We all contribute to society

The anti-BI (Basic Income) argument is that a social wage will a) inadequately replace the welfare state (‘turn everyone into a shopper’), b) will alienate workers from each other, c) is a new capitulation to capitalist control over the surplus, d) would be expensive. These assert an incredible novelty. Also, they argue, against Marx (per Scarry 1985), that work under capitalist conditions is making, not unmaking, so needs to be the ideal.

Looking at the MB BI experiment, I remain unconvinced that anyone should be against Basic Income. It does not decommodify as social democracy does, but it does one crucial thing: It institutionalizes the idea that everyone within a territory contributes to society. In an era of neoliberalization (the conservatization of liberalism), this is radical.

From B-I, anything could be done, just as anything could be done from the current sorry state. Shouldn’t we be fighting for social citizenship rights and institutions? Shouldn’t we be strategizing how to collectivize B-I?

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Junk Jobs

“(W)e used BLS stats (US) to estimate the extent to which the
structure of the labour force is shifting towards the modern equivalent of ‘lumpenproletariat’ or more contingent and least-paid occupations. Our estimates indicate that its modern equivalent in the US could account for as much as 40%-45% of the labour force; around half of incremental growth and low productivity occupations constitute ~70% of employment.

The same trend is evident in most other developed economies. Indeed these estimates understate the real impact due to lower benefits attached to these occupations; inability to secure jobs in line with qualifications or erosion of job and income stability.

Investors might argue that this is just a reflection of an accelerated shift towards services and that new higher value jobs will eventually emerge. We agree but as societies in the 19th century discovered, eventually could be a very long time.

What are the investment implications? As discussed in our prior notes, we believe investors are entering a world where the pendulum is swinging rapidly in favour of the state, as a multiplier of demand, provider of capital and setter of prices. We also believe that we are entering the age of de-globalization.”

Macquarie Research, “What caught my eye” V. 61.

Universalized Private Property & Mobility: Symbolic Domination Duo

Marketing the “universalized private property” non-solution to the problems of inegalitarian unfreedom has been the worldwide political organization “stock in trade of mercantilists, capitalists, and the jurists and politicians beholden to them ever since the Roman republic” (David Abraham. 1996. “Liberty without Equality” Law & Social Inquiry 21(1): 7, citing Moore 1966 and Mayer 1971). Rousseau once argued that through obeying the General Will, we would all have property, in the state, iff no one had associational capacity (such as private property allocates). Capitalists argue that we have property in our alienable labour. Jefferson tried to define citizenship as a patrimony of 50 acre land ownership. Bourgeois revolutionaries from France to the US South have argued for the universalization of private property. It’s an idea that’s stunting and killing us. By Bush II, the “Ownership Society” was reduced to a requirement to obtain credit, or debt in order to access the conditions of life…universalizing the company mining town model, smallholder slavery to the capitalist class, prioritizing the social reproduction of the lending class, in its internal billionaire rivalry to own and direct the world.

The opposite of exclusive private property is inclusive public property, vilified by conservatives as the True trajectory of injustice, which they define via idealist philosophy, and its impoverished conceptualization of change, as decentering exception. Abraham traces the domination of the marketed non-solution in a history of US ideas and law. With this co-optative discursive strategy, “America’s greatest libertarians could be slaveholders, just as Europe’s were political-economy free marketeers,” Abrahams observes (11) in accordance with Losurdo 2011 (2006). Occasionally, usually after wars, equal protection/fundamental rights jurisprudence “chips away” at the negative-liberty polestar. “The logic and politics that each time ended the progress: a politics and logic” of universalized private property (9).

we-all-declare-for-liberty-lincoln

How can libertarianism remain twinned with slaver interest in the US? Abraham identifies geographic mobility as the necessary, co-optative factor greasing the relentless, little-challenged marketing of absolutist private property right as universal interest within the settler US (13). Yet in capitalism, private property is exclusive, accumulative, unequally allocating sovereign agency and collective action capacity, enhancing economic, social, and political inequality and unfreedom. Cosmopolitan mobility for the few, the ideal, rests upon the imposed, disruptive, depleting mobilization of the many—often war discharging people from citizenship and sovereign socio-material networks–home, Bourdieu said, where you are culturally literate, and by that able to navigate to your own interest, or through which you are symbolically dominated.

But a settler society, wherein freedom is allocated by market power and yet marketed as universal private property and glorified expulsion from home, is a society of vast and pervasive symbolic domination. We are required to black-box capitalism to presume, as political-economic elites have marketed since Cato the Elder in the 2nd c. BC, that citizenship rights, positive freedom, are irrelevant to non-elite liberty. Black-boxing capitalism, we can sink into the familiar, if degraded lullaby of Ownership Society marketing, aided by a sleeping pill: freedom’s idealistic reduction to physical mobility, as proposed by that original conservativizer of liberalism, Thomas Hobbes (1651). Enjoy the institutionalized Enclosure sweeps, and give my regards to your banker, your Master.

us-intervention-before-after

Liberal Fart of Freedom: Mobilizing populations

bank pwnd

Liberal Fart of Freedom: Debt as Universal Private Property Ownership

Mobility freedom is subordinated to the Mill state’s global private property right protection obligation:

“But, then, in the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act passed on March 23, President Donald Trump not only reinstated the full amount but also added an additional $60 million, for a total of $510 million for the prison project.”

Mass incarceration:
“With 2.2 million people behind bars today and 11 million cycling through jails every year, the United States incarcerates more people, and at a drastically higher rate, than any other country in the world.

Building 1,200 more prison beds reflects our dependency on this system of racialized social control, revealing not only deeply held assumptions about crime and punishment, but also what we believe is possible for, and deserved in, rural America.” –Sylvia Ryerson & Judah Schept, 2018, “Building Prisons in Appalachia,” Boston Review.

Notes on Redoing Abraham:

  1. Writing in 1996, Abraham did not yet realize how hard a Catholicized Supreme Court would be restoring absolute private property right in upcoming years. That can be updated.
  2. His analysis of the poverty of negative liberty’s version of “autonomy,” choice, can be improved by contrasting choice, as delegated agency, to sovereign agency.
    1. We fear dependency (37) in absolute private property right regimes not because it is “entwined with collective action,” but because dependency is the denied condition within which all (except self-aggradizing property owners) make unfree choice. Within a law by, of, and for capitalists, most of our choices are non-sovereign, and we fear being called out. Anti-dependency discourse is a terrifying game of hot potato; the stakes are credit and cooperation.
    2. While the Pro-choice movement (footnote 120, p. 37) has conspicuously played by the pragmatist’s losing game, and, update, has lost massively by it within capitalism’s automated class warfare context, a subtle, thorough, and non-sexist analysis would also observe that social democracies and communist societies have, far more securely than liberal and of course conservative societies, recognized women’s right to reproductive sovereignty (see Baker & Ghodsee), because they recognize, behind the reproductive right, the societal value in the development of the woman, threatened by the high consequences of reproductive work for women’s lives in particular, particularly in commodified economies.
  3. Analysis from his comparator case, West Germany, can be improved. Instead, to grasp socialist-influenced, positive-rights constitutional law, use Sweden.
    1. While the West German constitution excerpt (38) is a fine example, point out how the positive rights constitution is sociological, where the Anglo-American liberal negative rights constitution is anti-sociological.
    2. Attack the (rather-Jewish) reduction of social democracy to merely the reproduction of “homogeneity” (per Abraham, Friedman, etc.). See my critique of Jantelagen decontextualization and fetishization. Ethnic “homogeneity” (reduction of the salience of ethnicity) is socially (not discursively) constructed by an inclusionary sociological definition of society (per Dewey 1916), as where ethnicity is converted into political subcommunity, eg. in Vansterpartiet, or political-economic variation is incorporated, as with the Sami in the Swedish Constitution (Basic Laws). There’s a reason (genetic diversity, including incorporating some isolated, genetically-distinct communities–analogous to Ashkenazi Jews) why long-traveling Swedes “look weird,” as the idealistic Germans like to say. Swedes’ national ethnicity is an historical project of inclusion. Like non-ethnic difference and inequality, ethnicity is also a construction, one that extends outside a multicultural society; it isn’t just subcommunity. It is an alternative society, sometimes (particularly when in relation with capital) functional, and otherwise often ascribed, isolating, somewhat functional (capitalism outlaws working class organization) but not very. Universal celebrations of ethnicity in liberal, negative-liberty regimes are about abstracting functional ethnicity as the universal, non-White condition, and denying the functional servitude assigned to ascribed ethnicization within capitalism.
  4. Ipsum lorem.

Dem Party Strategy as Management Subclass Interest

Since the Humphrey-Mondale-Freeman Modernization period (1940s-1968), the Dem Party strategy has been to dump out White slavers, drive them out of the Democrat Party.

To be clear:

The Dem Party strategy is to work with Republicans, the slaver party, to maintain the US as a society specializing in managerial surveillance and regulation, and militarized-policing labor, as well as to maintain “Open” Borders for discount support work (social reproduction, infrastructure maintenance, productive labor). Funneling past wealth and future wealth to global metropolitan capitalists, Dems and Republicans together deplete citizenship rights and expand slavers’ institutions across the Union, while coercively pushing (with imperial interventions) and pulling migrant labor into the US to lower the cost of labor. This is the liberal definition of altruism.

Liberal altruism achieves credibility through organizing pro-migrant and pro-immigration activists into the Open Borders coalition; and by the credible threat of White-brand terror campaigns, it promotes a sense of urgency, inevitability, and moral righteousness. Any working class-centric alternatives to the Open Borders working class-disorganizing, slavery system are denounced as enabling Republican state terror, posed as the only other organizable option.

The model showcase for this Dem Party strategy is California, where Open Borders policy attracted (pent-up) mass migration–especially Hispanic mass migration– that maintained group integrity, and outweighed and out-muscled policies to make migrant workers vulnerable. This migration largely settled California’s familiar geography and historically-contiguous territory.

Fairly efficiently, those settlers have provided votes largely to the Democrat Party, in recognition of that party’s maintenance of Open Borders policy and its comparatively moderate position on domestic state terror. Incentivized by capital’s demand for labor-factor mobility (labor arbitrage), the Dem Party believes that the electoral success they had with the bipartisan Open Borders strategy in California is universally replicable.

Further thoughts on Open-Borders Cosmopolitanism

Goodhart, David. 2013. “Why the left is wrong about immigration.” The Guardian.

Goodhart’s argument points toward the fact that individualistic capitalist liberalism (or anarcho-capitalism) discredits collective rights of the working class, such as citizenship rights. That is why a coalition of economists, financiers, left-liberals, liberals, and anarchists see migration, including disruptive, dislodging imperial warfare inducing migration, as the solution to inequity. In their view, labor arbitrage (enabled by immiseration and imperial warfare) will make financial capitalism, extraction, climate crisis, managerialism, surveillance, and blanket militarized policing and warfare whole and virtuous.

Because they only have to circulate populations to make metropole virtue in their view, liberals don’t care what happens to migrants once they’ve been circulated to the core. So that immigration consists of citizenship Lite or parole/semi-criminalized status, prison slave workhouse sentences, and egregious immigration qualification-job skills mismatch.

Note that David Graeber pointed out that in capitalist societies, the only forms of collective action that are unambiguously legal for the working class to engage in is through religious and ethnic networks, or of course vertically, in collaboration with the capitalist class. As TH Marshall noted, citizenship rights were up to late 1960s expanded in response to working class pressure to allow for democratic development by permitting solidarity, collective action beyond the market and religious-ethnic groups. Neoliberalism halts and reverses rights expansion as geographically “exclusionary,” a set of misallocated collective action privileges merely corresponding to the lived boundaries of working class life. Neoliberals instead fight for dislodging and inducing the global flow of capital and other factors of production as proper liberation.

Just as capitalists systematically discount social reproduction work in order to accumulate wealth, liberals in capitalist societies systematically de-institutionalize and criminalize working class collective action capacity. Thereupon, imperial wars can be waged and laboring migrants can be circulated without considering the costs and who is bearing them.

Angela Nagle wrote a piece, “The Left Case against Open Borders” arguing against the reigning anarcho-capitalist Open Borders coalition. It’s mostly a pretty good argument, although she is naive about a border-policing technology, E-Verify. I can kind of understand because it started as a way of regulating employers. As surveillance software deployed by the US police state, however, it’s been converted into surveilling employees, which makes workers vulnerable, vulnerable to super-exploitation. The Left alternative would be to unionize all migrant labor and have unions regulate employers. Unions certainly regulated Marxists; they could regulate employers’ hiring practices.

Certainly, the Left should be mobilizing to reduce management, surveillance technologies, ICE, and the entire militarized police state. Until the left finds a way of building better jobs for the working class than what we’ve got–what effectively amounts to a vast foreign- AND domestic-pointed military, “Open Borders” is just co-optive, fake-altrueese for the Chamber of Commerce’s agenda: no-citizenship, no-rights, discount labor circulation, subsidizing concentrated wealth accumulation while deferring the economic check of paying for social reproduction work, and freed up by military interventions. Open Borders is a policy that was automated decades ago, by politically-mobilized capital. The Dems and the Republicans just alternate who gets to put the capitalist screws, teargas, and handcuffs on workers, including the rightsless, vulnerable migrant workers.

Slavery and absolute elite freedom

“For us (Western civilization) freedom has been understood to sanction the ability of creditors to demand payment from debtors without restraint or oversight. This is the freedom to cannibalize society. This is the freedom to enslave. This is, in the end, the freedom proclaimed by the Chicago School and the mainstream of American economists.” —John Siman, reviewing Michael Hudson’s “And forgive them their debts” (2018).

Hudson argues that prior to the Roman Empire, previous agrarian Western civilizations enforced periodic debt amnesty in recognition of the inevitable, inevitably corrosive relationship between financial speculators and smallholding producers. After the Romans, Western economic elites were able to outrun the negative consequences of forcing those with the least degrees of freedom to carry the costs of market failure.

Why were elites able to dump economic failure on nonelites, cut and run, from the Romans onward–which is generally, popularly considered the geographic and historical boundary of Western civilization? Perhaps Hudson answers this? My guess: Incentives or balance of power changed in the relation between the king and the oligarchy/financiers. Why from the Romans on did it not usually pay for the king to intervene between financiers and their slaver tendency? Did monarchs become more dependent upon financiers, for example to fight wars and imperial wars? That Sweden was a late exception is interesting–In that country, there was alienation between the king and the aristocracy into the 19th century, which produced a heritage of space for non-elite semi-sovereign agency. Did something–for example the capacity to concentrate agriculture ownership and production–change in societies’ ability to contain economic and  political damage within their enslaved smallholder class? This was clearly a part of the British advantage in achieving early capitalism.

But what permitted this shift? Transportation technology, permitting export-oriented agriculture? Perhaps this is why economists are so insistent that agricultural production be export-oriented: Export-oriented agriculture removes control over the means of reproduction from non-elites. [Note to self: Draw the following mechanism out with examples:] Centrally controlling the means of reproduction, as means of production, coheres otherwise-divided elite interests, permits elite solidarity around a shared interest in advancing slavery.

As Siman says, this reproductive-productive controlling ownership is what we define as “economic growth;” it creates certain kinds of heavily-touted benefits, but certainly we recognize it produces vast, deep, endemic costs: epigenetic, environmental, war and violence, institutionalized incapacity to shift into ecologically- and socially-rational directions, stunting smallholders’ development, imposing a sin and shame psychological burden upon smallholders, racialized and genderized alienation and defection, inducing corrupt governance, etc.

With the French Revolution and the mass emigration, however, all of Europe’s financial class were restrained from enslaving the domestic population…slavery was instead imposed in the colonies. To this day, nonelite sovereignty is fragile or highly compromised in the colonies.

Research note: Seems like you could trace this ultra-burden/ultra-freedom discrepancy epigentically.

While debt is the slavery-instituting mechanism, Hudson’s analysis complements and goes back in history beyond Losurdo (2011) and Blyth (2002), locating the connection between Western political economy and slavery not just in liberalism, but liberalism as an extension of that Roman elitist innovation in transferring risk and culpability for market failure onto debtors rather than on gambling financiers.

“Moral Hazard” My Ass

…The last bit of Siman’s article, having to pedantically explain that it’s a little weird that conservative economists’ “Moral Hazard” only applies to smallholders, and doesn’t apply to financial speculators, despite their theory that these speculators are the agents, principally doing everyone a liquidity solid (favor), reminds me of a grad geographic economics class I took as a student. This, and how other blind spots were strutted out as if they were logical achievements, rather than formalized marketing and legitimation flim-flammery, went a long way toward revealing what the Economics discipline actually is and does.

Folke Fridell’s Analysis of Unfreedom in Capitalism

Based mostly on Swedish Syndicalist biographical material, I wrote most of Folke Fridell’s English-language Wikipedia biography. But toward the end, I started doing a little analysis of his work, which is not Wikipedia’s thing. So if they delete it, here’s what I wrote:

Folke Fridell

Fridell was born in 1904, the youngest of a large family (6 siblings, and 6 more half siblings by his father) living in a stream-side home in a woods in Lagan, Kronoberg County, Småland, in Götaland, Sweden. His mother was a public school teacher and seamstress and his father was a soldier, tailor, and postal carrier. The family was locally known for their intense reading culture, and Fridell’s education mostly came through that family culture, the local library, and a book collection he found in a deserted house while he was shepherding. At age 13, he started working in a textile factory, and after a youthful spell of learning the masculine arts of card-playing, drinking, fighting, and generally being a roughneck, at age 19 he was shocked straight by his older brother’s drowning. Thereafter he returned to reading, and in addition took up writing after factory work hours. Fridell married Hanna “Stina” Wahlberg (9 years his junior) in 1934, and together they raised two boys, born 17 years apart. He would remain at the factory until 1946, when he was able to quit and support himself on his writing.[1]

Despite his brief hard-living period, at a young age, Fridell joined the IOGT, the Temperance movement. In 1921, the year of his brother’s death, he participated in the formation of and was made secretary of a local branch of the Central Organisation of the Workers of Sweden (Sveriges arbetares centralorganisation, SAC). In meetings, he was at first shy about the organization material he wrote. When the Syndicalist Workers’ Federation (Syndikalistiska arbetarefederationen, SAF) broke from SAC in 1929, Fridell followed, as he admired the more radical politics of the founder, a Swede who had spent some years working and living in the U.S. Fridell became a member of SAC once again when SAF merged back into SAC in 1938.[2]

In the 1930s, Fridell started writing for Arbetare-Kuriren, the newspaper of SAF. After the reunion of SAC and SAF in 1938, he contributed frequently to Arbetaren, SAC’s newspaper. Fridell is recognized as a theorist of syndicalism.[3] He was also active as a lecturer and a delegate at several SAC congresses; from 1942 until 1946, he was a deputy in the organisation’s central committee. Swedish Syndicalist archives include posters prominently advertising Fridell as the featured speaker at May Day demonstrations inviting “All peace- and freedom-loving people together.”[4]

Fridell debuted as a fiction writer with the novel Tack för mig – grottekvarn (“Thanks from me, treadmill” ?) in 1945, and his breakthrough came with his second novel, the strongly autobiographical Död mans hand (1946). He was hooked and wrote a book nearly every year thereafter, winning labor and national awards for his writing every decade of his life after 1950. Although they were savagely denounced and dismissed by conservatives, his novels were widely read, in part thanks to their distribution by book ombudsmen in the factories. Fridell explained the reason behind his art:

“As long as there are proletarians, there is a proletarian literature. And I would like to go a little further and say that as long as people are insulted in their work for so long, there must be voices that speak their language and take their case.”

By his influential criticism of monotonous and soul-killing factory work in the era of Taylorist automation, Fridell become a renewer of the workplace as well as a champion of the right of the worker to defend his dignity and capacity for cooperative decision-making. Other frequent themes of Fridell’s writing were juvenile delinquency, rural emigration, and dystopian views of the future.[5]

Fridell’s work has been regarded as easy to read, conveying an ironic sense of humor. A prolific writer and editorialist, he often wrote in the voice of an alter ego.[6] Some of his plays were translated into English; the working class characters’ dialogue was represented in British cockney accents.

The following excerpt from his novel Tack för mig – grottekvarn demonstrates Fridell’s anarchist, but also very Swedish critique of the suffocating, crushing experience of intimate betrayal, excessively imposed upon workers as unfreedom cascades like a net from the controlling interest of the capitalist (concentrated wealth accumulation):

“Imagine if I went to the employer tomorrow and said, ‘I do not want to work today. I will snatch pike from the brook and laze me in the grassland, for I am a free person.’ What do you think he would say? He would say I was mad, that I should be investigated or detained at a forced labor agency.

I judge his judgment because he is a party to the matter and he loses financially if I celebrate but one day. But that’s not the worst.

Worse it is that everyone else becomes his avatar. My companions would say, ‘Now Oskarsson has gone crazy again.’ And in the barracks all the fools would huddle in the stairwells and pitch pointed words at my old lady, and the kids would ask my kids how it was with crazy Oskarsson! And the end of the whole thing would be my own wife crying, begging me to relent and, for her and the children’s sake, to get back to work yesterday.”

The dialogue suggests the character is struggling with the pain of betrayal, as he partially feminizes that traitorous net of inegalitarian social control. That associative feminization could work as a distraction from the inegalitarian distribution of sovereign agency that, Fridell also recognizes, directs that refracted, enveloping, and penetrating coercive power. Yet Fridell’s analysis, expressed in his creative work, does not point to human social interdependence–or even non-sovereign, delegated agency–as the root of unfreedom. Rather, the cause of unfreedom is the inegalitarian institution of ownership and control–as it dominates, enslaves, and turns against us our own human social interdependence.

In capitalism, we are compelled to betray one another, and our own needs, usually for nothing other than the thoughtless maximization of elites’ relentless accumulation of wealth and rivalry with each other. In this way, our torturous social- and self-dissolution, our unmaking, is automated. That is one devastating price of absolute private property right and absolute elite liberty.

Conversely within this framework, heroism, which is not automated, consists in collectively devising and implementing interventions–deprioritizing capitalist and other rentier interests in control, exploitation, and appropriation–by which working people can regularly allow each other and themselves reasonable freedoms. Apart from fleeting, idiosyncratic moments of grace, heroic interventions cannot be uncontested, painless, or bloodless. But they restore to us our captured social network and ourselves, our freedom. They restore to us our social human capacity to relieve our mortal, sentient suffering.

Fridell died in 1985 at the age of 80 and is buried in the cemetery of Berga church in Lagan.[7] Outside the library in Ljungby, a bronze head sculpture of Folke Fridell commemorates his contributions to the development of literature, working conditions, and human liberty in Sweden.

Unfree Labour & Mass Killing

“The preoccupation with the origins of ‘freedom’ and a persistent understanding of market economies as essentially ‘free’ has clouded our perspective of the past. It is time to engage with new explorations on the role of unfree relations, not only in the form of slavery, but in other variations as well. Studying the role of slavery in the Dutch global empire and the presence of slavery in the Dutch Republic is only a modest first step. It is important to critically re-examine the role of coercion in other parts of the history of and explicitly in Europe as well. How did debts, legal and economic force, or other limits to freedom influence migration, labour relations, social strategies, everyday life and politics?…As much of the global history of slavery, these questions are waiting to be explored” (Karwan Fatah-Black and Mattias van Rossum. 2014. “Slavery in a slave-free enclave?: Historical links between the Dutch Republic Empire and slavery, 1580s-1860s.” Werkstatt Geschichte 66-67: 55-73.

Family-Portrait-with-Black-Man-Duyster-1024x787

I.

What is liberalism? Liberal principles have been asserted as rear-guard, ad hoc defenses of elite privileges under significant assault by absolutist rulers, chartered corporations, and centralized states. Across these rear-guard defense options, one principle grounds liberalism: absolute private property right.

  1. See Losurdo 2011.
  2. Fatah-Black and van Rossum: The States General (1776) “The freedom of the Negro and other slaves, brought here from the State’s colonies to these lands” ordinance stipulated that “the freedom of the citizens of the state, who would lose their property (if slaves were freed), would be damaged more severely than that the upholding of the principle of freedom would be worth… ‘This would be a far graver affront against the birthright and immediate freedom of the inhabitants of this Republic,’” the preamble announced (64).
    1. Roman Law was introduced in 1629 to manage slavery in the Dutch Republic (62).
    2. Creditors’ rights superseded both plantation owners and slaves’ rights (65).

II.

Varieties of domination across space: Why (where) slavery and not wage-wage slavery or genocide?

Premise 1: There are different forms of slavery.

Premise 2: Imperialists rely on genocide where slavers’ freedom cannot be supported by the slavery of the regional population.

What conditions support or attenuate slaver freedom?

  1. Structural explanations:
    1. As slavery contributes to slaver societies’ value accumulation–for example, between 1595 and 1829, slavery contributed around 70 million guilders to the Dutch port cities’ economic profit margins (69), slavers are an economic network. Within this network, slave traders‘ profits are typically “modest” (70), and could be a bottleneck for the development of slavery.
    2. To capture and distribute wealth within an oligarchical metropole, specific commodity chains produced by slavery promote or prevent slavery across locations.
      1. Slavery-promoting commodities: Cotton, sugar, rum, coffee, sexual services, domestic service, diamond mining. See also economic sectors that rely heavily on “volunteer,” “labor of love,” and “intern” labour: education and research, conservation, community and social services,…
      2. Wage slavery commodities: Expansive, alternates with slavery, see above.
      3. Genocide commodities: Commodities requiring total territorial control? Doubtful. Rather than “genocide commodities,” genocide probably is structurally caused by irreconcilable oikoi within a region, and may be indicative of a closer power balance than is present in slavery and wage slavery regions. As they are central in financing slavery commodity production, expanding financial metropoles and capitalization may play a role in spurring oikos rivalry blocs into genocide.
      4. To parse out the distribution of slavery, wage slavery, and genocide, compare commodity production and capitalization histories of high- indigenous population American regions–Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, the Four Corners, USA, (New Zealand?); and regions that relied more heavily upon genocide: financial-manufacturing Eastern US and Canadian regions, Argentina, Australia, etc. What is happening distinctively with commodity production and capitalization in indigenous-settler mixing zones– “La Malinche” Mexico, New Zealand, and Metis Manitoba?
  2. Cultural & social network explanations:
    1. Within this structure described above, relative regional coordination capacity and culture would matter.
      1. In Dutch Asia, slaves came from East Indonesia because the non-Islamic population had low coordination capacity and lacked anti-slavery culture (60). By engaging in internecene war and raiding, supplying slaves to the imperial merchants, violent Indonesian parochial competition made Dutch slave traders’ work easier and profit margins higher.
    2. The trade in slaves was (re-)produced through elite networking. Slaves were taken from merchant elites’ business travels and dislocated around the globe, via elite network gifting, etc (59-60).
      1. Network symbolic capital, distinction (63)–as in modern, inegalitarian, imperial, cosmopolitan immigration/colonial settler societies–incentivizes the separation and relocation of humans as slaves, and by that, produces “trouble” in metropoles.
        1. This trouble had to be regulated with metropole laws that progressively reduced slaves’ freedom further, until at the last (just before illegalization of the slave trade) owners’ sacred property was threatened–the law threatened to free any slave who gave herself up to authorities when entering the metropole (65-67).
          1. Capitalism works by unevenly allocating exploitation and appropriation across space, across social categories. Yet over time separating these geographically requires great management effort, including racialization to reproduce exploitable parochial competition, and this differential breaks down when the slave comes to the metropole. The metropole is a value-distribution zone opposed to extraction zones.
            1. Contemporary: Core global metropoles–NYC, SF, Singapore– are even today policed and efficiently cleansed of anyone surplus who is not a wage slave or owner. Non-capitalist populations in metropole space degrade the capitalization-coordinator/accumulator function. Check out geography lit.
    3. Slavers could depend on black overseers to use their human capacities to innovate torture, to control slaves on plantations (72).
      1. The Master’s dependency on the humanity of the dehumanized: “Men do not want solely the obedience of women, they want their sentiments. All men, except the most brutish, desire to have in the woman most nearly connected with them not a forced slave but a willing one.” –JS Mill, 1869, “The subjection of women.”
        1. See also Hegel’s critique, “Herrschaft und Knechtschaft” (1807).
      2. The human capacity for unmaking (see Scarry 1985): Using others’ human sentience against them to destroy their material worlds, and in place of their semantic world, promote the imperial voice and order.
      3. The stimulated jump from a state of unsolidaristic, competitive, parochial soveriegnty to a state of subordinate patriarchal intermediary secures the social construction of steep and complex social hierarchy.
        1. According to Federici 1998, patriarchy in complex societies invokes intimate and, by categorical extension, systematic alienation and fear of the target of defection and the defected relation, to realign trust and solidarities to an inegalitarian, socio-spatially dispersed network, an imagined global community of men, “winners v. losers.” This trust realignment permits the transfer of property to and up the hierarchy of men. Alienated on multiple everyday levels, and crippled by fear, non-elites are compelled to reproduce exploitation and appropriation.
          1. Not all communities are responsive to patriarchal co-optation, and it is not structurally advantageous. For example the Basque maintained intra-community solidarity that permitted an autonomous and successful economic development path within capitalism (Federici 1998). Some communities rather are disposed to the protection racket bargain and patriarchal co-option. Why? What are the factors?
            1. As well as Robin (2004), the comparative history of the Scandinavian countries suggests some hypotheses, see Barton (1986). Ask Jonah Olsen about the Basque exception as well.
        2. Once instituted, capitalist law recreates the vertical-solidarity, competitive patriarch.
  3. See Losurdo (2011), Robbie Etheridge, Fatah-Black and van Rossum (2014).

What conditions support or attenuate genocide?

  1. See Straus, Scott. 2007. “Second-generation comparative research on genocide.” World Politics: 476-501. Of the early 21st century efforts to improve on genocide theory, Valentino’s (2004) is the most convincing, least ideologically-motivated, most comparative explanation. He argues that in the modern era, small groups of leaders are ideologically persuaded to choose mass killing (including both genocide and politicide) as an instrumental solution to resource and land acquisition, or to defeat collective resistance. Everyone else just accommodates and enables the political entrepreneurs. Valentino’s theory has the virtue of specifying a central role for rational calculation as well as a lesser role for irrational ideology, both by a small leadership group. In modern/capitalist societies, the popular classes are dominated and socially accountable to elite-ruled networks.
    1. Valentino (2004) identifies two categories of mass killing: a) Dispossessive mass killing, such as where leaders seek to transform/modernize societies across diverse, populated territory; and b) Coercive mass killing, including mass killing in wars and in imperial strategy, where “leaders try to defeat resistance and intimidate future resistance” (485).
      1. Arguably the long colonial genocide in North America is the progressive confluence of both forms of mass killing.
    2. Levene’s (2005) explanation is flawed but offers a couple of insights of value. In his first volume, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, he argues that genocide is a contingent outcome and more likely when targeted populations resist. He specifies the irrationalism as phobia. However, Levene is an elitist, and his overall argument is that popular irrationalism in late-developer countries causes genocide. To arrive at this explanation, he ignores colonial mass killing. However, the irrationalism of phobia could just as well be imported into Valentino’s theory to specify the elite ideology behind the genocidal path. Semelin suggests that leaders use ideology to transform popular anxieties into fear, and this is affirmed by Federici’s study of the European witch hunts.
    3. Of the comparative genocide theorists, Levene’s second volume alone attempts to survey mass killing in the vast expanse of the pre-modern period. While he is unable to substantively theorize pre-modern mass killing, it exists empirically. The transhistorical abstraction of mass killing explains it as a byproduct of “political development.” So by comparison (following the Marxist technique of comparing a phenomenon’s capitalist form to its transhistorical form), “modern” or capitalist-era mass killing is caused by political development (also), state interest, and to a lesser extent, ideology, or the elite deployment of fear.
    4. Midlarsky’s comparative work (2005) is also flawed but has the virtue of exploring where genocides did not occur: There was not genocide in Cambodia, but politicide. Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and Jews in pre-WWII Poland were not targeted for genocide. Such examples could be used to help explain mass killing. Midlarsky thinks that modern genocides are created in the context of loss: territorial, economic, or population loss in war (486). His theory also helpfully specifies that targeted populations are simultaneously feared as threatening and assessed as vulnerable (486), and he points out that genocide perpetrators have both gotten away with violence before they commit the genocide, and have some international support, such as the Vatican for Nazi Germany and France for the Rwandan genocide (486).
    5. This brings up the point that theorists of genocide have to take political sides. In the early 20th century, the UN defined the problem of mass killing as genocide on the model of the Shoah. That specific context and formulation produces a liberal moral framework and research agenda, which at first produced explanations of genocide that were highly idiosyncratic to the Jewish community’s preexisting frameworks and post-Holocaust political needs (see pp. 480-483), and in the second wave of genocide scholarship, still produced explanations, like Weitz’s (2003), that identified communist revolution as genocide, or like Mann (2005) tended to select genocide cases from amongst the Anglo-American Empire’s late-to-the-party rivals. Less ideological approaches recognize and theorize the mass killings committed across the political and geographic spectrum, including the colonial genocides.
    6. Note that both Mann and Levene think that late capitalist development causes genocide. I don’t agree with this, but I think it’s interesting that sociologist Mann as well as Levene acknowledge the position of Germany relative to the Anglo-American Empire at the start of the 20th century. Idealist explanations for the rise of fascism typically obscure what Hegel had identified in the early 19th century as the intractable problem of an already-owned world–at the individual level, The Right of the Starving Man.
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At stake:

Consider the recent indigenization interventions of Glen Coulthard and Leann Betamosake Simpson. They call for a reclamation and reinvention of indigenous lifeways and associated ways of knowing, and anti-capitalist and anti-colonial refusal, rather than mere Reconciliation and cultural celebration. Their intervention is heroic.

At the same time, even liberal Reconciliation is countered by furtive but insistent protest. If a viable alternative to capitalist extractivism was built in extractivist Canada, a place that exists within the World-system in order to transform nature’s work into capitalist accumulation, would the settler protest switch into mass brutality again? As it is, it’s more like a constant mining or blood-letting. One thinks of the baby moose of the north-eastern U.S. seaboard, drained to death by tens of thousands of ticks. Humans have mass-killed off our rival macro-predators, and the tiny killers, the biomass of bugs, flood into the breach. We sit like Mr. Kurtz amidst the entropy we have created, and we celebrate culture.

Under what conditions does capitalist power organize through its hierarchical network its primary forms of economic- and other warfare, its infinitely-negative judgment–wage slavery, slavery, and genocide?

Research Site

The Equal Justice Initiative’s The Legacy Museum in Montgomery, Alabama. For background, see review by Laquer, Thomas. 2018. Lynched for drinking from a white man’s well. The London Review of Books.

The US has killed more than 20 M people in 37 countries since WWII.