The recent Canadian election argues for Britain’s upcoming vote to replace the marginally-democratic First-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system. This long-overdue change would require protest and disruption as well as within-establishment work.
FPTP defenders argue that the old FPTP British electoral system “tends to produce a two-party system (see Duverger’s Law), which in turn tends to produce single-party governments, which don’t have to rely on support from other parties to pass legislation.” In our era, this is a disadvantage for everyone other than the conservative party faithful, as the next purported “advantage”, “FPTP encourages ‘broad-church’ centrist policies,” is not a law but is rather contingent upon class mobilization. Given the context of a capitalist playing field, FPTP only encouraged centrist policies in the mid-20th century era of strong working class mobilization (backed by a credible communist alternative threat)–a structural-political compromise. Strong capitalist class mobilization and weak working class mobilization on that same capitalist playing field is a double-whammy that results in increasingly more right wing governance, in which case FPTP produces extremism, rather than centrism. We can see this very clearly in contemporary Anglo-American electoral politics and governance.
An additional factor is also actually rather key in the evolution of electoral politics, esp. in the US: “FPTP forces parties to become coalitions in themselves, rather than forming coalitions with other parties later.” In effect, since parties are coalitions anyway, FPTP forces excessive amalgamation. This debilitates left-liberal coalitions particularly, as they contain an irreconcilable class-rift disadvantage that modern right-wing coalitions do not. Thus lib-left coalitions are less chronically illegible, frustrating, and alienating to voters and more effective when they are not forced to internalize their more fundamental contradictions within one party, but rather negotiate a coalition in government.