No Borders Leftish

When I lived there for a year at the beginning of this century, Sweden stood out for its social democratic citizenship. Among the many distinct things that means, I was impressed by the benefits I didn’t expect, including the fact that I had access to no-nonsense, constructive (not policing) state assistance immediately, and that I could vote after a couple of months. I had political citizenship rights within weeks of living in Sweden. How democratic is that?! Lots of African Americans and other expropriated Americans never get political citizenship rights in the US. Who couldn’t vote in Sweden were expats. That kind of right to vote is what today’s Leftish No Borders advocates call “domicile citizenship,” as if they invented it and their ahistorical, radical anarcho youthfulness alone will will it into existence.

When I moved to Canada, that darling, that sweetheart of immigration advocates everywhere, I was struck by its opposite citizenship: I was not able to exercise citizenship rights for a decade, while I went through the residency and citizenship process. But people with a lot of money can readily buy citizenship rights in Canada. Expats enjoy citizenship. If you aren’t rich, residency is only a supplemental, contributing criterion for Canadian citizenship. It’s either Jus Sanguinis or money that efficiently makes the Canadian. And if you don’t believe me, well then let me tell you what a young, female African immigrant said at our surveillance-rich, monarchical swearing-in ceremony. New citizens were invited to give a speech about What Canadian Citizenship Means to Me. Her speech theme was: Canadian citizenship means, finally, I won’t be forced to submit to exploitation by Canadians so hard anymore. We could all relate, and she got a standing-O for it. (As well, opposite of Sweden, Canada or at least Manitoba has the most Kafkaesque bureaucratic culture I have ever experienced. No guiding principle of substantive rationality exists there. All of Canadian bureaucracy is geared for men in networks to pilfer from, while female secretaries preserve the assets for them.)

DHS and ICE are abominations, crimes against humanity. For sure, the brutal US approach to immigrants is enough to drive anyone crazy. In fact, I’ve seen that happen. It seems to me though that the problem is clear enough: Divest from policing and carceralism; impose borders and limits on your capitalist class, and tax them; and distribute wealth to support social reproduction and other productive economic contributions. And do like the Swedes: Make citizenship about living and contributing in a place, within communities, not about payoff.

In all the miserable time I was on Facebook–steered by its algorithms into some excellent people, but some irredeemable, flat-out jackasses as well, and steered by its algorithms into their most provoking posts—eventually the No Borders Left arose within social media. What frustrated me about them at the time was the stance they took: Borders are what cause capitalist inequality. Evidence? ICE and Global inequality. Hm.

Baffling. Would they explain their theory, flesh it out?

They would not. It was a moral principle dividing Good from Evil.

Most capitalists want the removal of all barriers to uprooting people, so that capitalists can mobilize and immoblize populations at whim, monopolize the human capacity for coordination, and substitute inputs (factors of production) without friction. Could a No Borders politics just be easily subsumed by that hegemonic force? Ruled irrelevant.

What struck me as distinctive about the Leftish No Borders mobilization is the “coalitional” involvement of Dem Party wonks and the total lack of explanation or practical strategy. I am not alone. According to one of its erstwhile advocates, David Feldman, the No-Borders “principle has come to stand for migrant and immigrant justice.” Where promising Left movements are engaging  practical politics and thinking strategically across many fields, Leftish No Borders advocates have not engaged practical politics and thinking strategically about immigration and citizenship at all (Catalyst 4(10): 148-9).

Given the obvious, capitalist No-Borders bedfellows, such an unusual dearth of Left theory and strategy in the 21st century should ring alarm bells. But apparently the Democratic Socialists voted thumbs up on the cosmopolitan, content-free, wonderfully-philosophical Open Borders principle. Somebody in there is killer at taking the group out for late-nite cigarettes and beer bonding. The Left kids are capable of better than this, and I think we should demand better from the Left kids. If we let them slip into pure romantic idealism in such political pockets, we’ve created holes for capitalists, the Right, and police to crawl into and start fucking us up.

Feldman is trying to operationalize Leftish Open Borders politics as “domicile citizenship.” So even though it’s weird that these metropole kids don’t recognize that such a thing exists within a certain, specific framework, the concept still is not as rigorous as normal Left thought. How in hell’s name is domicile citizenship going to get rid of global inequality, particularly if you recognize that people are not inputs or factors of production to be frictionlessly swapped around? A sociologist would know that empirically, people hate leaving home, and most displaced people just want to get back home. A sociologist would also know why: It takes a lot of communal work for individual people to adapt to a complex place and society. We can call that cultural and social capital for short, so that we can understand that these are a kind of asset, resources that people, a social species, require to live, and if you don’t get assets with money, they require work. The No Borders Leftish vision is so conservative- economistic, so anti-sociological, it really makes you wonder.

How can you make migration just when the propulsion for migration–not just capitalist inequality (as if that were an effect of geography, rather than the cause of geographically-distributed life chances; as if capital is immobile), but also imperial war and climate crisis–remains utterly unjust? What is the vision here? Billions of poor people–that is to say, people without assets, stripped of even socio-cultural resources–chasing capital all around the globe? Domicile (Swedish) citizenship is better than “national” citizenship or (Canadian) citizenship-by-effective demand, but you don’t get there through untethered idealism. And while it can contribute to working-class strength within a polity, domicile citizenship will not do much about capitalist inequality.

Occam’s Razor: Just fight against population managment in its disrupt and mobilize (war) and isolation and immobilization (policing and carceralism) modes. If all you want is a tite slogan: Defund Police > No Borders. Fight for people to live peacefully where they want to, which, except for capitalists, is usually home. Fight for making citizenship rights based on where you live, not what’s in your Cayman Islands vault. And fight for democratic citizenship rights, because those have been under enormous assault, and they’re all that protect us from the powerful in a world gone inequality- and inegalitarianism-mad. There’s something really fishy, really rotten about No Borders, kill-citizenship-off politics.

We should always strive for internationalism, for the democratic motley crew, and that’s a tough row to hoe (See Erica Benner’s Actually Existing Nationalisms). But the sacred Borderless world will come after and not before the bloody, global Communist (or at least social democratic) revolution.





Foreign Policy & Immigration: France

Reviewing the US perspective (Paul Gallis, Congressional Research Service, 2006) on French foreign policy requires some interpretation, or reading between the lines, but here are notes:

  1. Anglo-Americans cannot understand that French societal reproduction balances the deeply-antagonistic cultural contenders, laicite (secularism) and Catholicism. Managing this explosive cultural antagonism is why there is precious little independent room for other religions to shift French societal reproduction.
    1. Anglo-Americans misread French culture as wholly secularized because, as Tories and slavers, Whigs and capitalists, they are scandalized by the persistence of any democratic reproduction capacity at all. It consumes their attention, while Catholic culture seems natural.
  2. Sources of French sovereignty include:
  • Proven European coordination capacity;
  • Consensus-cohering human rights and democracy brand;
  • The UN;
  • Arab and worldwide colonial ties;
  • US governance has been constrained by economic orthodoxy, which reduces US strategic degrees of freedom.
    • For example, France can (and can coordinate Europe to) take advantage of  extreme US averseness to disrupting core FDI-based commercial relations, permitting the “medium size” “modest resource” country strategic sovereignty to resist and counter some of the US’s military geostrategic disruption and reorganization initiatives.


Caged within the orthodox econ framework that political-economic organizers like Paul Samuelsson and Milton Friedman had erected, it was impossible for the American polity to understand why France did not cooperate with the belligerent imperial takeover of Iraq, and worse, it was impossible for them to understand how France was able to not cooperate. According to econ theory orthodoxy, the FDI ties should have absolutely subordinated France to US sovereignty. After all, the territorial invasion and takeover was executed on behalf of the immediate economic interests of an international capitalist community–though monolithically conceived and under-specified.

Designed to support financialization and expropriation, the orthodox econ perspective rigidly excludes interests external to its view-from-the-top framework. France was afforded greater strategic degrees of freedom by French theories–including a revolutionary theory of democracy that economic orthodoxy had excluded and rendered completely illegible/irrational to US polity members. (This sheds light on the value France places on maintaining its own semi-sovereign philosophical establishment.)

Although France was the target of US exasperation, the conceptual and strategic constraints imposed on the US polity by total economic orthodoxy capture was a significant source of frustration to the US Congress in the early aughts.

I hypothesize that, relatively freed by its conservative paradigm (with its sacred social hierarchy core, as opposed to the more constraining liberal paradigm core, absolute private property right), the Republican aspect of the US Congress learned from this conflict with (what it viewed with frustration as) an “illegitimate” European power.

Trump was propelled to leadership by the Republican Party because of his capacity to engage imperial strategy beyond economic orthodoxy. Trump’s dogma is conservatism, wider than private property-bound economic orthodoxy, and endowed with more strategic degrees of freedom in the current expropriation-oriented context. Unlike Bush strategically constrained by economic orthodoxy in the early aughts, Trump today can suppress France’s sovereignty, and other sovereignties, and subordinate other governments and alternative interests to US strategy because he can temporarily suspend commercial relations. Prior to Trump, that tactic had been unthinkable. In both orthodox economic and Ordoliberal theory, only capitalists, and not states, were supposed to have the capacity to suspend economic relations as a power tactic. As President Bizniz, Trump is trusted to wield capitalist and state powers.

While other countries today are frustrated with Trump’s tactical suspension of commercial relations to impose absolute US sovereignty, it is important to point out that this phase is the consequence of foiled, unrealistic expectations that were implanted by the artificial constructs sewn by the theoretical monopoly of economic orthodoxy–to which most those countries (not SE Asia in 1997, not France in the early aughts, not Russia or China) and factions still cling. Two truisms apply here: “It is difficult to get a man (or a polity) to understand something, when his salary (GDP) depends on his not understanding it” (Upton Sinclair); 2) They want their cake and to eat it too.

The Democrats are in disarray as remnant heterodox factions struggle to expand their theory and collective action repertoire, and their core continues to try to pursue traditional neoliberal policies constrained by orthodox economic theory, and the traditional racial management objectives that coordinate global ruling class interests. The crisis in a US that has been nearly gutted of theory diversity, including the democratic Enlightenment theory that allowed its independence, is between a faction operating within the authoritarian slaver legacy of conservative theory, as embodied in the Southernized US military,  and a faction around the DNC, operating within economic orthodoxy and devoted to managing domestic and international racializations (including with military coercion) to serve secure private property rights to major global asset acquirers.

Foreign Policy & Immigration

The State’s Objective: Racialized population management on behalf of an international network

In the 1950s, UBC political scientist David Corbett compared postwar Commonwealth Canadian and Australian immigration and foreign policy. He started with the premise of the objectives of foreign policy and domestic policy. According to the political scientist, while foreign objectives are satisfied in policy, domestic objectives are satisfied in politics. Racial management from a British perspective played a central role in both foreign and domestic objectives.

The objective of foreign policy is…prevention of a precipitous move into the communist camp on the part of the non-white populations of the world,” while the objective of “domestic politics” is preserving “harmony among ethnic groups, and the economic strength and national patriotism necessary for a nation to meet its international commitments, defend itself, perform its treaty obligations and carry out its proper responsibilities in the community of nations” (Corbett 1958: 115).

While Corbett used language that tended to hide the sociological distribution of duties and obligations within Commonwealth social contract, it is apparent from the Commonwealth perspective that, along with controlling racialized peoples around the world, domestic ethnic management primarily serves the anti-Rousseauian purpose of permitting the Commonwealth country to perform its obligations to external interests. A postwar liberal might specify those interests in relation to some nations, as Corbett did, and a more contemporary observer would specify those global interests as belonging to an economic network or the capitalist class, and carried by states.

[While critical analysts in the US core can often more clearly see the structure and political organization of the capitalist class, the advantage of the tributary Commonwealth perspective is that it can more reliably apprehend the spatial distribution of that interested class’ network, a perspective that the US lost as it became a financial and consumption core tied to an aging oil-based GPT. Together, they may shed light on the distribution of sovereignty in global capitalism.]

Failing to Conceptualize Postwar Australian Policy

Labouring to jam his comparative case study within a Procrustean bed of liberal notions (Realism, Idealism), Corbett goes on despite himself to demonstrate that the Australian Labour Party was able to efficiently parlay its wartime nationalism brand into the capacity to manage the conversion of working-class interest in reducing working-class competition– via immigration– into the working-class interest in full employment. By instituting full (male) employment, the Labour Party was able to institute mass immigration without contribution qualifications–that is to say, not capitalist but humanist immigration, immigration without structured stigma.

It was very difficult for Corbett to conceptualize the postwar institutionalization of Australian foreign and immigration policy from within a liberal framework. From a liberal perspective, Corbett had to interpret full-employment-embedded mass immigration without stigma as “idealistic” policy. However slippery the Realism/Idealism terms, by liberal definition, anti-capitalist policy is not “realistic.” But in fact, in combination with policy supporting universal working-class access to income, stigma-free immigration is a pro-worker variety of nonelite mobilization.

The normalized mobilization, called simply “immigration,” contrastingly tends to be designed and legitimized by economists, capitalists’ think tanks, and consanguine conservative-liberal policymakers to disrupt and constrain nonelite collective action, in service of the governing objectives Corbett described at top.

It was not that the postwar Australian liberal party was simply, craftily using nationalist credibility earned in the war and solidified in a brand to orchestrate exoteric domestic politics imposing the objectives of international capital, but rather that the Australian working class understood its interests and responded not with the irrationality that liberals and conservatives automatically, tendentiously attribute to the working class’ distinct interests, but with rational cooperation.

[Conservatives and liberals influenced by conservative thought (eg. Hobbes’ tendentiously-narrow definition of non-elite liberty as bodily movement) will not grasp the distinction, but with a socialist recognition that labour mobility can come in both pro-labour and anti-labour forms, what the Australian Labour Party instituted is pro-labour mobility, as contrasted to migration as “a capitalists’ proposal, a weapon against labour” (Corbett 1958: 113).

From a liberal framework that simply naturalizes the working class subjectivity as irrational, Corbett was unable to satisfactorily explain the Australian working-class’ acceptance of postwar mass immigration. In wavering language, he suggested that “probably” mass immigration was imposed upon and sold to an unwitting working class with idealistic messaging (Corbett 1958: 115). He offers this weak analysis, lacking any empirical evidence, as confirmation that under unspecified conditions, Political Science’s Idealist hypothesis is as valid as its Realist hypothesis. This framing begs the question of the conditions under which “Idealism” v. “Realism” may operate.]

Postwar Canadian Liberalism: Immigration Policy

Corbett’s comparative case, exemplifying Realist governance, was Canada, where the Liberal Party leader Mackenzie King presided in the postwar period, as before. The ruling Liberal Party did not institute full-employment policy in Canada, and, despite postwar resettlement needs, maintained the capitalist’s contribution-qualified Canadian immigration policy, only expanding numbers gradually.

Over the decades, the Australian right removed the full employment framework, restoring the working-class disciplining variety of mass immigration.

In Canada, the variety of mobilization, the “immigration” that King maintained was eventually expanded, and has become branded not only in Canada but abroad as well as the model for achieving the state’s domestic-politics objective, the objective of ethnicized population management in service of an external network.

The context for the diffusion and adoption of Canada’s model is the neoliberal milieu, conditions in which (we have begun to recognize) liberalism has been widely reoriented to conservative social-ordering principles of inequality and inegalitarianism. But these social-ordering principles are not how neoliberal delegates sell their transitional work. Historically, conservatives have sold their society as a form of divine paternal protection and cultural patronage. In facilitating the transition to greater inequality and inegalitarianism, neoliberal delegates aestheticize, moralize, center, and normalize the marginal experience.

Research Agenda

How does King’s Canadian immigration model continue to reflect and amplify the conservatized liberal consensus? How does it continue to secure the worker-constraining variety of immigration? (TFW.) How does the Canadian model achieve the domestic objective to secure compliance across ethnicity for the benefit of international economic interests? (Multiculturalism.)

With the growth of refugee migration, could the Canadian model lose its glamour again, even for liberals, if pro-worker governments arise elsewhere to institute “idealistic” policy? In that case, it may be useful for the growth industry of Canadian immigration expertise to diversify their portfolio and comparatively consider the virtues of different varieties of immigration policy within distinctive policy packages.

Method: Compare Canadian to contemporary Swedish foreign and immigration policy.

Sweden as Comparator: Immigration & Integration

The utility of Sweden as a comparator in discussions of immigration and cohesion is partially that Sweden is a society that achieved integration, coherence at the turn of the 20th century, though this fact tends to be buried in liberal propaganda characterizing Swedish coherence not as a hard-won social achievement, but as “natural” or “biological.” What is the function of portraying a political achievement as a biological attribute?

Liberal and conservative consensus portrays Sweden as “monolithic,” an inferior or insufficient multicultural model in comparison to “diverse” Canada. While I experientially understand the difficulty of integrating into Swedish and as well Canadian social relations, my analysis is that the Sweden-is-homogeneous framework is an overplayed symptom of global military and economic interests in breaching the country’s democratic-sovereignty boundaries. Any “homogeneity” (cohesion, sovereign democratic boundaries) Sweden has is a hard-won achievement, and those boundaries can be at odds with metropole priorities. Like Canada and Ukraine, Sweden was integrated into the global economy as an extraction (forestry, mining) periphery. Prior to the social democratic reorganization at the turn of the 20th century (not so long ago), it was a highly-balkanized country, in terms of regionalism, elite internal conflict, and relations with global powers–Britain, Germany, and Russia. Capitalist ideology will always paint any degree of working-class sovereignty as an obstructive monolith…a many-headed hydra, as Linebaugh and Rediker observed.

Canadian Multiculturalism: More Than Ethnic Management?

It has been suggested that Canadian multicultural policy serves as a sort of vehicle for deliberative democratic practice, fortifying sovereign democratic development. One researcher starts from the empirical observation (surveys) of dehumanizing and non-compromising attitudes in Ukraine. The idea here is that these attitudes are cultural, not based in ongoing experiences where there are little by way of compromise options. This view sees untapped capacity, multiculturalism not as ethnic management but as Bahktinian carnivale. After all, in the staid old Soviet Union, bureaucrats were also involved in disruptive collectives as critical artists (O. Kulick, 2020). With the addition of multicultural institutions, space could be made within capitalist societies for more deliberative democracy and regional sovereignty, right?

By contrast, I have been viewing multicultural policy as an insufficient vehicle for deliberative democracy in the face of global financial and military interests. I have been living for 11 years in Canada, and, along with studying comparative immigration policy, I am versed in the Canadian and OECD arguments for the virtues of Canadian multicultural institutions–These arguments tend to highlight Canadian multiculturalism as a culturalist vehicle allowing rapid immigrant ownership of the nationality, thus enabling smoother market integration, and as a byproduct, social integration. Canadian multiculturalism is really cultural, taking the form of toleration aesthetics and manners, and food celebrations.

While it is tempting in a context of liberal cultural determinism to imagine that we can negate externally-imposed intra-territorial conflict by simply, stealthily instituting cosmopolitan cultural-appreciation institutions, Canadian multiculturalism is not constructed as a vehicle for the deliberative democracy that can build sovereign democratic capacity, that can set boundaries (to some extent) upon imperial interventions. Canadian multiculturalism is an institution cohering for the global market a colonial society comprised of a selected (“chosen,” with all its divine connotations) influx of contributing labour and capital superimposed over a defeated native population. But even were it backed by similar pro-immigration norms and structural factor requirements, multiculturalism is probably not robust enough to overcome ongoing, externally-imposed alienation.

My research in Sweden was with immigrant groups and the political parties (Vansterpartiet), unions (LO), and national and state welfare and research agencies involved in newcomer integration and advocacy. Multicultural policy in Sweden predates Canadian multicultural policy. While this is a heightened moment of immigration in which conflicts come to the fore, Sweden has been a longtime immigration country (including, per LO-led policy, for distinctly different, particularly war-refugee, economic-refugee, and family reunification migrant populations compared to Anglo-American settler countries, including Canada, primarily managing economic mobilizations). As well, Sweden uniquely exercises particularly strong, institutionalized, sociological self-critical capacity, while maintaining (struggling to maintain, but still struggling) the boundaries that allow for the reproduction of substantive democracy (real equality of opportunity and democratic outcomes).

Consequent to my Sweden-Canada immigration comparison, I tend to view multiculturalism as an oblique contributor to market-centered social cohesion, an adjunct to a national order that prioritizes market autonomy, not deliberative democratic capacity. Multiculturalism helps coordinate market actors and so stabilizes the market–an antidemocratic institution. It also can accommodate or reproduce non-democratic dispositions, practices, and skills. It doesn’t require education for democratic development (Dewey 1915), only communications professionals. It is a policy jewel owned by conservatism still under socialist heat, though multiculturalism was not even pioneered by conservatives or liberals, but by social democrats with socialist backbone. Though it has been posited as a integration resource in Eastern Europe, I think multiculturalism has thin capacity to substitute for or create the conditions for deliberative democracy enabling citizens to collectively organize sovereign boundaries and development. It may not be adequate to the social challenges of tributaries riven by imperial rivalry.

Still, perhaps market-friendly multiculturalism is a possible humanistic integration institution for regions, like Canada, that are confined to asserting symbolic sovereignty?* Sweden was able to assert some developmental sovereignty because a) political organizers prioritized cross-national union and working class development prior to polity strategy, and b) it works in a regional alliance with other Nordic countries serving different imperial masters. That may not be an optional development path everywhere. It’s not desirable in the British Commonwealth network.

Because it becomes institutionalized in an expert market, Canadian, American, and UK policy tends to be overhyped and exported excessively and uncritically, including to Canada’s and the US’s own hinterlands. This expertise can often be counterproductive to tributary regions’ political-economic and social development. Yet as a sociologist always aware of the social construction of our world, I am also committed to the collective, comparativist Enlightenment approach to knowledge building. I continue to think there is a great need for well-specified, interregional-comparative and historical-comparative scholarly interventions.


*Note: It sounds like I’m harshing on Canada. I do not think its immigration and integration policies are good export models. However, I do think there is a Canadian advantage, which some other countries share: It doesn’t have such a big population that it wastes incomprehensibly-vast amounts of cultural capital and human life on junk jobs, rentier activities, underemployment, military keynesianism, policing, surveillance, and incarceration, like the national capitalist cores do. It still wastes a lot of life.

However, what makes the Canadian model tick as a class compromise is that it is a pretty simple capitalist tributary–it never had any ambition to mess around with democracy beyond capital-serving political parties coordinated by metropole bond raters and Anglo-American capitalist core political parties (public goods and services are skeletal and mean, information is hard to get, there’s no white collar crime enforcement, it protects global mining rents from taxation, the police exist to remove indigenous peoples from resource extraction right-of-way); its main form of societal reproduction, the immigration pool, is highly vetted, and charged, for its capacity to deliver over cultural and financial capital; the population is low enough that only indigenous lives are systematically wasted; and Canadian virtue is achieved simply via expressions of nationalism, men’s hockey, and charity. Although it’s a neoclassical econ model, it’s not a societal model.


Econ Efforts to Mobilize Factors of Production

“It has become clear that migration is an essential element in the world
economy. Sending countries benefit increasingly from remittance payments
and the return of skilled migrants, receiving countries benefit from younger
workforces, and migrants themselves find new opportunities through their
move to a new country. Migration redistributes wealth at the world level and
plays a central role in development and poverty reduction. Moreover, within
the current globalization process, which favours an increasingly free
circulation of goods, information and capital, it is worth considering including
free movement of human beings as well.”–A. Pecoud, Universite Paris, paragraph 3 in Migration without Borders, 2007.




Social Reproduction Feminism on Worker Citizenship and Expropriation

“Once separated from the means of production and proletarianized, they are protected, at least in theory, from further expropriation.”–Nancy Fraser . 2018. “Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography–From Exploitation to Expropriation: Historic Geographies of Racialized Capitalism.”

In theory, but, yeah, no. Absolutely not. Exactly like masculinity, the Premium Economy status of “free”-individual metropolitan citizen-worker exploitables is always challenged, always has to be fought for, on pain of consignment to the larger class of expropriables subjected to regular state violence. (Knowing your gender theory, see Kimmel 2002, helps with political economic analysis.)

This is what nonelites organized by conservatives know that “progressive neoliberals” serving global capitalists discreetly overlook, in the conduct of their professional duties distancing from and disciplining the mob. Using the White Privilege that “the mob” knows it has fought for, to selflessly usher the Exceptional Deprived under the benevolent wing of protective or symbolic elite patronage, progressive neoliberals appeal to “fairness while extending expropriation” (Fraser 2018: 15). In this sense, are liberal-arts academics the public complement to private lawyers in capitalism–where private law quietly, massively secures oligarchy (Pistor 2019), while liberal arts academics piously, publicly attack unfair advantages accruing within pockets (other than the police) of the working class? Managerial sanctimony for some, little national flags for others.

fight club

Fraser understands that the legally-recognized (cosmopolitan–historically male, European, White, but shifting with the global mobilization of labour, see Fatah-Black & van Rossum 2014, and the rise of global capitalist metropoles) exploited worker has always been a hard-won, probationary status, though the function is required for capitalist value creation. Attaining state-recognized, exploited worker status is probationary because capital also needs a lot more expropriated work. For value to be accumulated by capitalists, exploited workers have to work upon the mass “raw material” of cheap nature and social reproduction, which is supplied by coerced, expropriated work (Fraser 2018; Moore 2015). Unlike capital assets (See Pistor 2019), the capitalists’ state will not protect–fully or durably–worker income achievements or other smallholdings without expensive private law securing it. Where one of Sweden’s innovations was to extend entitlements across the population, “leveling upward” (Barton 1986: 173), antisocialist societies keep the entitlements and rights markets scarce and expensive.

Though as early as the late 18th century, the impossibility of maintaining spatially-segregated expropriated v. exploited labour forces pushed the Dutch Republic to ban slavery (total racialized expropriation) in the European metropole (Fatah-Black & van Rossum 2014), the growth of hybrid exploitation-expropriation status has arisen with “financialized capitalism” (Fraser 2018: 12).

David Abraham (2010) has identified the political mechanism instituting hybrid exploitation-expropriation status: broadened but cheapened citizenship, the dismantling of social citizenship rights and institutions, along with the expansion and intensification of imperial disruption and population relocations, what in “progressive neoliberal” hands becomes the Dem Party’s Open Borders politics.

Like all progressive neoliberalism, Open Borders TM is a late-hour emergency reversal, a pious optical roll back from the deluge of neoliberal policies that have landed at grotesque expropriation visuals: ICE’s concentration camps for immigrant babies. The left hand of the conservatize-liberal Dem party suggests decriminalizing immigrants–great! But the more consistent, dominant right hand of the political party continues to follow Mises’ and Hayek’s Viennese Chamber of Commerce model, replacing national sovereignty with global capitalist sovereignty (Pistor  2019, Ch. 6; Slobodian 2018; Zevin 2019)–that is, diminishing citizenship rights, facilitating expropriation universally: criminalization of the rest of marginalized life (and in capitalism, marginalized life is a lot of life), for-profit slave-labour prisons throughout the Anglosphere, and disruptive, dislocating war abroad. There’s more than one way to skin the people alive. (That said, I wish the Justice Democrats well. May they slap down–and impale with a wooden cross–the dead right hand of the Slaver County-Wall St. Dem bloc.)

Why is N. Fraser so necessary and relevant today? After a three-year application process, I got citizenship in a country where to get citizenship (qualifying for legalized exploitation, as opposed to violent expropriation, but downgraded to hybrid exploitation-expropriation in the financialist restoration) you have to swear allegiance to the British monarchy. Canadian citizenship remains both colonial and Burkean:

Society is indeed a contract…between those who are living (and) those who are dead…So far is it from being true that we acquired a right by the Revolution to elect our kings that, if we had possessed it before, the English nation did at that time most solemnly renounce and abdicate it, for themselves and for all their posterity forever” (Burke, 1790).

Apparently, lots of new settlers aren’t down with this reactionary 1790 social contract, however symbolic (How does this even work in Quebec? Headscarf law, I guess.); so in the official ritual, the Canadian citizenship induction team makes a point of threatening the inductees and then monitoring them to ensure they swear fealty to the British monarchy, instead of mumbling The Internationale or La Marseillaise or even Elizabeth Bishop’s The Moose under their breath.

After a lot of official chit-chat about The Greatest Nation(-state) on Earth and how it requires unpaid labour (voluntarism), a citizenship inductee can volunteer to speak about what Canadian citizenship means to her. A young woman from Africa was introduced, got up, and gave a cheerful speech about how Canadian citizenship means that everyone in that room can now finally avoid Canadians expropriating them. She went over the varieties of expropriation line item by line item.

It was a super-instrumentalist account of what citizenship means, and, since no capitalist could object to it on ideological grounds, but it was a far cry from the conservative-liberal idealist bath we’d just been given, her assertion of imperial reality was kind of a subtly-subversive move. I appreciated the new citizen’s initiative.

On the other hand, it’s hard to be totally reassured: Canadian citizenship policy and Burkean discourse channel the real financialized-imperialism experience of unequal, inegalitarian, and predatory class and state relations into an “I got mine” discourse of individualist instrumentalism. Here’s hoping the liberal exhortations to volunteer and “be friends” with indigenous Canada somehow keep the back cellar door open for the internationalist-organization way out of this global rentier-capitalist, conservative-liberal Forever Home.

Naturally, the same citizenship team that had threatened and monitored us to swear loyalty to the British royalty was a bit nonplussed. “I expect you’ll take my job!” the exquisitely-cast, good-looking, Metis, pompadour-dyke-hair judge slipped out of character, as the new citizen wrapped up her oration and returned to her seat.


Abraham, David. 2010. “America, Germany, Israel: Three Modes of Citizenship and Incorporation.” International Labour and Working-class History 78: 123-128.

Barton, H.A. 1986. Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 1760-1815. University of Minnesota.

Burke, Edmund. 1790. Reflections on the Revolution in France.

Fatah-Black, Karwan & Matthias van Rossum. 2014. “Slavery in a ‘Slave-free Enclave’?: Historical Links between the Dutch Republic Empire and Slavery, 1580s-1860s.” Werkstatt Geschichte 66-67: 55-73.

Federici, Silvia. 2019. “From Crisis to Commons,” pp. 175-187 in Re-enchanting the World: Feminism and the Politics of the Commons. PM Press.

Fraser, Nancy. 2018. Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography–From Exploitation to Expropriation: Historic Geographies of Racialized Capitalism.” Economic Geography 94(1): 1-17.

Kimmel, Michael S. 2002. “Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity.”

Meiksins-Wood, Ellen. 2014. “Capitalism’s Gravediggers,” Jacobin.

Pistor, Katharina. 2019. The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality. Princeton.

Slobodian, Quinn. 2018. Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Harvard.

Zevin, Alexander. 2019. “Every Penny a Vote.” Pp. 27-30 in the London Review of Books, 15 August.



Policy Proposal: Develop Alternative Paths from University for Immigrants Who Aren’t Scholars

Political Economic Context for the Policy of Immigration through Universities in the Anglosphere under Financial and Military Rule

Population growth is a requirement in societies dedicated to aggregate (undistributed) economic growth. Much as Anglo-American societies place far less emphasis on fostering developmental conditions than attracting, hosting, and taking a cut of wealth from around the globe, Anglo-American Settler societies continuously reproduce vulnerable, disrupted labor via import, immigration, not biological reproduction, which risks a working class with contributory claims on the wealth global elites are trying to amass and store. Functionally self-perpetuating, the Anglo-American empire requires continuous mass-disruption and dislocation of populations in strategic regions; thus, the US military functionally produces via war that traumatized migration central to the liberal Anglo social model’s growth objective. Culturally, liberal Anglo societies discount the reproduction of human capital in favor of reproducing working classes with weaker contributory claims; they discount human capital’s role in technological innovation, and they discount technological innovation as an engine of growth, in favor of raw, mass wealth accumulation and the capacity to dismantle rivalry and upstarts (See Gordon 2016).

With the restoration of financial leadership in the Anglosphere and the militarization of American society, financial and militarized policing interests have increasingly come to determine who will deal with the process of immigration to minimize the costs of migration and immigration to financial accumulation and the US’s other main work– surveillance, Military “Keynesianism,” and warfare. It is financial metropoles like the City of London and New York City that produce the accumulation-focused policy templates replicated–often irrationally–throughout its tributaries, from repurposing housing and urban infrastructure into a real estate repository for global elites’ surfeit wealth, to repurposing Trente Glorieuses social citizenship institutions like the build-up of university infrastructure from mass human development to commercial R&D and direct business subsidy, as well as immigration processing.

Universities as migration institutions is a policy and institutional incentive system that looks like it might make sense from a distance, but has a lot of fundamental structural flaws that the “front-line service workers” (as Anglo policymakers construct professors) are left to jury-rig in the 100-hour workdays (in the alternate reality of policy-makers’ minds) of teachers and professors/researchers and other atavistic remnants of democratic institutions. In Commonwealth regions that adopt the finance-oriented City of London’s policy models, including processing immigration through universities, professors can manage neither their own departments (This is optimal from the professional management interest.)–nor their own workloads (This incapacity to be accountable is suboptimal even from a professional managerial perspective). This dysfunction operates to the extent that the material professors are provided to evaluate students for admissions has been found to be mostly fraudulently produced, and inaccurately represents the students’ actual capacity or propensity for education and scholarly work. In such regimes, there is little fit between immigrants and universities. Nonsensically, the responsibility for this lack of fit is downloaded onto individual professors; perhaps it will eventually drift to departments or university management, who will doubtless attempt to implement more surveillance software on employees.

Should professors be saddled with the responsibility for making universities fit immigration, since universities are generally about finishing up adult newcomers, polishing them up for market and social contribution, and this is a many-faceted task? From the professor’s perspective, undergrad education is something of a gong show; but universities have always played an adult-transition “governess” role, among the many functions that have been delegated to universities. This great social contribution, like any such indispensable, feminized, developmental social reproduction work, is readily discounted in liberal Anglo culture–particularly as it reproduces non-elites and their work, versus directly reproducing elites and wealth. So by undertaking this important, complex work, professors, educators and researchers consequently can be portrayed as doing nothing in Anglo liberal cultures. But it is in recent years that Anglo-American politicians and university managers have coalesced to fill professors’ imaginary work “gap” by expanding the en loco parentis tradition into En Loco Department of Immigration.

In addition to their other responsibilities and contributions, now professors are saddled with processing population growth for aggregate economic growth. Professors are left holding the immigration bag for no logical reason, but simply because they are not that organized or powerful a constituency. Already internally riven by professional schools divorced from scholarly purpose and married to commerce, scholars are incapable of organizing and articulating how scholarship contributes to society. In lieu of clarifying scholarship’s contributions, disciplines simply competitively market their wares while giant university administrations fund-raise and manage the help.

The US Working-class Risk Model in Credential Consumption and Immigration-via-University

The distinctive institutional resource that allows universities to manage this prescribed misdirection of migrants and migration workload transfer in the US is that, in contrast to the British system, graduate students in the US are not guaranteed the services of professors. Advising, mentoring, working on graduate students’ committees is completely up to professors’ discretion in US universities. In the US system a strong percentage of graduate students unceremoniously fade away from the academic departments where they were accepted for study–They have to individually develop a new strategy and leave academia–because they cannot secure the faculty members to sit on their committee or get faculty to continue serving on their committees. Grad students in the US have the typical American individualized high-risk contract for workers, rather than the more favorable contract that the British tradition provides students as consumers.

On the negative side, this US model allows for plenty of personalized and institutional abuse of graduate students. On the more functional side, in the US the burden is not on professors, but on graduate students to demonstrate through their own work, to their professors, that they can do the more independent work that I think employers and communities should expect of someone with a graduate degree. This virtue is currently not true of graduate students in the British Commonwealth.

But I think that in the Commonwealth, you could retain the better treatment of graduate students while making a graduate degree a signal of the holder’s capacity rather than a reflection of her or his professors’ capacity. This reform would provide stronger information, a benefit, to employers.

Anglo Immigration through Universities, A Reform Proposal: Not Just the Boot But Settler Chutes for Immigrants

US-style professor discretion allows the on-the-ground “migration agents”–professors– to evaluate students as they do work rather than be forced into overwork connecting university education and research with the incongruous expectations and needs of a migrant pool, people already under high adjustment demands and often unwilling and unable to take on graduate-degree work expectations. Those of us who think that universities contribute massively to society without taking on the huge sideline of immigrant-processing work may suggest alternative departmental, institutional, regional or Anglo policy we could find from within the British traditions that would permit us to best preserve core university work within the Commonwealth. An alternative to that American student-risk model that the Anglo tradition has foregone is policy that provides alternative “chutes” stemming off from an academic immigrant entry point.

This chute approach has strong precedent in English policy. In Anglo countries with indigenous populations, policy has institutionalized “ladders” for indigenous people to enter the social work, childcare, and teaching job markets from Community Schools that serve as poorly-funded neighborhood welfare hubs. Anglo approaches to working class motherhood institutionalize chutes from the delivery room to surveilled, socially-subsidized, low-wage, unskilled labour for businesses, a policy called Workfare. Such Poore Lawes policy, while extremely coercive, exploitative, and multi-generationally handicapping, is embedded in the Anglo tradition, and squats squarely in the liberal Anglo ideological wheelhouse. Institutionalized chutes are quite naturalized and legitimate in Anglo management and political cultures and not regarded as contributing to policymakers’ shame at all. Chutes policy should not be a hard sell in an Anglo region.

While chutes can be mainstay Anglo fare, they need not be Anglo-vampiric. The chutes from university for those immigrants without current scholarly capacity could serve as an alternative to the catastrophic deportation default, and avoid the political and litigation frenzy that the British government has incurred in going to extremes to avoid professors evaluating immigrant students’ work as academic work. And institutionalizing chutes does not have to be as carceral and debilitating as class-warfare Poore Lawes policy is. British Commonwealth jurisdictions do not have to reinstitute indentured servitude for immigrants. After all, the Anglo-American growth model depends on mass immigration, and in competition, Anglo regions need to continue “pulling” in a working-age population. Tweaking the concept, the chutes could be called “bridges.”

More substantively, building such connections for failing student-immigrants between universities as the immigration entry point and a number of secondary immigration paths–remedial education, vo-tech education, labour markets, and small-business supports–and investing in the on-the-ground university departments the discretion to direct immigrant-students to these bridges–to transfer immigrants to other settlement options rather than giving them the boot, rather than (unsuccesfully) treating failed students as if they were criminals because they try to game universities, could help correct migrant incentives and settler enculturation, including to fraud and inefficient distrust. Institutionalizing chutes can reinforce university standards, incentives, work, priorities, and credentials, rather than undermine them as current, underconceptualized, underdeveloped immigration-through-universities policy does. Moreover, by ending Commonwealth professors’ institutionally-enforced obligation to credential accepted students by hook or crook, restoring to professors the capacity to evaluate and credential students upon the student’s performance as a semi-independent worker, employers in the Commonwealth could count on advanced academic degrees to signal work skills and capacity.

Assessing Barriers to Productive Reform: The Reproduction of Financial Fraud & Rentier Grab-n-Go Cultures in Late Monopoly Capitalism

It looks that at this point in history, important underlying socio-economic priorities are mitigating against reform that preserves education and research integrity. I’m sure you saw that the British government conducted a review a few years ago, after the BBC blew the whistle in 2014, and found that a majority–tens of thousands– of migrants within their university system had cheated on their university English-language entrance exams. This fraud lies behind the massive redirection, across the Anglosphere, of professors’ workload into dealing by hook or crook with illiterate immigrants, innumerate immigrants, and immigrant-“students” who have little to nothing to do with scholarship, but quite unsurprisingly, just want to immigrate and not be bothered by extraneous stuff like university. Because they’re immigrants. And to be clear, it’s neither that immigrants corner the market on illiteracy, innumeracy, and socio-intellectual apathy. Nor is it that there are no scholar immigrants. It is that business-driven politicians and management working together to demote scholarship as the university priority helps legitimize general colonization of the university by interests that oppose scholarship, philosophy and science. When scholarship is marginalized at the university, we have renounced both democracy–which, yes, Anglo societies have renounced–and economic growth–which we have not yet admitted.

After attempting unsuccessfully to hit the emergency expulsion button, UK policymakers are unwilling to do anything about fraud and university colonization. No one has admitted that, in institutionalizing and normalizing cheating and falsification of qualifications, converting universities into a main migration institution is not only overloading and degrading the scholarly, citizenship, and even commercial development work that is simultaneously presumed to be done at universities, not only debasing professors’ capacity to administer and evaluate the progress of students to some level of adult, citizenship, and work competency, but also actively incentivizing fraud and gaming behaviour in the growing population.

It must be easy and quick for finance and defense industry interests to construct universities as needing to contribute ever more to financial accumulation. Far too easy. And yet, regional policymakers and business organizations need regional scholars to remind them when regional development interests diverge from the much-flogged interests at the financial metropoles that design and sell policy in support of metropole wealth accumulation and storage.

Even in this specific case of universities converted into immigration institutions, it’s obvious that there is a lot of work to do in coordinating Anglo-American cities and provinces– their Chambers of Commerce, developers, and policy makers– to incorporate a new generation of migrants in a way that allows newcomers–permanent and temporary–to align their own goals and welfare with regional development, to develop their best selves, work, and communities, to get the most out of the settler region that they can while re-creating a cohesive, vibrant, and capacious society.


Aziz Rana’s Internationalist Platform

Aziz Rana’s (2019) policy-development prescription (somewhat reformulated by me) for Justice Dems and labor organizers, as a polity-challenger coalition:

1) Labor organizing, building networks capacitating internationalist immigrant organizing leadership.

Problem: “The overwhelming tendency–and not just on the Right–is to present immigration as an issue that begins at the national border, with virtually no attention paid to the particular histories, international economic pressures, and specific US foreign policy practices that generate migration patterns” (Rana 2019).

2) Democratic budgeting exercises reworking the security state budget, to demonstrate popular capacity to democratize foreign policy, and to reintegrate foreign and domestic policy beyond the shallow, corporate-military “America First” working-class appeasement campaign.
3) Policy ideas for transitioning the US from overgrown military keynesianism on behalf of global capitalists to a wealth-circulating, democratic-tech developing, social reproductive economy appropriate to an “overdeveloped” (rentier capitalist) economy.
4) Develop trade policy with constraints on transnational property rights, linked to the domestic economy via enforced labor and environmental standards throughout supply chains, as well as policing redirected toward repatriating (sharing across production-impacted countries) excess profits and other private accumulation stockpiles.
I would add:

5) Organizing needs to address the great portions of the American working class materially and symbolically co-opted by the capitalist security state, particularly guard labor and owners of marginal businesses. These are the American working class, herded by right wing orgs and socially- subsidized into supporting global, militarized rents extractivism at the astronomical cost of global, social and environmental destabilization. Besides designing and investing in a democratic social reproductive economy to reincentivize this working class population, how can as many as possible of these co-opted working-class Americans be reorganized into supporting a transition to democracy, demilitarization, and a social reproductive economy? David Graeber’s lesson in “Army of Altruists” (2007) can be a starting point in organizing strategy: People want to work together for a great purpose.

6) Required: an assessment of policing and military capacity to tolerate v. oppose advancement to a democratic economy and polity in the US. Assessment needs to include an inventory of tools of suppression at police and military disposal.

7) Required: an assessment of the implications of US demilitarization and democratization on international investors, private and state, and their capacity to tolerate v. oppose, including an inventory of tools of suppression at their disposal.

8) Required: an assessment of antidemocratic imperial state partners’ capacity to tolerate v. oppose US demilitarization and democratization, including an inventory of tools of suppression at their disposal.

9) Note that the fight for social democracy in Sweden required that political organizers concentrate on building unions and a union confederation across the country for three decades before launching into the polity with a political party.

This planning sketch recognizes that much of finance-organized capital, as well as the conservative-Catholic US judiciary, and most of the polity are organized against democratic development. As well, it also recognizes historical structural shifts, including those identified by Rana, that can enable organizing toward stymied social, economic, and political democratic emancipation.

Globalization Ltd

“In terms of conventional markers of contemporary globalization such as trade, migration, investment or tourism, it is hard to find evidence of increased global integration or even of faster growth since the 1970s (thought to be the start of neoliberal globalization). In all of these forms of interaction except migration, growth has remained steady since the 1950s, and even slowed in per capita terms…And the distribution of flows between different regions of the world has remained almost steady since the 1870s…To be sure, the accumulated growth is significant, but it does not mark out a transformative moment of accelerated interaction or time space compression” ( McKeown 2007: 227).
What has changed globally since the 1970s is:
1) The growing global role of East Asia and trans-Pacific trade
2) The decline of Africa, Latin America and the ex-Soviet bloc
3) Subcontracting network expansion
4) Patterns of migration, and
5) The shape of global inequality (McKeown 2007: 227).
A globalist rather than Eurocentric approach to globalization will recognize that northern and southeastern Asia sits alongside the Americas among the world’s great frontiers. “Absolute and per capita emigration rates across Asia were as large as the transatlantic migrations and followed similar ebb and flow cycles. Manchurian soy fields, Malayan tin mines, African palm oil plantations and Siamese rice paddies were as much a part of the expanding world economy as Manchester factories and North American wheat… These migrations were part and parcel of globalization. But it was a segmented and unequal globalization” (McKeown 2007: 226).

We need to recognize “globalization as a process that generates inequalities as well as convergences” (McKeown 2007: 226). Like Eurocentric periodizations, neophilia, insistence on Newness, obscures the violence, compulsion, segmentations and hierarchies that have long accompanied globalization, and “renders past interactions invisible…The past promises and failures of civilization, colonialism and modernization to bring the world together are forgotten…This forgetting makes it possible to keep claiming endlessly (as Modernists will) that only in the present have we truly obtained the power to overcome rather than perpetuate existing patterns of inequality and segmentation, and thus to further obscure the creation and perpetuation of that inequality and segmentation” (McKeown 2007: 228).

Capitalist Murder

“Behind the self destructive behaviour, the authors say, are economic factors, including rising poverty rates, unemployment, financial insecurity, and corruption. Whereas only 4%of the population of the region had incomes equivalent to $4 (£2.50) a day or less in 1988, that figure had climbed to 32%by 1994. In addition, the transition to a market economy has been accompanied by lower living standards (including poorer diets), a deterioration in social services, and major cutbacks in health spending.” James Ciment 1999

“Though the Whites executed and starved tens of thousands of Reds after the war, they were particularly ruthless with the Women’s Guards. White soldiers raped and mutilated them before shooting them dead. Their bodies were stripped naked or twisted into obscene positions.

A 2016 study by a young historian, Marjo Liukkonen, uncovered evidence revealing that the Whites executed far more women and children in the infamous Hennala concentration camp than previously believed.” –“Finland’s Red Women,” Jacobin

A Century of U.S. Intervention Created the Immigration Crisis.


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Protecting capitalist sovereignty

“There is an ethical and logical consistency to interventionism: a moral common sense that, just as borders shouldn’t divide markets or capital, they shouldn’t protect repressors and illegitimate governments. The world should do something to stop barbarism. The rhetorical consistency of such common sense only amplifies the hypocrisy and double standards – not to mention the often disastrous consequences – of its application. Economic globalisation promised a prosperous, borderless world, even as its promoters signed a raft of treaties that freed capital but effectively criminalised (while forcing) labour mobility. Humanitarian interventionism justifies itself by a universal ideal morally superior to the concept of national sovereignty, but then picks its targets – Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and now Venezuela – according to criteria that have to do with something other than universalism.” —Greg Grandin, 2019, LRB February 8.

“Hull – who, according to his adviser Ernest Gruening, spoke a born and bred Tennessee gentry lisp, dropping g’s and wrestling with r’s – objected to the idea of Latin American sovereignty: ‘What am ah goin’ to do when chaos breaks out in one of those countries and armed bands go woamin’ awound, burnin’, pillagin’ and murdewin’ Amewicans?’ Gruening says Hull asked him. ‘How can I tell mah people that we cain’t intervene?’ ‘Mr Secretary,’ Gruening answered, ‘that usually happens after we have intervened…

(Hull announced to the Latin American leaders) that the United States would henceforth ‘shun and reject’ the ‘so-called right-of-conquest … The New Deal indeed would be an empty boast if it did not mean that.’”

“In its 1917 constitution, Mexico was the first country in the world to adopt the principle that absolute sovereignty over natural resources belongs to the state. Venezuelan policymakers had pushed for national control of its petroleum reserves since at least the 1930s. The United Nations accepted the legitimacy of resource sovereignty in 1962.”–Grandin

In the 1970s, some world leaders openly entertained the idea of repatriating what were called “excess profits,” to support the democratic distribution of sovereign agency. That got them assassinated by the US global police.

what’s happened to sovereignty:

“Luigi Einaudi, the US ambassador to the OAS, explicitly reclaimed for the United States the right to intervene in the affairs of another country because it considered the quality of its sovereignty unworthy of recognition. ‘Today, we are … living in historic times,’ he said, ‘a time when a great principle is spreading across the world like wildfire. That principle, as we all know, is the revolutionary idea that people, not governments, are sovereign.’”

But which people, Einaudi? Aye, there’s the silent rub at the black heart of all liberal abstraction. The capitalist state exclusively protects that sovereignty distributed globally by market power, with discretionary allowances for useful justice exceptions on the left tail of the distribution. The “New Constitutionalism” Stephen Gill and Isabella Bakker called it back in the 90s. The imperial JS Mill liberal state.

It’s time to talk about the maldistribution of sovereignty across people. That is the way that we will get back to recognizing what Latin Americans recognized: A democratic distribution of sovereign agency requires a state, embedded in a regional coalition, that can both protect citizenship and facilitate working-class (peasant/indigenous) internationalism.

The justice distinction has to be whether and to what extent border controls and citizenship rights turn immigrants into a disadvantaged underclass, or continue to provide them enabling, if graduating positive rights. We need to clarify, in the case of European countries, whether there is a distinction between the treatment of European migrants and semi-permanent immigrants. Like usual, there’s no appreciable analysis of this central distinction in Jacobin’s recent mystifying reporting on Denmark. Just an assumption that if we aren’t centering the justice of the exception (eg. capitalists, migrants, etc.), we are committing injustice. It takes a real conservative to believe that the justice of the average has to exclude the justice of the left-tail exception.

‘Hostile attitudes toward multiculturalism are presented as legitimate concerns (by the Danish Soc Dems): “you are not a bad person because you don’t want to see your country being fundamentally transformed.”’

Was this written for Jacobin by a Laclau-Mouffe Gramscian or by a moonlighting Davos PR staff member? No one could tell, and that’s a problem. Why reduce resistance to the absolutely-undeniable accretion of top-down transformation to nothing more than a “hostile attitude toward multiculturalism” unless you’re an already-co-opted part of a deep bullshit problem? There is something truly, deeply, madly wrong today with our 100% elite-position/interest understanding of internationalism strictly as cosmopolitanism.

Why is no one concerned about working class reproduction? Why are we directed to pour our charitable hearts like a blessing of syrup over capital reproduction via population disruption and mobilization? If the Danish government can figure out that Africa is biologically reproducing, then it can be pushed to figure out how to circulate wealth to solidaristically support working class reproduction in Africa.

Don’t tell me physical movement is the greatest freedom, Thomas Hobbes. I have never met an African immigrant would wouldn’t prefer to return to and live in Africa if non-elite social reproduction were not being essentially fucked with there by our governments, economists, militaries, and bosses. I meet way more African immigrants, and listen to them, than most other people. They don’t want our junky lives. They just want to be in the calmer eye of the storm. Founded on conservative European philosophy centering the justice of the exception, culturalist interpretations of state border politics magnify political symbolism, fail to contextualize politics, misidentify immigrants and migrant interests with capitalist interests, and misplace egaliberte solidarity.

Voting rights for non-residents is not a great achievement for democracy. A great achievement for democracy would be if residents had the right to vote, which they do not have in Canada. Democratic countries, like Sweden, protect voting rights for residents, not for expat capitalists.

Voting rights for non-residents is a great achievement for financial metropoles and Treasure Islands, global capitalism, or, technically speaking, Herrenvolk democracy, which is only democracy in the thin, dubious sense that property rights for slavers is “democracy,” and political patronage = “free speech.” This is what you would expect out of a liberal country, where the sine qua non is absolute private property right.

“The combination of exclusive union representation, mandatory agency fees, no-strike clauses and “management’s rights” (were) the foundation of (the peculiar and now dismissed) American labor laws…

“It reward(ed) the unions with a guaranteed right to exist and a reliable base of fee-paying membership. But it reward(ed) employers with the far more valuable guarantee of the right to direct the uninterrupted work of the enterprise while union leadership has to tamp down rank-and-file gripes and discord for the length of the contract.” –Shaun Richman. 2018. “If the Supreme Court rules against unions…” The Washington Post, March 1.

The US Constitution no longer applies in the areas in which 2/3 of the US population resides. –ACLU, “The Constitution in the 100-mile Border Zone.”


Culturalist Analysis of the Social: Immigration Politics through a Cultural-determinist Lens

RE: The Jacobin article on Danish immigration politics by cultural scholars:

The justice distinction has to be whether and to what extent border controls and citizenship rights turn immigrants into a disadvantaged underclass, or continue to provide them enabling, if graduating positive rights. (As well: Does the analysis and policy distinguish between sovereign European transmigration and the (semi-)permanent immigrants displaced from their home? It should.)

Like usual, there’s no appreciable analysis of this central distinction in the Jacobin article. Just an assumption that if we aren’t centering the justice of the exception (eg. capitalists, migrants, etc.), we are committing injustice. It takes a real conservative to believe that the justice of the average (structurally) has to exclude the justice of the left-tail exception.

‘Hostile attitudes toward multiculturalism are presented as legitimate concerns: “you are not a bad person because you don’t want to see your country being fundamentally transformed.”’ –Agustín & Jørgensen 2019

Was this written for Jacobin by a Laclau-Mouffe Gramscian or by a moonlighting Davos PR staff member? No one could tell, and that is a problem. Why reduce resistance to the absolutely-undeniable accretion of top-down transformation to nothing more than a “hostile attitude toward multiculturalism”? There is something truly, deeply, madly wrong today with our 100% elite-position/interest reduction of internationalism to cosmopolitanism.

Why is no one on the left today concerned about working class reproduction besides feminists and ecologists? Adam Smith was already concerned about this central capitalist problem in 1776. Alexandra Kollontai laid the issue out masterfully in 1915. Why are we directed–by leftists–to pour our charitable hearts like a blessing of syrup over capitalist reproduction, this time via population disruption and mobilization? Are immigrants traumatized? Yes! So are the sobbing crime victims that cops parade into city councils when they’re lobbying for more Nightwatchman state budget. Yes, the treatment of immigrants is a crisis! No, that does not mean that we need to line up behind capitalist justice framing and policy.

If the Danish government can figure out that Africa is biologically reproducing, then it can be pushed to figure out how to circulate wealth to solidaristically support working class reproduction in Africa. How did continental Europe get rich in the 20th century? In large part, the second-order capitalist societies fought wars against the primary Anglo-American capitalist core until the US shared some of the wealth under the Marshall Plan. We know Anglo-America won’t do it without getting fire-bombed, but what if Europe circulated wealth without having to go war with Africa? And if Africa was brought into the core capitalist economy, that would significantly undermine biological reproduction incentives.

To stay relevant, Social Democrats should distinguish themselves from the Right by always including international grants and cross-borders working class organization and capacity-building with citizenship rights policies. (Though that would put them afoul of Anglo-American police states running down democracies to protect global capitalists.)

To stay relevant, Social Democrats should distinguish themselves from the Right by making an emphatic distinction between education for democratic development (educating for dispositions to exchange information, ideas, and grievances, remaking democracy anew, per Dewey 1916) and cheap, ugly symbolic theater victimizing immigrants (dumbshit handshake and head scarf politics and policies).

I have never met an African immigrant who wouldn’t prefer to return to and live in Africa if non-elite social reproduction were not being destroyed there by our governments, economists, militaries, and bosses. African migrants just want to be in the calmer eye of the storm. We are not doing anyone* working class any favors with the Open Border smallholder/worker physical-mobilization policy agenda, because it’s an easement attached to the agenda of a concentrated if rivalristic ownership of the whole world. Whether branded or de facto, Open Borders have accompanied the decimation of positive citizenship rights, and in capitalism, where Anglo-American states primarily protect the asset-backed citizenship of global capitalists, there are both structural and political reasons for that.

I can grant that, perhaps, there is some non-linear probability that (let’s face it) forcibly pushing smallholder and propertyless populations around, and killing off positive citizenship rights and the non-managerial labor aristocracy in core nationalist communities (All the better to expropriate/privatize their private and public assets, my dear!) could hypothetically accompany the restoration of working class internationalism–or rather, submission to cosmopolitanism, per cultural Pollyannaism–and even mystically produce a socially-rational revolution. But why is it that concrete internationalism is never the Open Borders advocates’ focus? Are they playing some kind of 16th-dimension chess? Or do they not know what game they are playing into? Or are they already-coopted tools? My money is on international Democrat Party policy coordination and consulting. The Dem Party strategy model is that while today, the nearly-rightsless but plucky funnel of immigrant population will toil in shit jobs, providing labor for a competitive small business economy and cheap consumer services to otherwise-redundant native workers, tomorrow the nearly-rightsless but plucky diverse population of smallholders and their hyper-exploited workers will prioritize immigrant identity and physical-mobility freedom, loyally voting for the immigration-positive liberal parties that chiefly manage the polity and imperial warfare for global monopoly finance, tech, and supporting capitalist interests.

Founded on conservative European philosophy centering the justice of the exception (tho wrapped in a Gramsci martyr flag), culturalist interpretations of state border politics magnify political symbolism, fail to contextualize politics, fail to distinguish conservative, liberal and egaliberte fundamentals, misidentify immigrants and migrant interests with capitalist interests, occlude internationalism behind cosmopolitanism, lean heavily on manipulative moralism, and misplace egaliberte solidarity.

* Note: Though it was disruptive of Mexican workers’ home communities, the American business class and its state were arguably doing Mexican migrants a solid to push and pull them into returning to California, which was part of their own society’s territory. On the other hand, it was not much of a favor to send them to work as slaves in Texan prisons.


Video from Davos, at The Guardian. And a theme song for Davos from Jarvis Cocker.

Observers and interests frrom JJ Rousseau to Adam Smith (1776) to Thomas Dewey (1915) to the socialist feminists to policymakers to commercial advertisers have noticed that newcomers, whether youth or immigrants, remake a society. As Dewey pointed out, how we incorporate newcomers determines whether we can even create or sustain substantial democracy.
Recognizing that democracy requires newcomer socialization into dispositions for democratic development, for example, the US and other liberal Anglo countries have long stipulated political conditions on migration, including prohibiting anticapitalist immigration. The US heavily subsidized casino-capitalist Cubans, including mafia, influentially remaking American politics, helping steer the US in the 20th century back to a more properly Anglo JS Mill version of liberalism allowing the US state to prioritize protection of the private property and negative rights of a global cosmopolitan citizenry.
“Nearly a billion dollars (of taxpayper money) was made available under the (US’s) Cuban Refugee Program to the first generation of Cuban immigrants. This was done in order to demonstrate the superiority of the capitalist system amidst the tremendous ideological offensive mounted by Moscow under the Khrushchev Administration.”
While Undesirable Cuban immigrants were incarcerated in Gitmo, “Cubans arriving in the United States have enjoyed unique and virtually unlimited rights to immediate or rapid residency, Green Card work permits, and a broad package of benefits, regardless of their legal status.” The Border has always been Open. Open Borders is not the issue for radical democrats.
(From Richard Dello Buono’s review of Eckstein’s Dem Party-sponsored “The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban-Americans Changed the US and Their Homeland,” where Eckstein forwards the Dem Party argument for recolonizing Cuba to a “moderate” Cuban-American audience).