scandinavian model of welfare.” TBD
^ Delton, Jennifer A. 2002. Making Minnesota Liberal. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. Hudson, Mark. 2007. The Slow Co-Production of Disaster: Wildfire, Timber Capital, and the United States Forest Service. Eugene, OR: University of Oregon.
^ Eisenhower, Dwight D. 1960. From Public Papers of the President. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Available online at
^ Caudwell, Christopher. 2006. “Islam on the outskirts of the welfare state.” The New York Times.
^ Esping-Anderson, Gosta. 1985. Politics against markets: The social-democratic road to power. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Samuelsson, Kurt. 1968. From great power to welfare state: 300 years of Swedish social development. London: George Allen and Unwin.
^ Integrationsverket website TBD; Alund, Aleksandra & Carl-Ulrik Schierup TBD; Mulinari, Diana and Anders Neergaard. 2004. Den Nya Svenska Arbetarklassen. Borea: Borea Bokforlag.
^ Berman 2006: 198
^ Steinmo, Sven. 2001. “Bucking the Trend? The Welfare State and Global Economy: The Swedish Case Up Close.” University of Colorado, December 18.
^ Sjöberg, T. (1999). Intervjun: Kjell-Olof Feldt [Interview: Kjell-Olof Feldt].” Playboy Skandinavia(5): 37-44.
^ McNally, David. 1999. “Turbulence in the World Economy.” Monthly Review 51(2).
^ Englund, P. 1990. “Financial deregulation in Sweden.” European Economic Review 34 (2-3): 385-393. Korpi TBD. Meidner, R. 1997. “The Swedish model in an era of mass unemployment.” Economic and Industrial Democracy 18 (1): 87-97. Olsen, Gregg M. 1999. “Half empty or half full? The Swedish welfare state in transition.” Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology, 36 (2): 241-268.
^ Olsen, Gregg. 2002. The politics of the welfare state: Canada, Sweden, and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
^ Steinmo, Sven. 2001. “Bucking the Trend? The Welfare State and Global Economy: The Swedish Case Up Close.” University of Colorado, December 18.
^ Steinmo, Sven. 2001. “Bucking the Trend? The Welfare State and Global Economy: The Swedish Case Up Close.” University of Colorado, December 18.
^ Sundström, Eric. 2007. “Första maj 2007 i Hudiksvall.”
^ Steinmo, Sven. 2001. “Bucking the Trend? The Welfare State and Global Economy: The Swedish Case Up Close.” University of Colorado, December 18.
^ Sundström, Eric. 2007. “Royal’s defeat”.
^ Esping-Anderson, Gosta. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Esping-Anderson, Gosta. “Three political economies.” Accessed at Therborn, Goran, TBD.
^ Acker, Joan. Hobson, Barbara. Sainsbury, Diane. 1999. “Gender and the making of the Norwegian and Swedish welfare states.” Pp. 153-168 in Comparing social welfare systems in Nordic Europe and France. Nantes: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme Ange-Guepin. Älund, Aleksandra and Carl-Ulrik Schierup. 1991. Paradoxes of multiculturalism. Aldershot: Avebury.
46] Fridell, M. 2007. The Politics of Citizenship.
47] Chernomas, Robert and Ian Hudson. 2011. The Gatekeeper: 60 Years of Economics According to the New York Times. Paradigm Publishers.
[48] European Commission. Impact Assessment: On a common system of financial transaction tax. Brussels.

Nu på Svenska:

Det socialdemokratiska partiet i Sverige
Eftersom det har varit redigerats bort från den här versionen nu ska jag äga upp till redigering och skriva denna Wikipedia posten i nästan sin helhet, medan jag gjorde min svenska avhandling forskning skriva upp några år tillbaka. Jag har re-edited det här lite för att få ut delar av berättelsen som jag tycker är relevant för att förstå vad som gör socialdemokratin fästing, men som inte särskilt vädja till Wikipedias konservativa, nationalistiska och liberala patruller.
Svenska socialdemokratin ryggrad: Sociala Rörelser och Socialism
Eftersom partiet har haft makten av Office för en majoritet av tal efter starten 1889, ideologi och politik det socialdemokratiska partiet (SAP, Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti har) hade stort inflytande på svensk politik. svenska socialdemokratin [5] är delvis en följd av den starka och välorganiserade 1880 och 1890-talet arbetarklassens frigörelse måttlighet och religiösa liberaliseringen folkrörelsestrukturen (folk rörelser), genom vilken bonde-och arbetstagarorganisationer såväl kraftigt störd status quo och trängde statliga strukturer tidigt, vilket banar väg för val politik. Dessa sociala rörelser hade ett stort inflytande på den politiska bildningen i Sverige (åtminstone delvis eftersom de upplevde mindre statlig repression än arbetarorganisationer har till exempel hela Anglosphere – Storbritannien, USA, Kanada, Australien). På detta sätt är svenska socialdemokratiska ideologin böjs av en socialistisk tradition foregrounding omfattande och individuell mänsklig utveckling. [6]
Gunnar Adler-Karlsson (1967) liknas tryggt Socialdemokraterna projektet till framgångsrika socialdemokratiska försök att avyttra kungen av all makt, men formellt storhet: “Utan farliga och störande interna bråk … Efter ett par decennier de (kapitalister) kommer förbli kanske formellt som kungar, men i verkligheten som nakna symboler för ett passerat och sämre utveckling stat. “[7] Emellertid hittills kapitalisterna har avgjort outmanoeuvered denna ambition, vilket är i varje fall inte troligt delas av nyliberala partimedlemmar .
Liberalism på svenska socialdemokratin
Liberalism har även starkt infunderas socialdemokratisk ideologi. Liberalism är orienterade socialdemokratiska mål som säkerhet, som där Tage Erlander, premiärminister från 1946-1969, beskrivs säkerhet “för stort problem för den enskilde att lösa med enbart sin egen makt.” [8] Upp till 1980-talet, då nyliberalismen och neoconservatism började ge ett alternativ, aggressivt pro-kapitalistiska modell för att säkra social inaktivitet, var SAP kunna säkra kapitalets samarbete med övertygande aktiekapitalet det delade mål att öka den ekonomiska tillväxten och minska de sociala friktion. För liberala socialdemokrater är marxismen i bästa löst anses vara värdefull för sin betoning på att förändra världen för en mer rättvis och bättre framtid. [9] År 1889, Hjalmar Branting, ledare för SAP från dess grundande till hans död år 1925 hävdade, “Jag tror … att man gynnar de anställda … så mycket mer genom att tvinga igenom reformer som lindrar och stärker sin position än genom att säga att endast en revolution kan hjälpa dem.” [10]
Några observatörer har hävdat att denna liberala aspekten har stelnat i allt nyliberala ideologi och politik så småningom maximera latitud kraftfulla marknadsaktörerna. [11] Visst har konservativa neoklassiska ekonomer varit fast trycka socialdemokratiska partiet i kapitulera till de flesta av kapital traditionella preferenser och privilegier, som de kallar “moderna industriella relationer.” [12]
Både socialistiska och liberala aspekter partiets påverkades av de dubbla sympatier tidiga ledaren Hjalmar Branting, och manifestera i partiets första åtgärderna: att minska arbetsdagen till åtta timmar och upprättandet av franchise för arbetarklassen.
Socialdemokratiska tillgångar
Vissa kommentatorer har sett partiet tappa fokus med ökningen av SAP nyliberala studiegrupper, har den svenska socialdemokratiska partiet i många år vädjat till svenskarna som innovativa, kapabel, och värt att köra staten. [13] Socialdemokraterna blev en av de mest framgångsrika politiska partier i världen, med vissa strukturella fördelar utöver sin gynnsamma barn enligt pulserande folkrörelsestrukturen.
Vid utgången av det nittonde århundradet, liberaler och socialister var tvungen att gå samman för att öka etablering demokrati, som var vid den tidpunkten pinsamt kvar i Sverige, de kunde peka på formella demokratiska framsteg på andra håll för att motivera politisk handling. [14] Sverige var ett semiperifert, lilla landet i början av nittonhundratalet ansåg oviktigt för konkurrerande globala politiska fraktioner, så det var tillåtet mer självständighet, medan snart samexistens mellan kommunistiska och kapitalistiska stormakterna får socialdemokratin att frodas i de geopolitiska mellanrum. [15]
SAP har resursen att dela idéer och erfarenheter och arbetar med sina systerpartier i hela Norden. Sverige kan också låna och förnya på idéer från engelskspråkiga ekonomer, vilket var en fördel för socialdemokraterna i den stora depressionen, men mer fördelaktigt för de borgerliga partierna under 1980-talet och därefter. Medan SAP inte varit oskyldig undertrycka kommunister, [16] partiet har totalt nytta i regeringskoalitionen och att undvika allvarlig stagnation och drift, genom att delta i relativt konstruktiva relationer med mer radikala vänsterpartiet och miljöpartiet, och stödja och arbetar med ett annat externt bundsförvant LO arbete förbundet, vilket har levererats till koalitionens sinnrika arbetskostnader ekonomer under åren. SAP haft interna resurser samt, i kreativa politiker med lysande taktiska sinne.
Bland de främsta ideologiska tillgångar den svenska socialdemokratiska partiet under de första två tredjedelarna av nittonhundratalet var dess omdefiniering av “socialisering” från “gemensamt ägande av medel för produktionen “att öka” demokratiskt inflytande över ekonomin. “[17] Med utgångspunkt i ett socialistiskt-liberal koalition kämpar för omröstningen, den svenska socialdemokratiska partiet (SAP) definieras socialismen som utveckling av demokrati-politisk  och ekonomisk . Det har hävdats att denna ändring av socialism var nyckeln till SAP: s jämförande förmåga att bilda koalitioner, förnya, och styra där andra europeiska socialdemokratiska partier blev förlamad och föll under höger-wing regimer. [18]
De svenska socialdemokraterna kunde räkna medelklass bland sina solidariska arbetarklassen valkrets genom att erkänna medelklassen som “ekonomiskt beroende”, “arbetande människor”, eller bland de “progressiva medborgarna”, snarare än som sub-kapitalister. [19] “Partiet inte syftar till att stödja och hjälpa [en] arbetarklassen på bekostnad av de andra, “den socialdemokratiska kongressen 1932 fastställts. I själva verket, med socialdemokratiska politik som avstått från att stödja ineffektiva och låg vinst företagen (utom stödja små företagsägande som en ekonomisk strategi för flyktingbarn invandrarfamiljer.) Till förmån för odling av högre kvalitet arbetsvillkor, samt ett starkt engagemang för allmän utbildning, medelklassen i Sverige blev så stor att den kapitalistiska klassen (i stort sett) har varit koncentrerat (jämfört med länder där politiken uppmuntrar ett stort låg vinst, hög felfrekvens, lågavlönad, småföretagen). [20 ]
Inte bara SAP smälta den växande medelklassen i deras valkrets de också briljant förfalskade initiala och efterföljande regelbundna koalitioner med småskaliga bönder (som medlemmar av “exploaterade klasserna”) till stor strategisk effekt. [21] Deras trans arbetarfientliga och röd-grön koalitioner skulle nyckeln till socialdemokratiska framgångar. En ryggraden socialistisk ideologi tillät SAP till lång upprätthålla en förutseende och effektivt utsikt över arbetarklassen: “[SAP] inte fråga … om de som har blivit kapitalismens offer … är industriarbetare, lantbrukare, lantarbetare och skogsarbetare, lagra kontorister, tjänstemän eller intellektuella “, hävdade partiets 1932 valmanifest [22].
Folkhemmet: SAP strategiska omvalet av konservativa nationalistiska ideologin
Som SAP har arbetat mer eller mindre konstruktivt med vänsterpartierna fungerar som en radikal kant, de Socialdemokraterna har lånat från socialister några av deras diskurs och allt mindre, den socialistiska förståelsen av strukturellt äventyras positionen av arbetet under kapitalismen. Ännu mer kreativt, socialdemokraterna beslag utvalda, transcendentala bilder från sådana nationalister som Rudolf Kjellén (1912), mycket effektivt underskred fascismen vädjan i Sverige. [23] På detta sätt Per Albin Hansson förklarade att “det finns inte mer patriotiska part än [SAP då] den mest patriotiska handling är att skapa ett land där alla känner sig hemma”, berömda tända svenskarnas innersta längtan efter transcendens med tanken på Folkhem (1928), eller folkhemmet. “Utbyggnaden av part i ett folkets parti betyder inte och får inte innebära en urvattning av socialistiska krav,” Hansson lugnas. [24]
“Grunden för hemmet är gemenskapen och gemenskap. Den goda hemmet känner inte igen några privilegierade eller försummade medlemmar, inte heller någon favorit eller styvbarn. I det goda hemmet finns jämlikhet, hänsyn, samarbete och hjälpsamhet. Tillämpat på det stora människors och medborgarnas hem detta skulle innebära avskaffandet av alla sociala och ekonomiska hinder som nu separata medborgarna in i privilegierade och försummade, i de styrande och de anhöriga, i rika och fattiga, besuttna och utarmade, de plundrare och plundrade. svenska samhället är ännu inte folkets hem. Det finns en formell jämlikhet, lika politiska rättigheter, men ur ett socialt perspektiv förblir klassamhället och ur ett ekonomiskt perspektiv diktatur få råder “(Hansson 1928) [25].
Men det socialdemokratiska partiet främjas Folkhemmet som en socialist hem med ett ännu oavslutat program vid en punkt där den part forswore störande arbetarklassens strategi och avstånd från den politik som verktyg för nationalisering (Även om det fanns undantag Järnvägsbolagen nationaliserades från 1939. – 1948 var LKAB nationaliserade 1957, och stora delar av banksektorn nationaliserades 1992).
Aktiva arbetsmarknadsåtgärder, centraliserad förhandlingar, och full sysselsättning: socialdemokratisk politik
Socialdemokraterna är allmänt erkänt som det viktigaste arkitekten av den progressiva beskattning, fri handel, låg arbetslöshet, aktiv arbetsmarknadspolitik (aktiva arbetsmarknadsåtgärder)-baserad svenska välfärdsstaten som utvecklats under åren efter andra världskriget. Sverige kom ljud från den stora depressionen med en kort, framgångsrik “keynesianismen-före Keynes” ekonomiska program som förespråkas av Ernst Wigforss, en framstående socialdemokrat som utbildade sig i ekonomi genom att studera arbetet i de brittiska radikala liberala ekonomer. Den frivilliga 1938  Saltsjöbaden mellan arbete och kapital avtalet reglera och begränsa kapitalets och arbetets taktiska repertoar konflikt, som inrättades kooperativet institutionella grunden för tre decennier av centraliserad förhandlingar. De socialdemokratiska arbetsmarknadspolitiken (aktiva arbetsmarknadsåtgärder) utvecklades under 1940-talet och 1950-talet av LO (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, den blå-collar fackliga federation) ekonomer Gösta Rehn och Rudolf Meidner. [26]
Den Rehn-Meidner-modellen presenterade centraliserat system för löneförhandlingar som syftade till att båda inställda lönerna på en rättvis nivå och främja företagens effektivitet och produktivitet. Med pre-1983 samarbete mellan kapital och arbetskraft förbund som förhandlade oberoende av staten, staten beslutat att lönerna skulle vara högre än marknaden skulle sätta i företag som var ineffektiva eller icke konkurrenskraftiga och lägre än marknaden skulle sätta i företag som var mycket produktiva och konkurrenskraftiga. Arbetare kompenseras med statsunderstödd vidareutbildning och omplacering, också, staten reformeras lönerna till målet “lika lön för lika arbete”, elimineras arbetslöshet (“den reservarmé av arbetskraft”) “som en disciplinär pinne” och höll inkomster ökar konsekvent, medan beskattning successivt och samla socialt välstånd för att leverera tjänster via lokala regeringar. [27] socialdemokratisk politik i Sverige har traditionellt betonat en struktur statliga utgifter där offentliga tjänster tillhandahålls via lokala myndigheter, i motsats till att betona sociala transfereringar försäkringar program. [28]
Från Emulation för att Disciplin: på respons av Anglo-Amerika till svenska socialdemokratin
Skildringen av det svenska samhället i utlandet har reflekteras eller tillrättavisade dessa socialdemokratiska politik. Den tidiga svenska “röd-gröna” koalition uppmuntras nordisk-nätverk socialister i delstaten Minnesota i USA, att ägna arbetet med att bygga upp en liknande potent arbetskraft bonden alliansen som satte socialisterna i governorshipen (WHO kan sedan använda det nationella vakt för att försvara strejkande arbetare från Pinkerton Detectives), sprang modell innovativa Statewide anti-rasism program i början av det tjugonde århundradet, och aktiverade federala skogsförvaltare i Minnesota att träna en brådmogen ekologisk-socialismen, innan Demokratiska partiets reformatorer beslag på Minnesota Farm -Labor Party infrastruktur för att den liberala demokratiska partiet i 1944. [29]
Å andra sidan har politiken som ingår i nordiska modellen ofta avbildas i amerikanska konservativa kretsar och den amerikanska pressen, som anställer stor förödelse på det svenska samhället. Vid en 27 jul 1960 Republican National Committee frukost i Chicago, hävdade president Dwight D. Eisenhower disingenuously att “en vänlig europeiskt land (kommentatorer läsa detta som Sverige) … har en enorm rekord för socialistisk drift, efter en socialistisk filosofi och posten visar att deras antalet självmord har gått upp nästan otroligt och jag tror att de var nästan de lägsta nationen i världen för det. Nu har de mer än dubbelt våra takt. Dryckenskap har gått upp. bristen på ambition kan skönjas på alla sidor “. [30] föga smickrande skildringar av det svenska samhället, som härrör från konservativa amerikanska konkurrenskraftiga avsmak för socialdemokratisk politik, har inte vissnat över tiden. Att hävda att den svenska inställning till muslimer är alltför överseende, en typisk [47]  New York Times redaktionella anspråk “(C) gäller helt enkelt, olika experiment nära hjärtat av svenska demokratin och svenska socialismen har gått fel.” [31]
Sverige & Global sociala störningar
Enligt socialdemokraternas administration, behöll Sverige neutralitet, som utrikespolitisk riktlinje under krigen i det tjugonde århundradet, inklusive det kalla kriget. Neutralitet bevarade den svenska ekonomin och ökade Sveriges ekonomiska konkurrenskraft under första hälften av nittonhundratalet, som andra europeiska länders ekonomier devasted av krig. [32] Under Olof Palmes ‘s socialdemokratiska ledningen Sveriges ytterligare förvärrat fientlighet politiska konservativa när det Palme öppet och otvetydigt fördömde USA: kejserliga aggressionen i Vietnam. I en typisk anfall av pique, tillfälligt Nixon tillfälligt diplomatiska förbindelser med den socialdemokratiska landet. Olaf Palme mördades år 1986, medan många småbrottslingar har fingrade för brott, är det populärt tror CIA var assassinator, på grund av FN: s medlare Palmes karaktäristiska brist på sympati för konservativa amerikanerna “Iran-Contras drift vid den tidpunkten.
Den svenska neutralitetspolitiken har förändrats i och med den samtida ascendancen av den borgerliga koalitionen, och Sverige har åtagit sig trupper för att stödja Anglosphere kejserliga äventyr i Afghanistan och andra olje-strategiska islamiska länder.
Sverige och dess kapitalister länge blomstrat i försvarsindustrin. Under socialdemokratiska styret, var en del av denna vinst omvandlas till relativt starka utländska humanitära program och en relativt väl utvecklad flyktingprogram, det är ändå en åskledare för neoliberalization argument [33].
Tipping Point / Inte med en Bang, men ett kvidande:  Den Avslag socialismen, en triumf för SAP nyliberalerna & The Decline of Social demokrati i Sverige
Eftersom Rehn-Meidner-modellen får kapitalisterna äger mycket produktiva och effektiva företag att behålla övervinster på bekostnad av företagens anställda, arbetstagare i dessa företag började agitera för en andel av vinsten i 1970-talet. Meidner etablerat en studie kommitté som kom med ett 1976 förslag som innebar att överföra övervinster i investeringsfonder som kontrolleras av samhällen och arbetarna i de effektiva företagen. Det var en socialdemokratisk stup för Sverige. Capital skiljas omedelbart detta förslag som socialism, och inledde en aldrig tidigare skådad opposition som blev förstärks av den globala nyliberala rörelsen. Det socialdemokratiska partiet blinkade, och backas bort från den progressiva “reform”. [34] Här var det  verkligagränsen för socialdemokratin löfte om ett vänligare, mjukare övergång till socialismen.
Som svenska huvudstaden alltmer flyttat Svenskt investeringar i andra europeiska länder med sammansmältning av Europeiska unionen, en hegemonisk konsensus uppstod bland eliten finansvärlden: progressiv beskattning och pro-egalitära omfördelning blev ekonomiskt kätteri. [35] finansiella kapitalet slog då den svenska regeringen införde en mycket liten ekonomisk skatt på lokala mäklartjänster (de experimenterar staten försummat att införa skatt på utländska mäklare tjänster, och detta anses vara den politiken olycklig brist),. utländska investerare ut sina spekulativa pengar till angelägen London och inhemska investerare minskat deras antal aktietransaktioner [48].
Nedgång i BNP per capita efter 1970-talet skildrar den svenska ekonomin i en nedtoning ljus, men det är viktigt att notera inte endast vinstnivåer börjar falla över hela världen under 1970-talet, [37] även denna period såg åt höger förändringar i socialdemokratiska ideologin och politiken, växande missnöje med SAP, och valet ökningen av den borgerliga koalitionen i stället för socialdemokraterna. En ledande förespråkare av kapital sak inom SAP vid den tiden, reminisced socialdemokrat handelsminister (1970-1975) och finansdepartementet medlem Kjell-Olof Feldt i en svensk som Playboy intervju om sin roll i SAP: s åt höger tur.
“Den negativa arvet jag fick från min företrädare Gunnar Sträng (finansminister 1955 till 1976) var en starkt progressivt skattesystem med höga marginalskatter Detta var tänkt att få till stånd ett rättvist och jämlikt samhälle, men jag kom så småningom till uppfattningen att.. det helt enkelt inte fungerade på det sättet han avslutade. progressiva skatter skapade i stället ett samhälle av Wranglers, skojare och egendomliga manipulationer, falska ambitioner och nya orättvisor. Det tog mig minst ett decennium för att få en del av partiet att se detta. “[36]
Socialdemokratiska nyliberala åtgärder som inletts i 1980-talet, inklusive en avreglering av valutan, släppa företagsbeskattning och beskattning av höginkomsttagare arbetare, och växling från anti-arbetslöshet politik för att anti-inflationsdrivande politik – förvärrades av internationell lågkonjunktur, okontrollerade valutaspekulation, och en center-högerregeringen under ledning av Carl Bildt, vilket skapar den finansiella krisen, och sedan staten finansiell kris, i början av 1990-talet. [38]
När socialdemokraterna tillbaka till makten 1992, svarade de att den inducerade finansiell kris genom att stabilisera valuta och nationalisera en stor del av banksystemet. Som väl i standarden nyliberala  Chockdoktrinen tillvägagångssättet i eran minskade SAP välfärdsstaten och privatiserades offentliga tjänster och varor. Med kollapsen av den vänstra banken som var Sovjetunionen, sprang rätt däcktryck amok över hela världen och socialdemokratiska partiledarna försökte knyta SAP, sina egna karriärer och Sveriges anslutning till Europeiska unionens (EU) förmögenheter. Göran Persson och Mona Sahlin främjas EU-medlemskap, och den svenska folkomröstningen passerade 52-48% till förmån för anslutning till EU den 14 augusti 1994. Men eftersom SAP hävdade att det skulle tillåta svenskar att påverka resten av Europa, den nyliberala SAP: s tur att EU fick med djup ambivalens om inte populärt onåd i Sverige. I en efterföljande folkomröstning avvisade svenskar SAP ledningens ansträngningar att överge den svenska penningpolitiken (semi-) kontroll genom att konvertera till euron valutan.
Fortsatte dock många av de aspekter av den socialdemokratiska välfärdsstaten att fungera på en hög nivå, beror ingen liten del till både banan beroende och den exemplariska kompetens för feminiserade offentliga sektorn arbetskraft. [39] Förutom inledde socialdemokraterna studier om effekterna av de nyliberala förändringar, och dystert, regressiva bild som framkom från dessa konstateranden gjorde det möjligt för part minska många skatteutgifter, något höja skatterna på höga inkomster arbetare och avsevärt minska skatten på mat. Den socialdemokratiska finansministern ökat utgifterna för barnbidrag och fortsatte att betala ner statsskulden. [40] I början av det tjugoförsta århundradet, har Sverige en väl betraktas allmänt robust ekonomi, och den genomsnittliga livskvalitet, ges statsandelarna, är mycket hög, är ojämlikheten om lägsta i världen – även på andra håll om det ökar (Gini-koefficienten .28) och social rörlighet är hög (jämfört med de rika, men sklerotisk anglo-amerikanska och katolska länder) [41].
De 20-talet sdp champions “en öppen ekonomi, starka fackföreningar och generösa välfärd” som “pelarna i den svenska modellen”, [42] i motsats till den korporativistiska beslutsfattande institutioner och solidariska lönepolitik som tidigare utgjorde den svenska modellen. [43] Samtida liberala svenska socialdemokratiska politiker uppmanar alla “normala” europeiska socialdemokratiska partierna att “avsvärja alla marxistiska idéer”, som den tyska SPD gjorde i Bad Godesberg 1959. [44] När decommodifying politik ger resurser för att arbetarklassen människor hjälpa dem att ha lite oberoende av arbetsgivare och kapitalistiska klassen kontroll [45] socialdemokratiska ansträngningar att decommodify arbetstagare har minskat.
Även som politik att åter kommodifiera arbetare fart, det socialdemokratiska partiet fortsätta miljöhänsyn och feministiska politik som försvarar villkoren för reproduktionen och fortsätta att verka för decommodification på ett sätt som tar könsroller hänsyn till. Feministiska politik som bildas och genomförs av det socialdemokratiska partiet och dess coalitional partners, vänsterpartiet och miljöpartiet, inkluderar betalas mamma-och pappaledighet, hög sysselsättning för kvinnor inom den offentliga sektorn, att kombinera flexibla arbetsformer med levande löner och förmåner, vilket ger offentligt stöd (fortfarande en otillräcklig grad) för kvinnor i sina traditionella ansvar för vård ge, och strategier för att stimulera kvinnors politiska deltagande och ledarskap. Igenom strategier och institutionella praxis för deras inverkan på kvinnorna hade blivit vanligt i det sociala demokratiskt styre.
Identity mästare, även inom SAP, även allierade med efter-1990 Höger vinge “immigration kris” politisk kampanj, vilket leder till utveckling av en ” invandring krisen “enighet om att fläktade en passionerad rädsla för att skada hela det svenska samhället, främja en önskan om lag och ordning, sätta arbetsmarknadsinstitutioner i fråga, och avancerade den stärkta borgerliga koalitionen på bekostnad av de allt mindre särskiljande SAP år 2004 och därefter. [46]
Det verkar som om SAP strävar efter att modellera sin post-socialist/social demokratin roll i det svenska samhället på Storbritanniens nya Labour och USA: s demokrat, något fler legitimation-orienterade, kapitalistiska partier. Det återstår att se, om LO och de andra förbund arbetskraft kommer att ompröva de Saltsjöbaden eftergifter, bör ett mer gynnsamt politiskt tillfälle struktur protester och störningar uppstår globalt.

Pseudo-democracy II

We have established 2 points in our previous installment:

(1) Improbable cross-national OECD regime harmonization, with the US as lead. We know that most of the European public detests Bush. Yet they apparently voted in their own Bushes. This should raise eyebrows.
(2) Where in an extreme incidence, and despite all US anti-democratic mechanisms (gerrymandering, Diebold voting machines, corrupt State Secretaries, the Electoral College), the public still fails to vote for capital’s selected candidate, the Supreme Court simply installs him, eg. Bush the Younger 2000.

(3) Now, it is an established fact, although not well publicized, that the US economy is almost always in better shape when the Democratic Party is running the US executive (see Henwood, Doug. Left Business Observer). The question this typically poses is: Why don’t capitalists support Democrats, given their superior economic “performance”? I propose that this question is incorrect, if we start from the assumption that capital is well-organized politically (established by Domhoff, Useem, Vogel), and if we furthermore assume that capital is confident it can determine the executive. In that case, the questions would be, at what economic growth rate does capital allow a Democrat occupy the executive, with what caveats?

(4) It is an established fact (see Pollin 2003) that whereas both Carter and Clinton campaigned on progressive-reformist platforms, upon winning office they were immediately and repeatedly visited by the chief representatives of capital (political capitalists in Carter’s time; Greenspan and Reuben when Clinton won office), whereupon their campaign promises were abandoned to a startling and remarkable degree in favor of policies dictated directly by capital. Political sociologists should be trying to uncover, if possible, the methods of coercion that capital uses, because there is some hint here that they are extreme, see history of Salvador Allende, Olaf Palme, the Kennedys, MLK, Malcom X, the Black Panthers, Paul Wellstone, Fatah– a random smattering among the many assassinated and deposed. Sure, there is capitalist structural heat on politics, but I am interested to know what sort of explicit heat capitalists’ political representatives additionally put on social democrats and progressive liberals to get them to fall in line when they attain some control over an executive office, because there’s a lot of historical indication that the political heat can be blistering. Indications are that control over the CIA (as Bush the Elder had) supports political control of the executive. Has anyone done an elite network analysis of CIA leadership?

(5) When the US Supreme Court gave Bush the Younger the executive in 2000, the Democrats rolled with nary a whimper. At what level of national prominence do party players understand their role in the capitalist state? What role does a creepy neocon goon like Rom Emmanuel play in grooming Democrats to dance properly?

(6) Hard-core Democrat party guys simply insist that people of a progressive persuasion HAVE to vote for the Democrats. But they give no substantial reason. Is the reason because Democrats are second-tier professional politicians and they want the public to let capital know that these second-tier professionals are valued so they can retain their jobs? Is it because the federal system is a patronage and pork barrel system, and Democrats who win on a local and regional level need some networks to D.C. in order to get the federal funding?

What does having two capitalist parties, an A-team and a B-team do?

(a) Legitimation. But hasn’t the Bush regime shown legitimation to be unnecessary? The voting American Middle class and small business understand that there is little difference when either party rules, and don’t care very much who rules. The Republican lack of concern for legitimation makes sense, given point 6 above. But why does capital care about legitimation? For negotiation purposes? Isn’t an electoral process an expensive tool?
(b) (Why) does capital need a “progressive reformist” subsidiary executive, in selected periods where it is very confident that progressive reform will not interrupt the accumulation process?

Given that all ruling parties in the OECD are neoliberal (even socialists and social democrats have to reform to neoliberalism in order to rule), why do European governments have to coordinate their executive with the US?